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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring the nature of normativity in ethics and
epistemology, with an emphasis on insights that can be gleaned by comparing and contrasting
debates within those two fields.
In chapter 1, I consider particularism, a relatively recent view which holds that, because reasons
for action and belief are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest for a general theory
of what one ought to do or believe is doomed for failure. In making these claims, particularists
assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units
undergirding all other normative relations. However, I argue that the claims particularists make
about the behavior of reasons undermines the very framework within which they make those
claims, thus leaving them without a coherent notion of a reason for action or belief.
Chapter 2 concerns a problem arising for certain theories that take the opposite extreme of
particularism and posit a fully general theory of what one ought to believe or do. In the epistemic
realm, one such theory is process reliabilism. A well-known difficulty for process reliabilism is the
generality problem: the problem of determining how broadly or narrowly to individuate the process
by which a given belief is formed. Interestingly, an exactly parallel problem faces one of the most
dominant contemporary ethical theories, namely Kantianism. I show how, despite their seeming
differences, process reliabilism and Kantianism possess a markedly similar structure, and then use
this similarity in structure to assess the prospects that each has of ever solving its version of the
generality problem.
Finally, in chapter 3, I consider a recent argument by Timothy Williamson that what it would
be rational for one to do or believe is not luminous, in the following sense: it can be rational for one
to do or believe something, without one's being in a position to know that it is. Careful attention
to the details of Williamson's argument reveals that he can only establish this limit to our
knowledge by taking for granted certain controversial claims about the limits of belief.
Thesis Supervisor: JudithJarvis Thomson
Title: Professor of Philosophy

5Acknowledgements
Two people deserve thanks above all others for helping me complete this dissertation: my wife,
Carol, and my primary thesis adviser, Judith Jarvis Thomson. Due to an unfortunate encounter
with a certain tick-borne illness, finishing this dissertation proved much more difficult than
expected, and I don't think I could have done it without Carol's love and support. Judy, on the
other hand, devoted vast amounts of time in discussing this work with me, and I feel that her
boundless demand for rigor has made me much of the philosopher that I am today.
I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Alex Byrne and Caspar Hare,
as well as those faculty in the MIT philosophy department with whom I discussed some or all of
this work: Stephen Yablo, Robert Stalnaker, Agustin Rayo, Vann McGee, Rae Langton, Richard
Holton, and Ned Hall. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to many of my fellow graduate students
while at MIT for their help, including Clare Batty, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan,
Leah Henderson,JamesJohn, Sarah Moss, Bernhard Nickel, Dilip Ninan, Chris Robichaud, Eric
Swanson, and Seth Yalcin. Tyler in particular deserves singling out for having commented on
multiple versions of every single chapter of this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my
mother, Terrell Sundermann, and my father, Nihat Berker.

Table of Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgements
1. Particular Reasons
1. Introduction ...............................................
2. The Generalized Weighing Framework .........................
3. Particularism about Reasons for Action .........................
4. Weak Holism about Reasons for Action .........................
5. The Argument from Cases ....................................
6. The Argument from a General Holism ..........................
7. Whither Non-Combinatorialism? ..............................
8. Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action? .....
9. A Newtonian Analogy .......................................
10. Giving Up Non-Combinatorialism? Or Moving Beyond Weighing? ....
2. General Processes, Specific Maxims
1. Introduction ..............................................
2. The Generality Problem for Reliabilism: An Initial Characterization ...
3. The Generality Problem for Kantian Ethics: An Initial Characterization
4. The Need for a Deeper Characterization of Each Problem ............
5. Alston's Attempted Solution ..................................
6. Structural Similarities Between the Two Problems ..................
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
...........9
.. .. ..... .. 13
........... 18
...........20
...........23
...........30
...........37
........... 40
...........51
........... 55
61
........... 61
........... 63
........... 66
........... 69
...........71
........... 76
Desiderata for a Successful Solution to Either Problem ......................
First Neo-Kantian Strategy: Privileging a Certain Level of Generality ...........
Second Neo-Kantian Strategy: Counterfactual Tests ........................
Third Neo-Kantian Strategy: The First-Person Perspective ...................
Toward a General Hypothesis on the Origins of the Generality Problem ........
3. Luminous Conditions
1. Introduction .....................................................
2. W illiamson's Core Argument ........................................
3. Narrowing the Target ..............................................
4. Coarse-G rained Safety .............................................
5. Fine-G rained Safety ...............................................
6. Do the Relevant Constitutive Connections Obtain? .......................
7. Coda: The Lustrous and the Luminous ................................
... 79
... 81
... 84
... 86
... 91
99
... 99
..100
..105
..106
.. 114
.124
..128
References 133

Chapter 1: Particular Reasons
1. Introduction
Many, if not most, fields of human inquiry are guided by a search for unity. Whether one is studying
economics or biology, philosophy or physics, it seems entirely unsatisfactory to say that instances of a
given phenomenon (be it inflation or evolution, personal identity or proton decay) form a motley crew
with no discernable underlying unity. What we usually want is a common explanation for how the various
instances of the phenomenon hang together--some general principle linking those instances to one
another-and to insist that such an explanation or principle is not in the offing would seem to invite
skepticism about the reality of the very phenomenon being investigated.
In ethics, this pressure toward unification takes its starkest form in the long-standing tradition that
sees the field as a search for a unified theory of the moral realm, as a quest for a "supreme principle of
morality" (as Kant called it) that would give us a single, universal criterion for rightness and wrongness in
action. This principle could then be used to discover which of the actions available to us in a given
circumstance are right and which are wrong, and also to justiz (both to ourselves and to others) why,
exactly, the right actions are right and the wrong ones wrong. The two best-known attempts at such a
single principle of morality are Kant's categorical imperative and Bentham's principle of utility, but this
tradition lives on to this day, with many contemporary Kantians and consequentialists, among others,
actively searching ]for what they take to be the most plausible version of a fully unified theory of morality.
In the past century a growing number of moral philosophers have expressed dissatisfaction with
this monist tradition according to which there must be a single fundamental principle of morality. Often
influenced by Aristotle, these critics find the monist principles thus far proposed unbearably crude and
contend that any attempt to reduce morality to a single principle will inevitably leave something out.
Monism seems to assume that there exists a moral algorithm, and if only we knew it, we could turn the
crank and deduce for any given situation what we should and should not do. But, these critics insist,
morality isn't the sort of thing that can be reduced to an algorithm; it isn't the sort of thing that could in
principle be programmed into a computer. Rather, what is supposedly needed to arrive at the correct
moral verdict in a given situation is moral wisdom-a kind of sensitivity to the morally relevant considerations
present in the case at hand, and an ability to properly judge the right thing to do in light of those
considerations.
Among the philosophers sympathetic to this sort of criticism of the monist tradition, some have
chosen to embrace a pluralist approach to ethics such as that found in W. D. Ross' theory of prima facie
duties or in some (but not all) forms of virtue ethics, where instead of one, solitary moral principle there is
posited to be a plurality of basic principles-an "unconnected heap of duties," to use David
McNaughton's apt expression, that are all equally fundamental.' These differing duties can in principle
conflict, but in such cases there are claimed to be no finitely codifiable rules dictating which duty trumps
or outweighs the others, for otherwise the basic principles together with the weighing rules could be
conjoined into a single master principle. Instead, what is allegedly needed in cases of conflict is the ability
to accurately judge whether, say, one's duty of beneficence to perform some action outweighs one's duty
ofjustice to avoid it, or whether it would be better in this situation to be honest than to be loyal. The hope
is that by allowing for a plurality of equally fundamental moral principles we can better cover the entire
moral landscape, while at the same time providing an ineliminable role for moral judgment in deciding
what one ought to do in a given circumstance.
In recent years, though, an even more radical break with the monist tradition has begun to
develop.2 According to what has come to be known as moral particularism, even the pluralist's search for a
multitude of basic moral principles is in vain. It's not that we need seven, or 27, or even 207 fundamental
moral principles to fully capture the moral realm; rather, the particularist insists that no finite number of
finite, exceptionless principles could account for all the truths there are about right and wrong, good and
bad, virtue and vice. In the particularist's eyes, it's judgment all the way down: judgment as to which
features of a given situation are morally relevant, and judgment as to how the features that are morally
relevant play off each other to determine what one should and should not do in that situation. If the
I McNaughton (1996).
2 See Dancy (1981, 1983, 1993, 2000a, 2001, 2004); Kihlbom (2002); Lance & Little (2004, 2006a, 2006b); Little (2000,
2001a, 2001b); McNaughton (1988); and McNaughton & Rawling (2000). The possibility of such a position was first pointed out
and given the name "particularism" in Hare (1963), p. 18.
particularist is right, any attempt to reduce morality to principles, even the sort of pro tanto principles
appealed to by Rossian pluralists, will inevitably lead to error: the features that make something good are
just so complicated, the conditions under which an action is right just so variegated, and the properties
that make a person virtuous just so nuanced, that the moral realm resists capture by any finite number of
finite principles. Therefore the pluralist's quest for a disconnected heap of duties is just as misguided as the
monist's dream of a grand unified moral theory.
Such is the particularist's challenge to both monist and pluralist approaches to ethics. But it is one
thing to have a sneaking suspicion that there are no substantive moral principles-one thing to place one's
bets, as it were, on none ever being found-and quite another thing to adequately establish that this must
be so. The main particularist strategy is to argue for their claims about principles by first attempting to
secure certain claims about reasons. More precisely, full-blooded moral particularism is not one thesis, but
rather a cluster of three related theses. Roughly stated, these theses are:
particularism about reasons for action: Whether a given feature of an action provides a reason for or
against acting in that way-as well as how all the relevant reasons combine to yield an
action's overall moral status-is an irreducibly context-dependent matter.
particularism about moral principles: There are no substantial, finite, exceptionless moral principles (or
at least we should not expect there to be any).
the particularist moral epistemology: Knowledge of what one ought to do at a given time is attained by
directly attending to the morally relevant features of the particular situation that one is in,
not by subsuming that situation under general principles. 3
Particularists usually proceed byfirst arguing for particularism about reasons for action, and then insisting
that particularism about moral principles and the particularist moral epistemology follow from that view;
3 See Little (2001a), p. 32, for a similar tripartite division among the particularists' claims. Exact formulations of
particularism about moral principles vary significantly from particularist to particularist (and even within the work of the same
particularist over time); see McKeever & Ridge (2005a) for a helpful discussion of the various possibilities.
A number of philosophers who do not consider themselves full-fledged particularists have recently endorsed one or
another of the three central particularist doctrines while remaining agnostic about, or even explicitly opposed to, the other two.
For instance, Cullity (2002) presents an argument for a weak version of particularism about reasons for action while remaining
silent on the subject of particularism about moral principles and the particularist moral epistemology, whereas Jackson, Pettit &
Smith (2000) appear willing to endorse some form of particularism about reasons for action despite explicitly arguing against
particularism about moral principles. On the other side, Holton (2002) explores the plausibility of a version of particularism about
moral principles while remaining silent on the subject of particularism about reasons for action and the particularist moral
epistemology, whereas Crisp (2000) and Raz (2000) appear willing to endorse some form of particularism about moral principles
despite explicitly arguing against particularism about reasons for action. Finally, although several of the articles reprinted in
McDowell (1998) express sympathy for positions very similar to particularism about moral principles and the particularist moral
epistemology, in conversation McDowell openly disavows particularism about reasons for action.
indeed, that is the general argumentative strategy pursued by the most prominent particularist, Jonathan
Dancy, and it is echoed by many of his most ardent allies.4 The purpose of this chapter will be to assess
that strategy by considering the case that particularists make for their views about reasons for action.
The structure of this chapter will be as follows. First (§§2-4), some time will be spent carefully
formulating particularism about reasons for action. I think that in the current debates about particularism,
insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that particularists frame their entire position within an
unargued-for framework according to which reasons are the fundamental normative units whose
interactions determine, through a metaphorical balancing of the weight of reason, all other normative
properties and relations. Making explicit this framework both clarifies the assumptions of the debate, and
allows one to formulate the central tenets of particularism in a perspicuous manner. Second (§§5-7), I will
consider the particularists' two main methods of arguing for particularism about reasons for action. Both
of these argument will be found wanting, but the main reason for considering them is that one way in
which they fail points the way to a deeper problem for particularism. The deeper problem is this (§§8-9):
the position that particularists seek to establish about the nature of reasons threatens to undermine the
very framework within which they attempt to establish that position, thus leaving them with no coherent
notion of a reason for action; or, at least, so I shall argue. Finally (§10), I will consider an important reply
to this charge of incoherence, and close with some speculation about the tenability of what I take to be the
real position that particularists are after.
By focusing in this way on the particularists' views about reasons, I will for the most part be
ignoring the significant further question as to whether particularism about reasons for action genuinely
entails particularism about moral principles and the particularist moral epistemology. 5 However, I believe
that there is enough cause for concern over the plausibility and even coherence of the particularists' views
about practical reasons to render this further question essentially moot. The case for particularism about
" Dancy's defense of all three particularist doctrines via a defense of particularism about reasons for action can be found in
his (1983, 1993, 2000a, 2004), among other places. Other particularists who follow Dancy's lead in pursuing this strategy include
Kihlbom (2002), Lance & Little (2004, 2006a, 2006b), Little (2000, 2001a, 2001b), and McNaughton (1988).
5 For arguments that such an entailment does not hold, seeJackson, Pettit & Smith (2000), pp. 96-99; Holton (2002), p. 197,
n. 12; Vaiyrynen (2004); and McKeever & Ridge (2005b).
reasons for action is sufficiently fraught with difficulties that unless that position is drastically amended or
the arguments for it radically improved, the version of the particularist project that starts by first
attempting to secure particularism with respect to reasons is in danger of never getting off the ground.
2. The Generalized Weighing Framework
Particularists typically formulate their views within the confines of a certain widely accepted framework
for how reasons for action function. Thus it will help to outline this framework before laying out the
particularists' own position on the nature of reasons.6
Suppose Andy is trying to decide which of two apartments to rent. How might he go about
making that decision? One natural suggestion is that Andy should do something like the following. On a
piece of paper he should make four columns and, in the first column, write down the positive elements-
or "pros"--associated with taking the first apartment; in the second column, write down the negative
elements-or "cons"-associated with taking the first apartment; in the third column, write down the pros
of taking the second apartment; and, in the fourth column, write down the cons of taking the second
apartment. Next, he should decide the weight of each item in the four columns-that is, decide how
heavily each pro or con will impact his ultimate decision. Finally, he should survey the relative weights of
the various pros and cons, and come to a final decision about which option has the most favorable
balance of considerations in its favor. Note that in this process Andy need not be able to represent the
weight of each pro or con with anything as precise as a numerical value. Note, also, that the final
determination of which option is the weightiest need not involve anything as mechanical as adding up the
weights of a given option's pros and subtracting the weights-of its cons in order to determine a total weight
that can be compared with the total weight of the other option. But despite these deviations from a strict
analogy with a weighing of masses on a scale, there still seems to be a useful sense in which we can say,
metaphorically at least, that Andy is weighing his options--or, as it is commonly put, that he is weighing
the reasons for and against each alternative to see where the balance lies.
6 See Broome (2004), §3, and Horty (2004), §3.3, for similar accounts of the general framework assumed by particularists in
their discussions of reasons for action.
According to what I will call the generalized weighing model of practical deliberation, all practical
deliberation does-or at least should-take the above form. Whenever an agent is in a given situation,
there are a variety of actions that the agent might choose to perform in that situation.7 Each of these
actions in turn possesses a variety of non-normative properties, such as the property of causing pleasure in
someone or the property of being a telling of a lie. According to the generalized weighing model, some of
these non-normative features give rise to a reason in favor of performing the action possessing them, and
some of the features give rise to a reason against performing the action possessing them. 8, 9 Moreover, each
of these reasons has a metaphorical weight or strength corresponding to how heavily it counts in favor of or
tells against the action it counts in favor of or tells against. Finally, the generalized weighing model holds
that each available action's overall moral status (such as its being right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden,
permissible or supererogatory) can be determined by balancing the weights of the relevant reasons against
each other in order to see where the overall weight of reason lies.'l When so construed, the generalized
weighing model is a widely held conception of practical deliberation with an undeniable attraction to it;
indeed, talk of reasons and their weights almost makes this model seem inevitable."
As presented thus far, the generalized weighing model is an epistemological position concerning
how one does (or should) determine the overall moral status of the actions available to an agent. However,
it is also tempting to assume that the deliberative order of discovery mirrors the metaphysical order of
explanation-or in other words, it is tempting to make a slide from the epistemological claim that the overall
7 Following the particularists, I will be using the terms "situation," "circumstance," and "context" interchangeably.
8 The type of reasons under consideration are sometimes called "contributory reasons" or "pro tanto reasons" to represent the
fact that they need not be decisive reasons for a given course of action. (A slightly older term for the same notion is "prima facie
reason"-a term that was misleading, since the entities in question are not merely "at first glance" reasons, but retain their
normative force even if outweighed.) For brevity I will usually omit the "contributory" or "pro tanto" qualifier.
9 A note about the ontology of reasons: throughout I talk about the features of an action as providing (or giving rise to) reasons for
or against performing that action, and about the fact that an action would have a given feature as being a reason for or against
performing that action. By taking reasons to be facts, I am regimenting our moral terminology in a way that not all theorists
might endorse. However, nothing of consequence hangs on the particular regimentation I have settled on, and one can easily
translate my talk of reasons as facts into a terminology adverting to one's ontological category of choice.
10 My discussion here concentrates on the overall moral status of actions, but the generalized weighing model is often applied
more generally to the overall normative status of an action, such as its being what one ought (all things considered) do, or its being
what it is most in one's interests to do. Particularists usually intend their claims to extend to these normative categories as well.
II The two contemporary works most responsible, I believe, for making the generalized weighing model of deliberation as
widely accepted as it currently is are Baier (1958) and Nagel (1970), both of which quite explicitly endorse the model: see ch. 3 of
the former and ch. 7 of the latter. A more recent endorsement of essentially the same model can be found in Scanlon (1998),
pp. 65-66, and Parfit (forthcoming).
balance of reason reveals which actions are right and which actions are wrong, to the metaphysical claim that
the overall balance of reason is what makes the right actions right and the wrong actions wrong (and
similarly for other overall moral verdicts). According to what I will call the generalized weighing model of
morality, this metaphysical claim is indeed the case: the non-normative features of the actions available to
an agent in a given circumstance give rise to genuine metaphysical normative entities, called "reasons for
action," and the interplay of these reasons is what makes the available actions have the overall moral
status that they do.
To simplify our discussion, let us focus on two overall moral statuses that an action might have,
namely that of being right and that of being wrong. Also, drawing on a partial analogy with chemistry that
has become standard in the particularist literature, let us say that a reason for action has a positive or
negative valence depending on whether it is a reason for or against action, respectively. Then on the
generalized weighing model of morality, we can think of the metaphysical moral picture as having three
layers to it:
1. The underlying level: the facts about the non-normative properties of the actions available to a
given agent in a given circumstance.
2. The contributory level: the facts about the valences and weights of the reasons for and against
performing each available action, which obtain in virtue of the facts at the underlying
level.
3. The overall level: the facts about the rightness and wrongness of the available actions, which
obtain in virtue of the facts at the contributory level.12
So once this model is in place, we can say that a non-normative feature of an action that provides a reason
for acting in that way is a right-making feature, since it contributes toward the overall balance of reason in
favor of that action being such as to make the action right. Similarly, a feature that provides a reason
against an action can be said to be a wrong-making feature. What determines the rightness and wrongness of
actions on this conception is the overall balance of reason in favor of each, and what determines the
reasons for and against each action are its non-normative properties. To have a name for it, let us call the
12 Note that this talk of normative facts obtaining is all unabashedly realist-sounding; indeed, I take it to be a basic
assumption of the debate about particularism that moral realism holds. (Sometimes particularists insist that their talk of normative
facts and properties can be construed minimalistically if one has anti-realist persuasions, but whether this is really so is open to
debate.)
conjunction of the deliberative and metaphysical weighing models the generalized weighing framework.
Two slightly more concrete examples will help illustrate how the generalized weighing framework
works. Although classical utilitarians rarely talk of reasons for or against action, we can easily imagine one
way of fitting hedonistic act-utilitarianism (henceforth: utilitarianism) into the confines of the generalized
weighing framework. According to such a version of utilitarianism, there are two non-normative
properties at the underlying level that give rise to reasons for and against action at the contributory level:
the property of bringing about pleasure in someone, which always gives rise to a reason for action, and the
property of bringing about pain in someone, which always gives rise to a reason against action. The
"always" here is important: on the utilitarian story, not only is the property of bringing about pleasure in
someone right-making, but it is necessarily right-making (in every possible situation it provides a reason for
action), and not only is the property of bringing about pain in someone wrong-making, but it is necessarily
wrong-making (in every possible situation it provides a reason against action). Moreover, the utilitarian
has a correspondingly simple story about what fixes the weight of a given reason: the weight of every
reasonfor action is directly proportional to how much pleasure the action would bring about in the relevant
person, and the weight of every reason against action is directly proportional to how much pain the action
would bring about in the relevant person; indeed, we can even represent these weights with numbers if we
wish. Finally, our utilitarian holds that the overall level is determined by the contributory level in the
following manner: for each action, add up the numbers representing the weights of the reasons in favor of
acting in that way and subtract the numbers representing the weights of the reasons against; the actions
with the highest such total are right, and all other available actions are wrong.
A second ethical theory easily shoehorned into the generalized weighing framework is W. D.
Ross' theory of prima facie duties. 13 Adapted so as to involve explicit talk of reasons for action, Rossianism
maintains that there are seven sets of non-normative features that in every possible circumstance give rise
to reasons for or against the actions possessing them. For instance, on this account it follows from Ross'
13 At least since Urmson (1975), if not earlier, it has been common to reinterpret Ross' theory of prima facie duties as a theory
of (contributory orpro tanto) reasons for action.
prima facie duty of fidelity that the property of being a breaking of a promise always provides a reason
against action; from his prima facie duty of self-improvement that the property of contributing to the
improvement of one's intelligence always provides a reason for action; and so on, for all seven of Ross'
primafacie duties. ' 4 Thus in regard to what determines the valence of a given reason, the Rossian story is
similar to the utilitarian story, in that each posits a certain range of non-normative features that are
necessarily right- or wrong-making, although the Rossian list of such features is lengthier and of a more
varied nature. Moreover, Ross insists that "the ground of the actual rightness of [an] act is that, of all acts
possible for the agent in the circumstances, it is that whose primafacie rightness in the respects in which it is
prima facie right most outweighs its prima facie wrongness in any respects in which it is primafacie wrong,"
which strongly suggests that he too would determine how the facts at the overall level depend on the facts
at the contributory) level through the simple additive procedure endorsed by the utilitarian.15
Where the Rossian account diverges in spirit from the utilitarian one is in how the weight of a
given reason is determined. According to Ross, which of the various, possibly competing primafacie duties
is most binding in a particular situation depends upon "the circumstances of the case," since "for the
estimation of the comparative stringency of these primafacie obligations no general rules can ... be laid
down." 16 Thus on one plausible interpretation of Ross, he would hold that the relative weights of the
reasons stemming from his primafacie duties vary from context to context: a non-normative feature of an
action that gives rise to a reason of one weight in one situation might give rise to a reason of a different
weight in a different situation, depending on the details of the two cases. This is the sense in which Ross'
theory provides an ineliminable role forjudgment-as there are no general, context-independent rules for
how the non-normative features of an action determine the weights of the reasons for and against it,
discerning the weight of an individual reason in a given situation requires judging how demanding that
reason is in the current circumstance.' 7
14 See Ross (1930), p. 21, for the original list of Ross' seven primafacie duties.
15 Ross (1930), p. 4.6. He says something similar on p. 41.
16 Ross (1930), pp. 19, 41.
17 I have mentioned two theories that can be easily fit into the generalized weighing framework, but it is worth noting that
not all moral theories can be so easily fit into the framework. In particular, it is far from clear how to formulate Kantian ethical
3. Particularism about Reasons for Action
Particularists applaud Ross' inclusion of an ineliminable role for judgment in his theory but feel he did not
go far enough. As mentioned before, for particularists it's judgment all the way down: not only judgment
as to the weight of a given reason, but also judgment as to the valence of a reason and judgment as to how
the valences and weights of the relevant reasons play off each other to determine the overall moral status
of the available actions. Dancy summarizes the particularists' views about reasons as follows:
I see ethical particularism as merely one expression of an overall holism in the theory of normative reason.
... Such an overall holism can be expressed as follows:
1. What is a reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity [i.e. valence] in another.
2. The way in which the reasons here present combine with each other is not necessarily determinable in
any simply additive way. 18
Thus particularism about reasons for action is a two-fold thesis: it concerns both the way in which reasons
for action arise out of a situation's non-normative features, and the way in which the reasons for action
that are present in a given situation combine to yield the overall moral status of the available actions. Let
us consider each of these claims in turn.
According to what has come to be known as holism about reasons for action, 19 the very valence of the
reason (if any) provided by a given non-normative feature of an action can alter as we change contexts.
Here is one sort of example offered by particularists in support of this thesis: in most situations the fact
that an action would bring the agent pleasure is a reason in favor of performing that action, but when Jim
tortures a cat for fun, the fact that doing so brings him pleasure is (allegedly) a reason against his acting in
that way. Another example: in most situations the fact that I borrowed a book from you is a reason in favor
of my returning it to you, but if you stole the book, then the fact that I borrowed the book from you is
(allegedly) no reason at all for me to return it. The particularists' bold claim is that all reasons function in this
way: for every fact that is a reason for action in one possible context, there is another possible context in
which that same fact is either a reason against action or no reason at all, and an analogous claim is taken
theories within the generalized weighing framework without doing major damage to both the content and intent of those theories.
(For more on the structure of Kantian ethical theories, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.)
18 Dancy (2000a), p. 132.
19) Some might find the use of the label "holism" here a bit odd, since the position in question is quite different from the other
sorts of holisms that one finds in philosophy. However, by now the name "holism about reasons for action" (originally coined by
Dancy) is too firmly entrenched in the philosophical lexicon to resist.
to hold for reasons against action. So whereas our utilitarian and Rossian theories identify certain
necessarily right- and wrong-making features, particularists insist that all right-making features are only
contingently right-making, and all wrong-making features only contingently wrong-making. In sum,
particularists hold:
holism about reasons for action: For every non-normative feature of an action that gives rise to a
reason for/against action in one possible context, there is another possible context in
which that feature either gives rise to a reason of opposite valence or else provides no
reason one way or the other.20
Or as Margaret Little, another prominent particularist, puts it: "A consideration that in one context
counts for an action, can in another count against it or be irrelevant."2 1
Holism about reasons for action concerns how the facts at the contributory level depend on the
facts at the underlying level. The second half of particularism about reasons for action concerns how the
facts at the overall level depend on the facts at the contributory level. Let us call the function that takes as
input the valence and weight of all the reasons present in a given possible situation and gives as output the
rightness or wrongness of each action available in that situation the combinatorial function; given the
generalized weighing model's assumption that the facts at the contributory level determine the facts at the
overall level, such a function must exist.22 Let us say that the combinatorial function is additive if it can be
calculated by adding up the weights of the reasons in favor of each action and subtracting the weights of
20 In order to avoid certain cheap counterexamples in which one builds a complete description of a given context into the
property being considered (for instance: the property of being a telling of a lie in such-and-such a situation, where the "such-and-
such" provides an exhaustive description of some particular situation), particularists may need to restrict this thesis so that it
pertains only to non-normative features that can be specified "in finite or helpful propositional form." (The latter phrase is Little's;
see her (2000), p. 280). Because it is ancillary to my main concerns, I ignore this complication in what follows.
21 Little (2001a), p. 34.
22 Kagan (1988) uses the expression "governing function" for much the same notion, and then goes on to argue that this
function is not additive. Nagel (1970) prefers the term "combinatorial principle," but there is a worry that this choice of
terminology begs the question against the particularist by assuming that the combinatorial function can be represented as a
finitely expressible principle.
Note my talk of the combinatorial function, as opposed to a combinatorial function: since I am using the term "function" in
the mathematical sense, there is only one combinatorial function, which holds for all contexts. Suppose I ask you to think of two
natural numbers and either add the numbers together if they are both even, or multiply them if at least one is odd. Have I just
defined one function, or two functions that change depending on which numbers you choose? In the mathematical sense, there is
only one function here-only one mapping from the set of pairs of numbers you might choose to the set of numbers you might
end up with after you have done what I tell you to do. One way of representing this function is as follows:
x,) x + y if xandy are even
x
* y otherwise
Similarly, I intend there to be only one combinatorial function. Even if, intuitively, reasons combine one way in some contexts
and combine a different way in other contexts, this can always be represented by a single function from the morally relevant
factors in any given possible context to the rightness and wrongness of the actions available in that context.
the reasons against, and then assigning an overall moral status (right or wrong or neither) to a given action
on the basis of comparing the total weight of reason in favor of that action to the total weight in favor of
the other available actions. Then particularists are quite explicit in denying that the combinatorial
function is additive. 23 Moreover, their general rhetoric makes it clear that they intend to deny that the
combinatorial function can be written down in any finite formula, additive or otherwise. 24 In sum,
particularists hold:
non-combinatorialism about reasons for action: The combinatorial function for rightness and wrongness
is not finitely expressible (and so in particular, not additive).
Thus for particularists, reasons for action are inextricably context-dependent twice-over: which non-
normative features give rise to reasons for or against action varies from context to context, and how the
various reasons that are present combine to yield the overall rightness and wrongness of actions also varies
from context to context. 25 Together, the twin theses of holism and non-combinatorialism about reasons
for action make up the view that I am calling particularism about reasons for action.
4. Weak Holism about Reasons for Action
Before turning to the main arguments for particularism about reasons for action, let us take a short
digression in order to look more closely at the holist portion of that position. Not only does holism about
reasons for action need to be distinguished from a weaker-and more readily acceptable-thesis, but
pursuing this matter will allow us to introduce a distinction that will prove useful in what follows.
As stated so far, holism about reasons for action is a rather strong thesis: it maintains that all
23 In addition to the passage already quoted from Dancy (2000a), p. 132 ("The way in which the reasons here present
combine with each other is not necessarily determinable in any simply additive way"), Dancy (2004), p. 190, denies that "[o]nce
one has assessed the separate weight of each element, evaluative judgment consists of adding up the pros and cons to see which
side is weightier," and Little (2000), p. 280, rejects a view according to which each moral reason "goes in the hopper to be
weighed against whatever other independent factors happen to be present." See also Dancy (2004), pp. 15, 105-106, 127, 143.
24 Little (2000), p. 279, n. 3: "I'm reserving the 'particularist' label for those who deny codification at both levels [i.e. at both
the contributory and the overall level]." Little (2001b), pp. 166-167: "The particularist begins by rejecting attempts to codify
relations between nonmoral and moral properties. The resultant picture also leads to a rejection of efforts to systematize relations
among moral properties." Dancy's discussion in his (2004) of Kagan (1988) makes it clear that he too intends to deny that there is
a finitely expressible combinatorial function: "For the particularist, it is going to be variability all the way down" (p. 10). See also
McNaughton & Rawling (2000), p. 260, n. 12, where they claim that "[t]he relation between an agent's reasons and her
obligations is, we think, complex" and insist that there is "no weighing algorithm" for reasons.
25 It is important to notice that the type of context-dependence at issue here is very different from the sort of context-
dependence at issue in debates about epistemic contextualism. Unlike contextualists in epistemology, particularists are not making
a semantic claim about how a given word such as "knowledge" or "reason" picks out a different relation in different contexts;
rather, the context in question is the context qofthe subject, not the context ofutterance.
reason-giving features of actions are only contingently right- or wrong-making. However, might not a
particularist instead hold a weaker version of this thesis, according to which only some reason-giving
features are contingently right- or wrong-making? That is, might not a particularist instead adhere to the
following:
weak holism about reasons for action: There are some non-normative features of actions that in one
possible context give rise to a reason for/against action, and in another possible context
either gives rise to a reason of opposite valence or provide no reason one way or the
other.
Particularists and those with particularist leanings are somewhat divided over which version of the holist
thesis to hold. Dancy usually endorses the original, stronger version of holism according to which all right-
or wrong-making features are only contingently so. 26 Others only support the weaker version of the view. 27
However, this split in the particularist camp is puzzling, for two reasons. The first is that it is the stronger
version of the thesis that is needed to derive particularism about moral principles; weak holism on its own
is not enough.28 The second is that weak holism about reasons for action is such a weak thesis that almost
any moral theorist should accept it.
Suppose Tyler tells me to do something. It should be clear that, in some situations, the fact that
Tyler told me to do something is a reason in favor of acting in that way.29 For example, Tyler might be
the captain of an airplane performing an emergency landing, and I might be his co-pilot. However, it
should be equally clear that, in a multitude of other possible situations, the fact that Tyler told me to do an
26 Dancy (2000a), p. 130. Later in the same article, though, Dancy concedes that he might be forced to admit the existence of
a "privileged few" reasons whose valence is not sensitive to context, "including probably the intentional inflicting of undeserved
pain" (p. 131), and he says similar things in his (2004) at pp. 77-78. I believe Dancy should be more wary than he is of admitting,
however begrudgingly, that holism might only be true in its weaker form, for, as I will argue, not only is weak holism a trivial
thesis held by nearly all moral theorists, but moreover, only the stronger version of holism can do the work Dancy needs it to do
in securing particularism about moral principles.
27 Cullity (2002), for example, argues in favor of weak holism and against the stronger version of the thesis.
28 Proof: Suppose it turned out that the only reason-giving features of actions were the following: (a) the property of bringing
about pleasure, which always gives rise to a reason in favor of action; (b) the property of bringing about pain, which always gives
rise to a reason against action; and (c) the property of being a breaking of a promise, which gives rise to a reason against action in
some contexts and gives rise to no reason one way or the other in some other contexts. Then weak holism about reasons for
action would be true, since the property of being a breaking of a promise would be only contingently wrong-making. However,
we would also have the following two true, exceptionless principles: "For all agents A and circumstances C, if an action X
available to A in C would bring about pleasure, then that fact is a reason in favor of A's performing X in C," and "For all agents
A and circumstances C, if an action X available to A in C would bring about pain, then that fact is a reason against A's
performing X in C." So weak holism about reasons for action is compatible with the falsity of particularism about moral
principles. (After writing this chapter I discovered that McKeever & Ridge make a similar point in their (2005b), p. 96.)29 Or more precisely, and more in keeping with our previously noted regimentation of terminology (cf. n. 9): in some
situations, the fact that an action would be one that Tyler told me to do is a reason in favor of acting in that way.
action is neither a reason for nor against carrying out the action in question (say if Tyler on a whim told
me to do some utterly inane activity), or might even be a reason against performing the action (say if Tyler
is a sociopathic mass-murderer telling me to empty the contents of some canister into a town's water
supply). Or to adapt an example ofJudithJarvis Thomson's,3 0 the fact that an action would be a dancing
of a jig is a reason against acting in that way in some possible circumstances (such as when one is
attending a somber funeral), but is neither a reason for nor against acting in that way in other possible
circumstances (such as when one is in the solitude of one's own home). Examples such as these are
plentiful and should make it clear that everyone, particularist and non-particularist alike, accepts-or at least
should accept-weak holism about reasons for action. But then it becomes rather puzzling why some
philosophers have taken weak holism to be a substantive thesis worth dignifying with its own -ism and
then arguing for.
However, is weak holism at least enough to refute the utilitarian and Rossian theories we
considered earlier? After all, don't both theories assume that all right- and wrong-making features are
necessarily right- and wrong-making? In fact, they need not make any such assumption. According to the
utilitarian theory, there is one necessarily right-making property (that of bringing about pleasure in
someone) and one necessarily wrong-making property (that of bringing about pain in someone), while
according to the Rossian theory, there are seven sets of necessarily right- or wrong-making properties
corresponding to Ross' seven primafacie duties; however, neither theory is committed to these being the
only properties that are right- and wrong-making. Both theories can appeal to a distinction between basic
and derived reasons for action, and then claim that it is only the features that provide basic reasons for
action that are right- or wrong-making in all possible situations.
Let us say that the fact that action X would have feature F in circumstance C is a derived reason for
(or against) performing X in C just in case, although that fact is indeed a reason for (or against)
performing X in C, it is only a reason because: (i) if X were to have feature F in circumstance C, it would
also have some other feature G, and (ii) the fact that X would have G in C is a reason for (or against)
30 Harman & Thomson (1996), p. 193.
performing X in C. Call a reason for (or against) action that is not derived a basic reason, and call a feature
of an action that gives rise to a basic or derived reason a basically or derivatively reason-giving feature,
respectively. Then according to the utilitarian, there are only two basically reason-giving features: the
property of bringing about pleasure in someone and the property of bringing about pain in someone.
However, there are also any number of other features that in some contexts provide a derived reason for
action, due to the fact that an action's having that feature in the given context would thereby bring about
pleasure or pain; for example, consider the property of being a dancing of a jig, or of being something
Tyler told me to do. Clearly on the utilitarian's story some of these features can give rise to reasons of
opposite valences in different contexts, or even give rise to no reason at all, depending on whether an
action's possessing such a feature would bring about any pleasure or pain in the situation in question. So
the utilitarian can allow for the possibility that some derivatively reason-giving features are only
contingently right- or wrong-making; it is only the basically reason-giving features that the utilitarian insists
are necessarily right- or wrong-making. And similarly for the Rossian: she can distinguish a collection of
basically reason-giving features corresponding to Ross' seven primafacie duties, all of which are claimed to
be necessarily right- and wrong-making, from a collection of derivatively reason-giving features, some of
which may only be contingently right- or wrong-making.3 1
Thus I think we should conclude that all moral theorists who endorse the generalized weighing
framework ought to accept weak holism. The interesting question, as well as the one that is directly
relevant for establishing the rest of the particularist creed, is whether the stronger version of the holist
thesis is true. 32
5. The Argument from Cases
On, then, to the particularists' main arguments for particularism about reasons for action. Recall that the
31 Note that once we make a basic/derived reason distinction, to avoid overcounting issues only basic reasons should be
inputted into the combinatorial function that determines the rightness and wrongness of the actions available to the agent.32 What about a version of holism, intermediate in strength between the two versions discussed here, which insists that some(though not necessarily all) basic reasons switch in valence from context to context? Such a thesis is controversial enough to be
interesting, but the same example used in n. 28 to show that weak holism is compatible with the falsity of particularism about
moral principles can likewise show that this intermediate version of holism is compatible with the falsity of that thesis.
view consists of the following two theses:
particularism about reasons for action:
1. holism about reasons for action: For every non-normative feature of an action that gives rise to
a reason for/against action in one possible context, there is another possible
context in which that feature either gives rise to a reason of opposite valence or
else provides no reason one way or the other.
2. non-combinatorialism about reasons for action: The combinatorial function for rightness and
wrongness is not finitely expressible (and so in particular, not additive).
Particularists have two main positive arguments for particularism about reasons for action, both of which
originate in Dancy's writings: the first proceeds by appealing to our moral intuitions about cases, the
second by appealing to a general holism about normative reasons (both for action and for belief). In this
section I consider the first of these positive arguments; in the next I consider the second.
By far the most prevalent particularist strategy in arguing for particularism about reasons for
action is to cite a host of examples allegedly supporting the view.3 3 Or rather, the most prevalent
particularist strategy in arguing for the holist half of that view is to cite a host of examples, since the
particularist who appeals to examples usually insists on the general truth of particularism about reasons
for action without actually offering any examples in support of non-combinatorialism. The locus classicus
for such an argument by cases is chapter 4 of Dancy's book Moral Reasons, where Dancy opens his defense
of particularism by providing a series of cases designed to illustrate the ways in which reasons can change
or lose their valence from context to context, and many of the examples Dancy gives in this chapter have
become oft-repeated staples of the particularist repertoire. Each example works by fixing on a feature that
in many circumstances appears to provide a reason for (or against) performing the action possessing it,
and then pointing to a case in which that feature is claimed either to give rise to a reason against (or for)
performing the action possessing it, or else not to provide a reason one way or the other. Obviously none
of these examples has any direct bearing on the truth of non-combinatorialism, but do they at least
establish holism?
All of the examples that Dancy proposes in chapter 4 of Moral Reasons, as well as every other
33 See, among other places, Dancy (1993), pp. 56, 60-62; Kihlbom (2002), pp. 40-46; Lance & Little (2006b), p. 579-581;
Little (2000), pp. 280-281; Little (2001a), p. 34-35; Little (2001b), p. 165; and McNaughton (1988), pp. 192-194.
particularist example I have encountered in the literature, fall into three categories. The cases in the first
category all involve reasons that almost any moral theorist would hold to be derived, and so fail to serve as
part of an adequate inductive basis for the claim that all reasons for action, be they basic or derived, can
change or lose their valence with changes in context. For instance, one of the examples Dancy cites is the
following:
... that we did this last time can be a reason for doing the same this time, but sometimes it will be a reason
for doing something different. Whether it is so or not will depend on other features of the case.34
The example is intended to work as follows: we are supposed to accept that in some circumstances the fact
an action would be one we have done before is a reason in favor of performing the action (say, if we find it
comforting to do the same thing we have always done in the past), and that in other circumstances the fact
an action would be one we have done before is a reason against performing the action (say, if our former
practices have grown tedious and we yearn for something new). However, it should be clear that in either
case the action's being one we have done before provides a reason for or against doing that action only
because there is some other feature that the action possesses in virtue of its being one that we have done
before, such as its being tedious or comfortable. But this is just to say that the feature Dancy has fixed on
is only derivatively reason-giving in either situation, and I have already argued that everyone should recognize
that some derivatively reason-giving features are only contingently right- or wrong-making. The real issue
is whether there are any basically reason-giving features that are contingently right- or wrong-making.
The second category of cases avoids this failing, for the examples in this group fix on features
involving pain or pleasure and thus succeed in isolating features that some moral theorists claim to be
basically reason-giving. One such example is the following, which Dancy gets from David McNaughton:
Consider the suggestion that we have more reason to have public executions of convicted rapists if the event
would give pleasure both to the executioner and to the crowds that would no doubt attend. Surely this
pleasure is a reason against rather than a reason for; pleasure at a wrong action compounds the wrong.35
Dancy's claim here is that, in such a case, the fact that an action (performing a public execution) would
34 Dancy (1993), p. 61.
35 Ibid. Note that if the passage is read most literally, the action under consideration would seem to be our scheduling of public
executions ("we have more reason to have public executions"), but Dancy's subsequent discussion makes it clear that the action he
intends to be assessing the reasons for and against doing is in fact the executioner's performing of the public execution.
cause pleasure in some people (the executioner and the spectators) is a reason against performing that
action, whereas in many other cases the fact that an action would cause pleasure in some people is a
reason in favor of performing that action. Now if Dancy's interpretation of this case is correct, then he has
succeeded in establishing that a feature that some theorists insist to be basically reason-giving is only
contingently right-making, for utilitarians, at least, hold that bringing about pleasure in someone is always
a basically reason-giving feature of an action. 36 However, utilitarians need not accept Dancy's construal of
the case at hand.
To begin with, a utilitarian might challenge Dancy's intuitions about the case. I find that very few
people share Dancy's firm intuition that the execution's causing pleasure in the onlookers actually
constitutes a reason against performing the execution. But even if the utilitarian concedes that many people
share Dancy's intuition, the utilitarian has available to her a plausible way of explaining that intuition
away. A standard utilitarian move is to distinguish between the rightness or wrongness of an action and
the praise- or blameworthiness of the individual performing that action, or more generally, to distinguish
between evaluations of actions and evaluations of agents.3 7 With this distinction in hand, the utilitarian
can reply to Dancy that the fact that the execution would cause pleasure in the executioner and the
spectators does, in fact, count as a reason to perform the public execution, albeit one with such little
weight in its favor that it is easily overridden by other considerations so as still to yield the result that it
would be wrong to carry out the execution. However, the utilitarian might continue, the fact that the
executioner and the crowd would derive pleasure from watching the execution is also a reason to judge
poorly about their character, and it is this latter reason that Dancy is confusing with a reason against
performing the execution. In this way the utilitarian can disarm Dancy's example by denying in a
principled way his intuition about the case, and similar considerations can be employed against the
particularists' other examples in which the causing of pleasure is alleged to give rise to a reason against (or
the causing of pain to a reason for) a given action.
36 Or at least those who accept the generalized weighing framework do.
37 This move traces at least as far back as Mill (1863/1987), ch. 2.
Thus the examples in the second category would only tell against utilitarian theories of basic
reasons, and even then the utilitarian has ample resources available to her with which to disarm those
examples. Similar comments apply to the third group of cases, all of which appeal to the sorts of features
that only a Rossian would claim provide a basic reason for or against action. Suppose I promised to do
something, and performing action X in circumstance C would involve breaking that promise. Then
according to most Rossians, the fact that X would involve breaking a promise is a basic reason against so
acting. However, suppose the promise was made under duress-what then? Most particularists insist that
in that case, the fact that X would involve breaking a promise is neither a reason for nor against
performing X, since the promise in question was ill-gotten. Thus we appear to have a feature (being a
breaking of a promise) that in some contexts provides a basic reason against action, or at least does so on a
Rossian account, but in other contexts provides no reason one way or the other.3 8
However, as with the examples of the second sort, this third kind of case only threatens a single
theory's account of which basic features are necessarily right- and wrong-making, and even then, theorists
of that ilk have adequate means with which to rebut the alleged counterexample. According to most non-
Rossian theories of reasons for action, the fact that an action would involve a breaking of a promise is only
a derived reason against so acting; for example, on a (hedonistic act) utilitarian account, that fact is only a
reason against action in virtue of the long-term pain brought about both by the specific breaking of the
promise and by its contribution toward a general erosion to the practice of promise-keeping. Moreover,
even theories like the Rossian's which do claim that the reason in question is basic have available to them
ways of resisting the alleged counterexample, for Rossians (if they accept the particularists' intuitions
about the case) are likely to insist that the real basically reason-giving feature is not being a breaking of a
promise, but rather being a breaking of a promise that was not given under duress. Particularists might counter with
claims that the condition of not being given under duress is merely an enabling condition for a promise to be
practically relevant and is not itself part of the relevant reason against action.3 9 But what entitles them to
38 Dancy leans heavily on this sort of case in his (2004); see pp. 38-43, for instance.
39 The "enabling condition" terminology is Dancy's. See his (2004), pp. 39-41.
such claims? Are our intuitions really so precise that we can say with confidence that in a normal case in
which a promise is not given under duress, it is the fact that the action would involve breaking a promise that is a
reason against action and not the fact that the action would involve breaking a promise that was not given under duress?
My inclination is to say that our intuitions are not so precise, and if so, then it is perfectly open to the
Rossian to insist that it is the latter fact that is a basic reason against action in all possible contexts.
This move represents a second sort of response to the particularists' examples. With monist
theories such as utilitarianism, it makes sense, when faced with an example that threatens to show that
what one identifies as a basic reason can switch in valence with changes in context, to stand one's ground
and explain away our alleged intuitions about the case. However, with pluralist theories like Ross', there is
no reason not to turn around when faced with a putative counterexample and simply build the
particularist's enabling condition into one's basic reason; after all, if the pluralist is already positing a wide
variety of basically reason-giving features, why not make a few of those features a little more complex?
The particularist might in reply propose a new counterexample to the newly proposed basic reason (for
example, what if the promise was solicited by fraud?), but then the Rossian, if convinced by the example,
can turn around and make her proffered basic reason even more complicated in order to handle that
example as well. The particularist will no doubt insist that she can produce such counterexamples
indefinitely. But is this really so? After three or four iterations of this dialectic one's ingenuity tends to run
out, and although the Rossian might be forced to make her set of basically reason-giving features even
more complex and gerrymandered than they were in the beginning (which the Rossian is unlikely to see as
a fault in her account, since those attracted to simplicity and unity in their ethical theories tend to avoid
Ross-style pluralism), it is far from clear that she needs to make those features infinitely complex in order to
make them immune to counterexample. So although the third category of examples might seem to
threaten the Rossian's account of basic reasons, with some maneuvering she can avoid trouble.
Where does this leave us? I have claimed that every example provided by the particularists in
support of holism about reasons for action falls into one of three categories. The examples in the first
category are irrelevant: they fix on reasons that everyone would think are derived, and all theorists can
agree that some derived reasons switch in valence from context to context. The examples in the second
category threaten the utilitarian account of basic reasons, but the utilitarian has responses available to her.
And the examples in the third category threaten the Rossian account of basic reasons, but the Rossian
also has responses available to her. Thus even if I am wrong about the utilitarian and the Rossian having
adequate responses available, so that the particularists' examples do in fact show that their candidates for
basically reason-giving features give rise to reasons of different valences in different contexts, then-
ignoring the irrelevant cases in the first category-particularists would appear to be arguing from an
inductive basis of size two to the claim that any given theory's candidates for basically reason-giving features
must switch in valence from context to context. However, such a quick inductive argument seems
incredibly rash, to say the least, for there remains a whole host of moral theories whose designated
basically reason-giving features are untouched by the particularists' examples.
For instance, according to so-called desire-based accounts of reasons for action, all reasons for
action are ultimately provided by what the agent wants, or would want under certain conditions. 40 On
one such view, an agent has a reason to perform action X in circumstance C if and only if after ideal
deliberation the agent would desire that she perform X in C. So on this account, the fact that an action would
bring about pleasure in someone and the fact that an action would involve breaking a promise are only ever derived
reasons for action in a given context, if they are even reasons at all; the only basic reasons are the fact that
an action would be one that after ideal deliberation the agent would desire that she do and the fact that an action would be
one that after ideal deliberation the agent would desire that she not do, and none of the particularists' examples do
anything to show that the first of these is not always a reason in favor of action and the second not always
a reason against. The same holds for any number of other non-holist theories of reasons for action, from
numerous other desire-based accounts, to various non-desire-based views: the particularists' examples do
nothing to show that these theories' designated basically reason-giving features are all only contingently
right- or wrong-making. 41 The basic problem is that, by doing little more than proliferating putative
40 See Chang (2004) for a useful discussion of the distinction between desire- and value-based accounts of reasons for action.
41 Particularists might argue on independent grounds that desires cannot provide reasons for action, as Dancy does in ch. 2 of
his (2000b), but then they would have only succeeded in eliminating three classes of plausible candidates for basically reason-giving
counterexamples of the same general sort, particularists have failed to provide any kind of guiding insight
into the normative realm that would lead us to think that any purported basic reason must change its
valence from possible context to possible context. As such, we have not been given any general reason to
conclude that the phenomena the particularists are pointing at will extend to theories more sophisticated
than those offered by the utilitarian and the Rossian.
6. The Argument from a General Holism
We have found the argument from cases for particularism about reasons for actions to be wanting: as an
argument for the holist half of that thesis it is inconclusive, and as an argument for the non-
combinatorialist half it is non-existent. Until recently, the argument from cases was the only positive
argument that particularists had for their doctrine about reasons. However, in a recent article Dancy
offers a second positive argument for holism about reasons for action that proceeds by arguing for a
general holism about all normative reasons.42 Let us now turn to this second argument and see if it fares
better than the first.
According to Dancy, there are two basic kinds of normative43 reasons: theoretical reasons (i.e. reasons
for belief) and practical reasons (i.e. reasons for action). Within the domain of practical reasons Dancy sees a
further division, between ordinary practical reasons (i.e. non-moral reasons for action) and moral reasons (i.e.
distinctively moral reasons for action, if there are any), though he remains uncommitted as to the exact
nature of this distinction (indeed, it would only help his argument if there is no such distinction to be
found). With this taxonomy in place, the central claim behind Dancy's second argument is this: holism
about reasons is a general thesis that holds throughout the domain of normative reasons, including both
theoretical and practical reasons-or in other words, not only is holism about reasonsfor action true, but
holism about reasonsfor belief is also true.
Once we recognize this (alleged) fact, Dancy believes we have an argument for holism about
features rather than two, and the main point would remain.
42 Dancy (2000a), pp. 131-137; repeated with minor changes in his (2004), pp. 73-78, and in a more condensed form in his
(2001), §3. Little briefly alludes to the argument in her (2000), p. 281-282, and in her (200 1a), p. 34.
43 "Normative" because some philosophers draw a contrast between nonrmative reasons (which underwrite the normative
requirements on an agent) and motivating reasons (which explain an agent's having acted in a certain way): see Smith (1994), ch. 4.
reasons for action available to us. To begin with, Dancy insists that the truth of holism about reasons for
belief is utterly uncontroversial: "it seems to me that nobody has ever thought of denying [the thesis]."44
Similarly, Dancy holds that holism about ordinary (i.e. non-moral) reasons for action is a universally held
view whose truth "nobody has ever really debated." But then it would seem we have good reason to
believe that holism most be true of moral reasons for action as well: wouldn't it be odd, Dancy asks, if
holism were true of reasons for belief and of ordinary reasons for action, but were not true of moral
reasons for action? Isn't it more plausible that the logic of reasons is a unified kind that is the same for all
types of reasons, so that all normative reasons function holistically? Thus we should conclude that holism
is true of moral reasons for action as well, and as we supposedly already know that holism is true of
ordinary reasons for action, we can establish that holism is true about all reasons for action, both ordinary
and moral.
In other words, Dancy appears to be arguing for holism about reasons for action as follows:
1. Holism about reasons for belief is true. [premise]
2. Holism about ordinary reasons for action is true. [premise]
3. If holism about reasons for belief and holism about ordinary reasons for action are both
true, then holism about moral reasons for action must also be true. [premise]
4. So, holism about moral reasons for action is true. [follows from 1-3]
5. So, holism about all reasons for action is true. [follows from 2, 4]
This constitutes the particularists' second positive argument for the holist half of particularism about
reasons for action. Unfortunately for particularists, though, there is good reason to doubt the truth of all
three premises, and certainly the case Dancy makes for each is unsatisfactory. For example, Dancy's case
for premise 2 rests on examples that are just as problematic as the ones he appealed to during his
argument by example for holism about reasons for action, and his case for premise 3 involves an
unmotivated assumption that there is a presumption in favor of every type of reason behaving similarly.
However, the most serious problem with the argument occurs at premise 1, so in what follows I focus on
that portion of the argument.
44 Dancy (2000a), p. 132.
According to premise 1, holism about reasons for belief is true. Presumably holism about reasons
for belief should be formulated as follows:
holism about reasons for belief. If the non-normative fact that p is a reason for (or against) a subject
believing that q in one possible context, then there is another possible context in which
the fact that p either is a reason against (or for) the subject believing that q, or else is no
reason for the subject to believe one way or the other.45
Or in other words, a given fact can only at best be contingently a reason for (or against) a given belief.
Dancy's argument for the truth of holism about reasons for belief is exceedingly brief: he just takes it to be
blindingly obvious that the thesis is true, and he provides a single example to illustrate his point.
For instance, suppose that it currently seems to me that something before me is red. Normally, one might
say, that is a reason (some reason, that is, not necessarily sufficient reason) for me to believe that there is
something red before me. But in a case where I also believe that I have recently taken a drug that makes
blue things look red and red things look blue, the appearance of a red-looking thing before me is reason for
me to believe that there is a blue, not a red, thing before me. It is not as if it is some reason for me to believe
that there is something red before me, but that as such a reason it is overwhelmed by contrary reasons. It is
no longer any reason at all to believe there is something red before me; indeed it is a reason for believing the
opposite.4 6
The example is supposed to work as follows. The fact that I seem to see something red before me is in
most situations a reason for me to believe that there is something red before me. However, if I (justifiably)
believe that I have recently taken a drug that makes blue things look red and red things look blue, then the
fact that I seem to see something red before me is actually a reason for me not to believe that there is
something red before me. Thus a feature which gives rise to a reason for belief in one possible context
gives rise to a reason against belief in another-that is, the fact that I seem to see something red before me
is only contingently a reason for me to believe that there is something red before me.
Now the first thing to note about Dancy's argument here is that, this time at least, he is not
arguing by induction from cases. Dancy takes holism about reasons to be generally accepted by everyone,
and he offers his example for purely illustrative purposes, not to serve as a single-element inductive basis.
45 In keeping with my previous regimentation of terminology (cf. n. 9), I am taking reasons for belief to be facts, which some
might dispute, particularly since there is a venerable (though to my mind mistaken) tradition in epistemology according to which
only beliefs can be reasons for belief. However, as before nothing turns on my particular choice for the ontology of reasons of
belief, and one can easily reformulate the examples to follow so that the reasons in question are beliefs, or propositions, or
whatever other ontological category one prefers.
46 Dancy (2000a), p. 132. This one example has become quite the particularist warhorse: Dancy produces this same, solitary
example when recounting the argument from a general holism in his (2001), §3, and his (2004), p. 74, and Little does the same
when alluding to the argument in her (2000), p. 281 and her (2001a), p. 34.
But it is far from clear that Dancy's sociological claim about the general acceptance of holism in the
domain of reasons for belief holds true. The type of phenomenon that Dancy is pointing to with his
example is usually called a defeater in the epistemology literature: the idea is that my (justified) belief about
having ingested a red/blue-switching pill defeats the reason which I would otherwise have to believe, on the
basis of how things appear to me, that there is something red before me. However, determining whether
there is widespread agreement with Dancy's interpretation of the case at hand is complicated by two
issues. First, most contemporary epistemologists formulate their theories in terms of justfication (or near
synonyms such as "warrant" or "entitlement") rather than in terms of reasons for belief, and it is not always a
trivial matter to translate claims made in one language into claims made in the other. Second, and more
importantly, discussions of defeaters in the epistemology literature primarily focus on defeaters at the overall
level rather than defeaters at the contributory level: the issue epistemologists tend to concentrate on is whether,
at the overall level, one's sufficient reason to believe that p (or one's adequate justification for believing
that p) is defeated in some particular situation, not whether, at the contributory level, one of one's pro tanto
reasons to believe that p (or one of one's pro tanto justifications for believing that p) is defeated. 47
It is customary to distinguish between two types of defeaters at the overall level: rebutting
defeaters and undercutting defeaters. 48 Formulated in terms of reasons for belief, a rebutting defeater is a pro
tanto reason to believe that not-p which is strong enough that, although one would have had sufficient
reason to believe that p were that reason not present, as things are one does not have sufficient reason to
believe that p.49 So in the above example, if instead of remembering that I had taken a red/blue-switching
47 Talk of defeaters and defeasibility in epistemology began with Roderick Chisholm's (1964), in which he develops a
formalized version of a Ross-style ethics of prima facie duties and then notes certain parallels between how ethical requirements
may be overridden or defeated and how evidence may be overridden or defeated. Since then, appeals to notions of defeat in the
epistemology literature has centered around attempts to solve the Gettier problem by proposing a "defeasibility condition" on the
justification required for knowledge; for an introduction to defeasibility accounts of knowledge, see the appendix to Pollock
(1986), and for a more thorough investigation of the various accounts that have been proposed, see Shope (1983), ch. 2.
48 The rebutting defeater vs. undercutting defeater terminology is John Pollock's, who is usually credited with making this
distinction; see his (1986), p. 38, among other places (though be aware of Pollock's idiosyncratic definition of a reason in terms of
overall justification on p. 36). Terminologies for the distinction vary: for example, Casullo (2003) prefers to call them overriding
and undermining defeaters, respectively, whereas Sosa (1985) uses the terms "opposing overrider" and "disabling overrider."
49 It is customary when characterizing types of defeaters to appeal to subjunctive conditionals concerning what reason or
justification one would have were certain factors not present, but often the subjunctive conditionals appealed to lead to unintended
consequences for the proposed definitions: see Feldman (2003), p. 33-34. However, for the purposes of introducing the general
rebutting/undercutting defeater distinction, we can overlook such difficulties.
pill I had been told by an extremely reliable source that there is nothing red in front of me, the reason
provided by that piece of testimony would have been a rebutting defeater of the reason to believe that
there is something red before me provided by how things appear to me. A rebutting defeater of one's
sufficient reason to believe that p thus attacks the conclusion that p. An undercutting defeater, on the other
hand, attacks the connection between one's reasons and the conclusion that p, with the result that one no
longer has sufficient reason at the overall level to believe that p. However, undercutting defeaters can do
this in various ways: they can disable one of one's pro tanto reasons so that what would have been a pro tanto
reason to believe that p is now no such reason (perhaps because it is now not a reason at all, perhaps
because its valence has been switched so that it is now a pro tanto reason to believe the opposite), or they
can diminish the strength of one of one's pro tanto reasons to believe that p to such a degree that one now no
longer has overall sufficient reason to believe that p, or they can leave the valence and strength of one's pro
tanto reasons untouched but change what is required for one's overall reason to believe that p to constitute
sufficient overall reason to believe that p. Thus in order for his argument to work, Dancy needs
epistemologists to agree that the red/blue-switching case is not just an example of an undercutting
defeater, but rather an example of an undercutting defeater of the first variety, in which one of one's
would-be pro tanto reasons is completely disabled. In fact, he needs more than that: since ultimately he is
advocating a strong version of holism according to which all reasons can switch or lose their valence from
context to context, Dancy also needs there to be general agreement among epistemologists that every
reason for belief can be undercut in the way described.
Some epistemologists would simply deny that the red/blue-switching case is an example of an
undercutting defeater that completely disables the pro tanto reason to believe that there is something red
before me. One particularly clear example of how one might deny this is provided by the version of
modest foundationalism defended by James Pryor in his (2000). In that article Pryor argues that we always
have prima facie (i.e. pro tanto) justification to believe that the world is as our experiences present it to be.
Translated into talk of reasons for belief, Pryor's claim is that an experience as of its being the case that p
necessarily provides a pro tanto reason to believe that p-so in particular, its seeming to me that there is
something red before me provides a reason to believe that there is something red before me in every
possible situation, even one in which I believe that I have ingested one of those pesky red/blue-switching
pills. In such a case, what Pryor would say is that I also have a very good reason to believe that if I seem to
see something red before me, then there is something blue before me (and not something red). Since in
addition I have good reason to believe that I seem to see something red before me, simple modus ponens
reasoning gives me good reason to believe that there is not something red before me, and this reason
might outweigh the one to believe that there is something red before me provided directly by my
experience. So Pryor would claim that Dancy's example is at most an example of a rebutting defeater, and
other theorists might agree that this is not an example of the needed type of undercutting defeater,
perhaps because they think that the pro tanto reason provided by my experience as of something red is only
diminished in strength, or perhaps because they think its strength remains the same but what is required for
my overall reason to qualify as sufficient overall reason to believe that there is something red before me has
been changed.50
However, let us suppose that Dancy is correct about the case at hand, and that once one believes
(or perhaps justifiably believes) that one has taken a red/blue-switching pill, the fact that one seems to see
something red before one is no longer a pro tanto reason to believe that there is something red before one.
The problem is that then Dancy would have provided only one compelling example of a fact that is
merely contingently a reason to believe a given conclusion, and there are any number of examples of
other facts that it is plausible to think are necessarily a reason to believe some conclusion, in a way that is
not undermined by the type of phenomenon present in the red/blue-switching example. For example,
consider our reasons for believing mathematical truths. The fact that 19 times 23 equals 437 seems like a
good reason to believe that 437 is not a prime number; indeed, it would seem to be a conclusive reason in
favor of such a belief. However, it is rather difficult to conceive of any circumstances in which the fact that
50 Another way of rejecting Dancy's interpretation of the example would be to deny that how things seem to me ever provides
a (basic) pro tanto reason for belief, let alone one whose sufficiency can be defeated; for example, this would probably be the
reaction of most externalists about justification, since they usually hold that that it is "external" facts such as those concerning the
reliability of the process by which a belief was formed that provide justification or give one reasons, not "internal" facts about
what one seems to see. (For more on externalist theories of justification of the reliabilist variety, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.)
19 times 23 equals 437 would be neither a reason for nor against believing that 437 is not a prime
number, much less one in which that fact would somehow be a reason against believing that 437 is not a
prime number. Or take Descartes' cogito argument: the fact that I am now thinking seems to be a good
reason to believe that I exist. (The exact nature of this "I" that exists is another matter, but surely it at
least gives me reason to believe that I exist.) Yet is there any context in which I am now thinking but that
gives me no reason for or against believing that I exist, or any context in which I am now thinking and
that (rather incredibly) gives me reason against believing I exist? Finally, we can turn Dancy's own example
against him: there may indeed be some strange contexts in which the fact that I seem to see something red
before me is not a reason for me to believe that there is something red before me, but are there any possible
contexts in which the fact that I seem to see something red before me is not a reason for me to believe that
something is causing me to seem to see something red before me? In effect, what Dancy needs to claim is that
undercutting defeaters of the relevant disabling variety exist for each of these reasons-a claim which is
incredibly controversial, and to the best of my knowledge not endorsed by any currently practicing
epistemologist.
Which is not to say that such undercutting defeaters might not exist. Indeed, even if every single
contemporary epistemologist were united in denying the existence of such defeaters (and I suspect they
very well might be), they could all be wrong. Definitively settling the truth or falsity of holism about
reasons for belief would take us too far adrift. But it should be clear that Dancy's insistence that "nobody
has ever thought of denying" the view is blatantly untrue; indeed, if there is any lack of controversy over
the status of holism about reasons for belief, it would seem to be a lack of controversy among
epistemologists in agreeing, contra Dancy, that the thesis is false. So Dancy cannot avoid making a
substantive argument for the view by merely gesturing at its (alleged) universal acceptance. Rather, if he
plans to establish holism about reasons for action by first establishing holism about reasons for belief, he is
going to need some sort of positive argument in favor of holism about reasons for belief. And if he
proceeds by appealing to examples, he will face the same problems he faced when offering his argument
from cases for holism about reasons for action: some theorists will, like Pryor, deny his interpretation of
the cases provided (compare the response of the utilitarian to the argument from cases); other theorists will
accept his interpretation of the cases but insist that the real basic reason for belief is a more complicated
fact that avoids the counterexample, such the fact that one seems to see something red when one's faculty
of vision is working correctly (compare the response of the Rossian to the argument from cases); and
almost every theorist will deny that his examples serve as an inadequate inductive basis for the claim that
all reasons for belief can switch or lose their valence from context to context (compare the inadequacy of
the inductive basis in the argument from cases). So Dancy's argument from a general holism for holism
about reasons for action will ultimately be just as convincing-or rather, just as unconvincing-as his
original argument from cases for that thesis.
7. Whither Non-Combinatorialism?
Thus I conclude that the two positive arguments originating in Dancy's work for holism about reasons for
action both fail to establish the needed version of holism in a convincing manner. However, the attentive
reader will notice that something seems to have been left by the wayside here. Wasn't particularism about
reasons for action supposed to be a two-part view, of which holism about reasons for action was only one
half? What, one might ask, about non-combinatorialism about reasons for action? Do particularists
produce any positive arguments for that portion of their creed? And if so, are those arguments convincing?
The answer is that although the most full-blooded particularists such as Dancy and Little endorse
both holism and non-combinatorialism, and although sometimes they act as if the argument from
examples and the argument from a general holism also establish non-combinatorialism, Dancy and Little
rarely, if ever, explicitly argue for non-combinatorialism. In fact, matters are even worse than that. It is
not as if they merely forgot to extend their arguments to non-combinatorialism. On the contrary: I will
now argue that attempting to extend those arguments to non-combinatorialism about reasons for action is
hopeless once one has already embraced holism about reasons for action.
Consider first the argument from a general holism. Recall that the idea behind this argument was
that, because holism about reasons for belief and about ordinary reasons for action are (supposedly)
universally accepted views, there is pressure toward accepting holism about reasons for action, lest one
endorse an unattractively bifurcated account of the logic of reasons. So one might ask: can we argue in a
similar way that almost everyone accepts non-combinatorialism about reasons for belief and about
ordinary reasons for action, so that we should find it natural to also accept non-combinatorialism about
moral reasons for action? As with the argument for holism about reasons for action, the most pressing
problem with this argument occurs at the first step, where one insists that non-combinatorialism about
reasons for belief is a universally held view. If we take the relevant overall epistemic verdict about a given
belief that p to be "one has sufficient reason to believe that p," then non-combinatorialism about reasons
for belief can be formulated as follows:
non-combinatorialism about reasons for belief The combinatorial function that determines whether one
has sufficient reason to hold a given belief from the valence and weight of the reasons for
and against that belief is not finitely expressible (and so in particular, not additive).
However, it should be clear that this thesis is quite controversial, so that one can hardly gesture at its
(alleged) universal acceptance as a way of avoiding having to provide a substantive arguments in its favor.
Indeed, the very notion of a defeater, which we discussed in light of Dancy's red/blue-switching case, was
introduced into epistemology precisely as a way of capturing in finite terms what is required for one to
have sufficient reason to hold a given belief in a given context.
Non-combinatorialism about reasons for belief is controversial; but when we conjoin that view
with holism about reasons for belief (as particularists must if they want to use the argument from a general
holism/non-combinatorialism to secure both portions of particularism about reasons for action), then the
result is more controversial still. Particularists such as Dancy and Little think that the conjunction of
holism and non-combinatorialism about reasons for action directly entails particularism about moral
principles as well as the particularist moral epistemology. But then it would seem that these particularists
must also think that the conjunction of holism and non-combinatorialism about reasonsfor belief directly
entails a kind of particularism about epistemic principles as well as a kind of general particularist
epistemology. Such a particularism about epistemic principles would hold that there are no substantial,
finite, exceptionless epistemic principles, while a general particularist epistemology would imply that the
only way we can come to know what we ought to believe in a given situation is by "directly perceiving"
the epistemically relevant features of that situation without any recourse to general epistemic principles of
any kind. However, very few practicing philosophers adhere to such radical views about the nature of
either epistemic principles or our access to what we ought to believe: witness the widespread acceptance of
such substantial, finite, and seemingly exceptionless epistemic principles as that knowledge implies belief
or that knowledge implies truth, or the complete and utter lack of any contemporary defenders of a
general particularist epistemology. So once one has endorsed holism about all normative reasons, non-
combinatorialism about reasons for belief can hardly serve as an uncontroversial assumption from which
one can go on to prove other claims, but rather must be argued for, perhaps by providing intuitive examples
in support of it. 5 1
Which brings us to Dancy's other positive argument for holism, namely the argument from
examples. But here the chances of successfully extending the argument to one in support of non-
combinatorialism are even worse than they were for the argument from a general holism. It is tempting to
think that examples can be found which support non-combinatorialism, and perhaps some can. However,
such examples (if, indeed, they exist) will be utterly useless if one's ultimate goal is to establish both halves
of particularism about reasons for action, for the following reason: once one accepts holism about reasons
for action, it then becomes virtually impossible to argue for non-combinatorialism about reasons for
action via an appeal to examples.
The idea behind this claim is as follows. Suppose we wanted to establish that there is no additive
combinatorial function specifying how the valences and weights of the reasons for and against action
present in any possible context combine to yield the rightness and wrongness of the actions available to
the agent in that context. In order to do this, we would need to establish that what it would be right or
wrong to do in a given situation cannot be determined by simply adding up the weights of the reasons for
51 Some particularists might respond by insisting that although particularism about reasons for action leads to particularism
about moral principles and the particularist moral epistemology, particularism about reasons for belief does not in fact lead to a
particularism about epistemic principles or to a general particularist epistemology. However, doing so would undermine the case
for premise 3 of the argument from a general holism, for once one has highlighted such a disanalogy between the epistemic and
moral realms, one can hardly argue that there is a strong presumption in favor of reasons for action behaving just as reasons for
belief do.
and against each available action and then assigning a verdict ("right," "wrong," or "neither") to each
action based on the comparative values of those totals. The standard method of showing that this is not
the case by means of examples would be to find two situations in which all the relevant reasons but one
are "held constant" (i.e. have the same valence and weight), and then to argue that the dependence
between the one varying reason and what it would be right or wrong to do in the two situations is not
strictly additive. 52 However, if holism about reasons for action is true, the behavior of a given reason for
action potentially swings and shifts with every change in context. But then it seems we can never be
assured that all the reasons other than our one selected "independent variable" are being held constant
between the two cases, so this entire method is hopeless. 53 And matters are even worse when we attempt
to argue from cases that there is no finitely expressible combinatorial function of a non-additive form.
Conclusion: the prospects for securing non-combinatorialism about reasons for action through an appeal
to cases while at the same time endorsing holism about reasons for action are dim at best.
8. Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?
So far I have restricted myself to criticisms of the positive arguments that have (or could be) offered by
particularists in support of their particularism about reasons for action. But the results of the previous
section point the way to a deeper problem for the view. There I argued that it is impossible to use either of
the main particularist arguments to establish both portions of the twin-doctrine that is particularism about
reasons for action. The argument from a general holism/non-combinatorialism cannot be used to establish
both portions of the view: since the combination of holism and non-combinatorialism about reasons for
belief has extremely radical consequences, one can hardly say that no one has ever thought of the denying
their combination, and from there argue that we should hold analogous views about the nature of reasons
for action on the grounds that there is a presumption in favor of reasons for belief and reasons for action
52 For example, this is how Kagan argues in his (1988) that there is no additive combinatorial function.
53 A particularist might reply that she can ensure that all but one reason are "held constant" in the two situations by intuiting
that the valence and weight of all but one of the reasons are the same in both situations. However, while it might be conceded to
the particularist that our moral intuitions reliably track the valence of reasons from context to context and perhaps can provide a
general approximation to their weight, it seems rather excessive to claim that our powers of intuition are so great as to be able to
discern the exact weight of a given reason in a given context, which is what would be needed for the argument to go through.
behaving in a similar way. And the argument from cases cannot be used to establish both portions of the
view, either: once holism about reasons for action is in place, it is virtually impossible to show that the
combinatorial function for rightness and wrongness is not of a given form by comparing two situations in
which all relevant moral factors but one are held constant, so it becomes excessively difficult to support
non-combinatorialism through an appeal to examples. Thus, while the particularists' two main arguments
might have had some chance (however slim) of establishing one half of particularism about reasons for
action, once that half is in place, the chance of those arguments establishing the other half all but vanishes.
All of this strongly suggests that there is a kind of internal tension between the holist and non-
combinatorialist portions of the particularists' views about the nature of reasons for action. And the source
of this tension, I believe, is the following: once they have embraced both holism and non-
combinatorialism about reasons for action, then it is no longer clear that particularists have available to them a
coherent notion ofa reason for or against action.
Recall the three-level generalized weighing framework within which particularists formulate their
claims about how reasons work: according to that framework, certain non-normative features of the
actions available to an agent provide reasons of various valences and weights for and against performing
those actions (the dependence of the contributory level on the underlying level), and the overall moral
status of the available actions is determined in virtue of the valences and weights of those reasons (the
dependence of the overall level on the contributory level). Thus within this framework, the contribution of
an individual reason for action to the entire system is exhausted by two roles it plays: (i) some non-
normative feature of an action gives rise to that reason, and (ii) that reason counts one way or the other
toward the rightness or wrongness (as well as other overall moral verdicts) of the action bearing that
feature. However, particularists insist that each of these defining roles is inscrutably context-dependent. As
particularists see it, reasons for action are context-dependent both "from below" and "from above":
context-dependent "from below" since whether a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or
against action varies from context to context (holism about reasons for action), and context-dependent
"from above" since how the reasons present in a given circumstance combine to determine the overall
moral status of the actions available in that circumstance varies from context to context (non-
combinatorialism about reasons for action). But then particularistic reasons for action would appear to be
free-floating cogs in the normative machinery, and it becomes difficult to understand what particularists
even mean when they call something a "reason for action" or a "reason against action."
According to one common conception, a reason for action is a consideration that would decisively
count in favor of a given action were no other reasons present. So on this view, which we might call the
isolation conception of a reason for action, the fact that action X would have feature F in circumstance C
qualifies as a reason for performing X in C if and only if, in any possible situation in which F is the only
morally relevant feature of the actions available to the agent, the actions possessing F are the right thing to
do: when no other moral considerations are present, a reason for action "carries the day." Similarly, on
this conception, the fact that action Y would have feature G in circumstance D qualifies as a reason against
performing Y in D if and only if, in any possible situation in which feature G is the only morally relevant
feature of the actions available to the agent, the actions possessing G are the wrong thing to do. However, it
just falls out of this conception of what it is to be a reason for or against action that the holist half of
particularism about reasons for action is false. Suppose the fact that a given action would be a telling of a
lie is a reason against performing that action in some circumstance C. Then given the isolation
conception, it follows that in any situation in which the property of being a telling of a lie is the only
morally relevant feature of the actions available in that situation, those actions that involve telling a lie are
wrong. But this in turn implies that the fact that an action would be a telling of a lie is a reason against
performing that action in every circumstance, not just C, for in every circumstance it is now the case that,
were the property of being a telling of a lie the only morally relevant feature of the actions available to the
agent, the actions possessing that property would be wrong. Thus the isolation conception entails, contra
the claims of holism, that whenever some feature provides a reason against action in one possible context,
that feature must provide a reason against action in every possible context. 54 For this reason, particularists
54 Note that, as stated, the proposed definition also implies the falsity of weak holism about reasons for action, which in §4 I
argued is trivially true. Therefore if a non-particularist wishes to endorse the isolation conception, the proposed definition should
be revised so as to apply only to basic reasons for or against action (and similarly for the other conceptions to be discussed).
who endorse holism cannot accept the isolation conception of a reason for action.
According to a second possible conception, which we might call the removal conception of a reason for
action, a reason for action is a consideration whose removal would make the action in question less right,
and a reason against action is a consideration whose removal would make the action less wrong. More
precisely, on this conception the fact that action X would have feature F in circumstance C is a reasonfor
(or against) action X if and only if, for any sufficiently similar circumstance C' in which X, if performed,
would have all the same morally relevant features except F and no additional morally relevant features, X
is less right (or less wrong) in C' than in C. In a sense, then, this proposal is the converse of the previous one:
in order to determine whether a given feature of an action gives rise to a reason for or against performing
that action, we remove only the feature in question and see how the rightness or wrongness of the action varies,
rather than remove every other morally relevant feature. Now there are difficulties making precise how all of
this should go. For example, the proposal implicitly assumes that rightness and wrongness come in degrees
(which one might contest), and something needs to be said about how in general one is to strip away the
feature being evaluated while holding all other morally relevant features constant. (It is clear enough what
one is to do when determining whether the property of, say, producing pleasure gives rise to a reason in
favor of action-simply make the action less pleasurable and see if the rightness of the action in turn
diminishes-but in most other cases it is far less clear how to "cleanly excise" the property being assessed.)
However, we can sidestep these issues, because regardless of how they are resolved, the particularists'
holism prohibits them from being able to make use of the removal conception.
The whole point of holism about reasons for action is that the valence of the reason provided by a
given feature of an action is determined by other features of the case at hand, not by features of the action
(such as its comparative rightness or wrongness) in certain counterfactual situations. Holism holds that in a
counterfactual situation in which we remove only the feature being scrutinized, this change might lead to
any number of other changes in the valences and strengths of the reasons provided by other features of the
available actions; thus, given holism, the method invoked by the removal conception will be unable to
isolate the individual contribution made by the specific feature being considered. The following example is
used by Dancy to illustrate this very point:
[C]onsider a case in which I am thinking of doing something for a friend. My action, were I to do it, would
be good, and partly good because it is an expression of our friendship. But now, if I were to be doing the
action and not doing it for a friend, I would presumably be doing it for someone who is not a friend, and it
might be that doing it for someone who is not a friend is even better than doing it for a friend. . . . [O]ur
friendship seems to be a reason to do the action even though if we were not friends I would have even more
reason to do it. 55
The example is intended to work as follows: in one situation the fact that an action would be one done for
a friend might be a reason to perform that action, even though one has more overall reason to perform
the action (and hence, the action is more right) in some sufficiently similar situation whose only relevant
difference is that the person in question is not one's friend. Now Dancy's interpretation of this particular
pair of cases is controversial, but even if one rejects that interpretation the main point remains: holists
about reasons for action will want to allow for the possibility that pairs of cases might exist that have the
general structure Dancy alleges these two cases to have; the removal conception rules out the possibility of
such cases from the outset; so holists about reasons for action cannot avail themselves of this conception of
a reason for action.
According to a third possible conception, a reason for action is a consideration that counts in
favor of a certain course of action being the right thing to do, and a reason against action a consideration
that counts against. So on this story, which we might call the right-making conception of a reason for action, a
reasonfor performing action X contributes positively toward X being right in the given circumstance, and a
reason against performing action X contributes negatively toward X being right in the given circumstance
(that is, contributes positively toward X being wrong in that circumstance). However, particularists cannot
hold this conception of a reason for action, either. The problem is that talk of a reason being a
consideration counting in favor of or against a certain action being the right thing to do makes the most
sense when there is an additive combinatorial function; the more we deviate from an additive
combinatorial function, the more obscure such talk becomes.
In order to show why this is so, it will help if we get a little more formal. Suppose there are only
two non-normative features of actions that give rise to reasons for or against action: FI and F2. If X is an
55 Dancy (2004), p. 20.
action available to an agent in circumstance C, let rl(X, C) be a real number representing the valence and
weight of the reason, if any, provided by X's possessing feature FI in the following manner:
* if X would possess F1 if performed in C, and that fact is a reason for performing X in that
context, then ri(X, C) > 0 and its absolute value represents the weight of the reason so
provided;
* if X would possess F1 if performed in C, and that fact is a reason against performing X in that
context, then ri(X, C) < 0 and its absolute value represents the weight of the reason so
provided;
* otherwise, ri(X, C) = 0.
Moreover, let r2(X, C) represent in a similar way the valence and weight of the reason, if any, provided by
X's possessing feature F2 if performed in C. Then if there is an additive combinatorial function, we can
represent the total reason in favor of action X in circumstance C as follows:
t(X, C) = ri(X, C) + r2(X, C).
Finally, let the actions available to the agent in circumstance C that maximize this function be the right
ones to do in that circumstance, and let all other available actions be the wrong ones to do. 56
When we determine the rightness or wrongness of actions from the valences and weights of the
relevant reasons in this way, it is readily transparent why reasons for a given action are considerations that
count in favor of that action's being right and reasons against are considerations that count in favor of it's
being wrong. Since r,(X, C) is always positive when a reason for action is provided by X's possessing Fi,
reasons in favor of performing X always add to the total reason in favor of X in C. Since ri(X, C) is always
negative when a reason against action is provided by X's possessing Fi, reasons against performing X
always subtract from the total reason in favor of X in C. So when the combinatorial function is additive, it
is perfectly natural to talk about a reason in favor of some action being an individual contribution toward
its rightness, and a reason against that action being an individual contribution toward its wrongness.
For some ways of deviating from a strictly additive combinatorial function, the naturalness of this
56 Thus, if I is an index set that ranges over the indices for all the actions Xi available to the agent in circumstance C, the
combinatorial function can be represented in its full glory as follows:
f(X,C)= right if (Vj E It(X,,C) t(Xj,C)]
) wrong otherwise
way of talking is preserved. For example, suppose there are still only two non-normative features, Fi and
F2, that ever give rise to reasons for or against action, but the total reason in favor of action X in context C
is instead determined as follows:
t'(X, C) = [rl(X, C)]3 + r2(X, C).
As before, the right actions are those that maximize the total reason function, and the wrong actions those
that do not. And since [ri(X, C)]3 is always positive when ri(X, C) is positive and always negative when
rl(X, C) is negative, it still makes sense to talk about the reasons of positive valence provided by feature FI
counting in favor of the rightness of the action possessing that feature and the reasons of negative valence
provided by feature FI counting against the action's rightness. However, suppose instead that the total
reason function is determined like so:
t"(X, C) = [rl(X, C)]2 + r2(X, C).
Now we have trouble. If the fact that X would have feature F1 is a reason against performing X in C, then
although ri(X, C) is negative, [ri(X, C)]2 is positive, so that fact adds to the total reason in favor of X and
hence counts in favor of, not against, X being right in the given circumstance. In other words, given this way
of combining reasons to determine overall rightness and wrongness, whenever feature Fi provides a
reason against action in a given context, that feature is actually right-making in that context. For this reason
we are no longer operating with the right-making conception of a reason for action. And a similar point
applies if instead the total reason function is a multiplicative function like the following:
t"'(X, C) = ri(X, C) r2(X, C).
Suppose X would have feature Fi if performed in C, and that fact is a reason for performing X in C. Then
ri(X, C) is positive, but whether this positively or negatively impacts the total reason in favor of X in C
now depends on the sign of r2(X, C), and hence depends on the valence of the reason (if any) provided by
the other feature, F2. In this case, talk of a reason for action as being a consideration that always counts in
favor of the rightness of that action has become strained at best. 57
57 Kagan (1988), p. 17, makes much the same point when he notes that without what he calls the "additive assumption" (in
effect, the assumption that there is an additive combinatorial function), any talk of "contributions" made by individual morally
relevant factors seems out of place.
I take these examples to show that one cannot hold the right-making conception of a reason for
action while allowing that the combinatorial function determining rightness and wrongness can have any
old form whatsoever. In order to make sense of the idea that reasons for action always contribute toward
an action's rightness and reasons against always contribute toward its wrongness, we need the
combinatorial function to be such that (i) individual reasons always make discernible individual
contributions to the overall rightness or wrongness of a given action, and (ii) the individual contribution
made by a reason of positive valence always positively impacts the total reason in favor of the action in
question, and the individual contribution made by a reason of negative valence always negatively impacts
the total reason in favor of the action. Let us call the combinatorial function quasi-additive if, like the
combinatorial function constructed from the total reason function t'(X, C) above, it satisfies these two
criteria.58 It is important to notice that the vast majority of possible combinatorial functions are neither
additive nor quasi-additive.5 9 However, those who endorse the right-making conception must hold, on
pains of having an incoherent notion of a reason for action, that the combinatorial function is, if not
additive, then at least quasi-additive. It follows from the particularists' non-combinatorialism that the
combinatorial function is not additive. Moreover, it is not clear what grounds particularists have to insist
that, although we don't know enough about the combinatorial function to be able to write it down in
finite form, we do know enough about it to know that it is quasi-additive. This puts particularists who
endorse both non-combinatorialism and the right-making conception in a precarious position: the
58 Note that on this way of characterizing what makes a combinatorial function quasi-additive, all additive combinatorial
functions also count as quasi-additive.
The definition of quasi-additivity provided here is admittedly vague, but it will do for present purposes. Indeed, I suspect it
is not possible to be any more precise in characterizing quasi-additivity without making various assumptions about the
combinatorial function that would not be accepted by all moral theorists. For example, if we can represent the valence and weight
of every distinct reason by a variable ri in the way described in the text, and if the combinatorial function can be calculated in
terms of a total reason function, t(ri, r2, ... r,), that is a function of the reason-variables, and if that total reason function is
differentiable at every point with respect to each of those variables, then I put forward that the combinatorial function is quasi-
additive if and only if the following obtains for each i such that 1 5 i 5 n:
S 0 for all values of ri, r2, ... r•.
However, this precise a formulation of quasi-additivity comes at the cost of some fairly substantial-and controversial-
assumptions about the nature of the combinatorial function. (It is interesting to note that, given this formulation of what it takes
for the combinatorial function to be quasi-additive, the requirement that the combinatorial function be quasi-additive is
equivalent to the requirement that reasons for action satisfy the removal conception.)
59 This point is only bolstered if we do not assume, as I did in the examples of the past few paragraphs, that the weight of a
given reason can be represented by a real number.
coherence of their very notion of a reason for action depends on there being a quasi-additive
combinatorial function, but it is difficult to see what means they have of establishing that there is one
without conceding that the combinatorial function might, after all, be finitely expressible. Conclusion:
because of their commitment to non-combinatorialism, particularists are not entitled to hold the right-
making conception of a reason of action.6°
Could particularists resist this line of argument by insisting that it is an analytic truth that the
combinatorial function is quasi-additive? I doubt it. Even if we ignore Quinean concerns about
analyticity, the purported analytic truth is far more recherch6 than the sorts of things that are usually held
to be true merely in virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.6 1 Moreover, if we allow that we can
know by studying the meaning of the relevant terms that the combinatorial function satisfies one
constraint (that of being quasi-additive), this raises the question: why can't we also know by studying the
60 Objection: It is possible to construct a combinatorial function that is quasi-additive but not finitely expressible by splicing
together several quasi-additive combinatorial functions in an uncodifiable manner. For example, particularists could insist that in
some contexts the total reason function is given by t(X,C), that in other contexts the total reason function is given by t'(X, C), and
that there is no cashing out in finite terms when one of these two total reason functions applies. As each of these total reason
functions satisfies the conditions for quasi-additivity, it follows that the resulting combinatorial function will be quasi-additive but
not finitely expressible.
Reply: It is a mistake to assume that just because the combinatorial function constructed from total reason function t(X,C)
is quasi-additive and the combinatorial function constructed from total reason function t2(X,C) is quasi-additive, therefore the
combinatorial function constructed from the following total reason function must be quasi-additive:
(XC) t(X,C) if such -and- such conditions obtain
(X = t2(X,C) otherwise
For example, in the way already explained, we can construct an additive (and hence quasi-additive) combinatorial function from
the following total reason function:
t(X, C) = r (X, C) + r2(X, C).
Moreover, in a similar way we can construct an additive (hence quasi-additive) combinatorial function from the following total
reason function:
t"" (X, C) = ri(X, C) + r2(X, C) - 500.
However, a combinatorial function constructed in the same way from the following total reason function is not quasi-additive:
t.(x,c)= r,(X,C) + r,(X,C) - 500 ifr,(X,C) = 10
r,(X,C) + r2(X,C) otherwise
After all, t*(X,C) is the same function, in the mathematical sense (see n. 22), as the following non-quasi-additive total reason
function:
t(XC) -49 r,(X,C) + r2(X,C) ifr,(X,C) = 10
r,l(X,C) + r,(X,C) otherwise
Therefore patching together several quasi-additive combinatorial functions does not always yield a quasi-additive combinatorial
function, and so the objection fails.
61 After all, recall (n. 58) how difficult it was to even characterize quasi-additivity. If it is not even clear how to precisely
formulate quasi-additivity without making contentious assumptions about the nature of the combinatorial function, how could we
possibly derive analytic platitudes merely from the meaning of the term "quasi-additive"?
meaning of the relevant terms that the combinatorial function satisfies various other constraints, enough
of which might reduce it to finite form? Recall that the majority of possible combinatorial functions are
not quasi-additive. So to require that the combinatorial function be quasi-additive is a fairly demanding
restriction-a fairly sizeable way of cutting down the space of possible combinatorial functions. Why,
then, can't we appeal to more analytic truths to cut down the space of possible combinatorial functions
even further? And why couldn't doing so eventually result in a finitely expressible combinatorial function?
To insist that we can't reduce the combinatorial function to finite form but can know that it must be
quasi-additive is like insisting, of some number with an infinite, non-repeating decimal expansion, that we
can't reduce that number to a finite formula, but we can know that a "1" never directly follows a "0" in its
infinitely long decimal expansion. 62 Or closer to home, it is like insisting that, although we can know from
the meaning of the terms involved that some principle of impartiality holds, that is the only non-trivial,
exceptionless constraint we can know about rightness and wrongness. 63 How we come to know that the
combinatorial function must be quasi-additive is beside the point; what matters is that if we accept the
right-making conception and its subsequent requirement that the combinatorial function be quasi-additive
(whether through an appeal to analytic truths or on some other grounds), then this puts pressure on the
particularists' adherence to non-combinatorialism.
According to a fourth and final conception of what it is to be a reason for action, which we might
call the favoring conception, a reason for action is a consideration that counts in favor of a given action, and a
reason against action one that counts against. 64 The difference between this and the previous conception is
that, whereas with the right-making conception we said that a reason for performing action X is a
consideration that counts in favor ofX being the right thing to do, here we are saying that a reason for performing
X is a consideration that counts in favor ofX (full stop). It is tempting to think that at the end of the day there
62 Of course, we can prove similar things about some numbers (like n and e) that have infinite, non-repeating decimal
expansions, but in those cases there is always some way of expressing the number in question in a finite formula.
63 Note I am not claiming that it is plausible that a principle of impartiality is an analytic truth; rather, what I am claiming is
that if such a principle were an analytic truth, then it would be odd if there were no other analytic moral truths of that sort.
64 Raz (1990), p. 186: "The reasons for an action are considerations which count in favor of that action"; Scanlon (1998),
p. 17: "Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration
that counts in favor."
is little difference between these two conceptions of a reason for action. However, some philosophers-
including many particularists-make a distinction between the favoring relation and the right-making relation.
Dancy makes the point as follows (although in this passage he focuses on the alleged difference between
the favoring relation and the ought-making relation, the same reasoning, if it works, can establish a
difference between the favoring relation and the right-making relation):
[I]t seems to me that we are in fact dealing with two normative relations rather than one. The first is the
relation between reasons and ought-judgments; we specify the reasons, and pass to the judgments that we
ought to act. The second is a relation between reasons and action which is not necessarily mediated by any
ought at all; it is the one that is in play when we engage in the sort of practical reasoning whose
"conclusion" is an action. I don't always think, "There is this reason for jumping; so I ought to jump";
sometimes I just think, "There is this reason for jumping; so I'll jump." Crucially, the relation between
reason and ought-judgment is different from the relation between reason and action. And it is really the
latter that we are after when we try to understand the notion of a reason for action-a practical reason.65
Switching from talk of ought-making to talk of right-making, the idea here is that the favoring relation is a
relation that holds between a reason and an action, whereas the right-making relation is a different
normative relation that holds between a reason (or more accurately, a reason-giving feature) and an
action's rightness or wrongness. However, note that once one endorses the generalized weighing model of
morality (as particularists do), then feature F is a right-making feature of action X in circumstance C if
and only if the fact that X would have F if performed in C is a reason for performing X-and so, on the
favoring conception, counts in favor of X. Thus, even if technically the favoring and right-making
relations are different relations, within the generalized weighing framework the favoring and right-making
conceptions of a reason for action amount to much the same thing.
However, suppose I am wrong here, so that the favoring conception is, in fact, a distinct
conception of what it is to be a reason for action; even then the particularists' non-combinatorialism bars
them from being able to hold the favoring conception. The idea behind this claim is as follows. Let us
suppose there is a distinct type of practical reasoning that ends in an action, rather than a theoretical
conclusion about what it would be right to do (or what one ought to do). Then, given the generalized
weighing framework, which action is the correct conclusion of that piece of practical reasoning is
65 Dancy (2004), p. 20. Dancy later makes it clear (pp. 78-79) that he intends there to be an analogous difference between the
favoring relation and the right-making relation. This idea that there is a distinctive type of practical reasoning whose conclusion is
an action, though Aristotelian in origin, has its modem roots in Anscombe (1957); for criticism of the idea, seeJarvis (1962).
determined by the weight and valence of the reasons that are (or should be) appealed to in that bit of
reasoning. So, just as there is a combinatorial function that takes as input the valences and weights of the
reasons present in a given situation and outputs the rightness and wrongness of the actions available in
that situation, there is a combinatorial function that takes as input the valences and weights of the reasons
that are (or should be) appealed to in a given piece of practical reasoning and outputs the action (or
actions) that are the correct conclusions of that reasoning. And just as particularists hold that the first of
these combinatorial functions is not finitely expressible, they no doubt would also hold that the second of
these combinatorial functions is not finitely expressible-and in particular not additive in form. So we can
run an argument exactly parallel to the one used to show that particularists cannot hold the right-making
conception in order to establish that they cannot hold the favoring conception, either.
All of which raises the question: what exactly do particularists think reasons for action are? Their
holism about reasons for action blocks them from being able to hold the isolation or removal conceptions
of a reason for action, and their non-combinatorialism blocks them from being able to hold the right-
making or favoring conceptions. But then the particularists' notion of a reason for action is mysterious
indeed.66
9. A Newtonian Analogy
An analogy will help illustrate just how mysterious the particularists' notion of a reason for action really is.
We can think of the model of reasons that the particularists oppose as being akin to the following
simplified version of Newtonian classical mechanics. Suppose we have a number of massive point particles
in empty space that are interacting with each other purely through the classical law of gravitation. Then
each particle exerts a force on every other particle that is determined solely by the masses of the two
66 Does the argumentjust given assume that one must be able to give a reductive account of reasons for action? No, it does not.
I was intentionally silent about whether the proposed conceptions involved reducing reasons to more fundamental notions, or
whether they allowed for the possibility that some of the terms in the account of a reason might not be definable except in terms
of a reason. Thus even if, following Scanlon, one endorses the favoring conception of a reason but insists that the favoring relation
can only be cashed out in terms of the being-a-reason-for relation (so that one is a primitivist about both reasons and the favoring
relation), it still follows that one is not entitled to adhere to the favoring conception unless the combinatorial function is quasi-
additive, and that is all I needed in order to argue that particularists cannot hold the favoring conception.
particles and their relative positions. 67 So in any situation in which a particle of mass mi is at coordinates
(xl,yl, zi) and a second particle of mass m2 is at coordinates (x2,y2, Z2), the individualforce exerted on the first
particle by the second is the same in both magnitude and direction, regardless of the mass and position of
any other particles that may or may not be present in that situation. This is analogous to the claim, denied
by holism about reasons for action, that there are certain features of actions that always give rise to an
individual reason for or against performing the action bearing that feature, regardless of what other features
may or may not be present. Moreover, in our Newtonian model, the totalforce acting on a given particle is
determined by a vector sum of the individual forces acting on that particle due to every other particle in
the situation. This is analogous to the claim, denied by non-combinatorialism about reasons for action,
that we can determine the total reason in favor of each action by adding up the weights of the individual
reasons for and against performing that action.
We can easily imagine what a particularistic version of this Newtonian model would look like. As
before, we have various massive point particles moving around in an empty three-dimensional space.
However, for any given configuration of particles, the individual force acting on one particle due to
another is not given by any general formula that holds regardless of the positions and masses of the other
particles. Suppose that in one configuration there is a certain individual force acting on a particle of mass
mi at coordinates (xl,yi, Zl) due to a second particle of mass m2 at coordinates (x2,y2, Z2). Then there is no
assurance that in any other configuration in which those two particles have the same mass and are at the
same position, the individual force acting on the first particle due to the second is the same: depending on
the positions and masses of the various other particles in the configuration, the first might have no force
exerted on it by the second, or it might even have a force in the opposite direction exerted on it. This is the
holist element in the model. But we can also build in a non-combinatorialist element, so that there is no
finitely expressible formula, additive or otherwise, for determining how the individual forces being exerted
on a given particle combine to yield the total force that the particle is subject to. In some configurations
67 More precisely: the force acting on some particle 1 due to another particle 2 always points in the direction of particle 2 and
always has a magnitude of F = Gmim2/r2, where mi is the mass of particle 1, m2 is the mass of particle 2, r is the distance between
the two particles, and G is the universal gravitational constant.
the total force acting on a particle might be a vector sum of the individual forces acting on it, but in other
configurations the total force might be a cross product of the individual forces acting on the particle, or a
cross product added to another cross product, or something even more complicated, depending on the
intricacies of the case at hand.
However, it should be clear that, once we include both the holist and the non-combinatorialist
ingredients in our Newtonian model, we begin to lose sight of what this notion of an individual force even
amounts to. What does it mean to say that, in this model, one particle exerts an individual force in a given
direction on a second particle? It doesn't mean that if no other forces were acting on the second particle,
then it would accelerate in the direction of the individual force, because (due to the holist element in the
model) the nature of the individual force acting on the second particle is dependent upon the other forces
acting on it as well. It doesn't mean that if the individual force were not present, then the second particle
would tend to accelerate in the direction opposite to the individual force, because (also due to the holist
element in the model) the other individual forces acting on the second particle could potentially change if
the individual force due to the first were removed. And it doesn't mean that there is a contribution in the
individual force's direction to the total force acting on the second particle (a contribution that "counts in
favor" of the total force being in that direction, as we might put it), because (due to the non-
combinatorialist element in the model) the total force acting on a particle is not always a vector sum of the
individual forces acting on it. So what, then, does this notion of an individual force being exerted on a
particle amount to? And similarly, in case of particularism about reasons for action, what does this notion
of a reason for (or against) a given action amount to, if it doesn't mean that were no other morally relevant
considerations present it would be right (or wrong) of the agent to act in that way, and if it doesn't mean
that were the consideration in question removed then the given action would be less right (or less wrong),
and if it doesn't mean that the individual reason is a contribution counting in favor of(or against) acting in
that way, or in favor of (or against) that action's being the right one to do?
Thus once we build in the holist and non-combinatorialist elements into our Newtonian model,
we lose our grip on what is meant by an individual force exerted on one particle by another. Similarly, I
maintain, once particularists build in their holist and non-combinatorialist elements into the generalized
weighing framework for how reasons for action function, we lose our grip on what they mean by a reason
for or against action. This problem is particularly serious for particularists, for both of their positive
arguments for particularism about reasons for action rely on our having intuitions about whether or not
certain reasons, be they for action or for belief, are present in a given situation. However, if we have no
idea what these mysterious entities which particularists are calling "reasons" are, how can we settle
whether they are present in a given situation by an appeal to our intuitions? So this worry that
particularists do not have available to them a coherent notion of a reason for action is especially troubling
given their general argumentative strategy.
Finally, not only are particularists in danger of being left with no coherent notion of a reason for
action once they have taken on board both their holism and their non-combinatorialism, but moreover,
there is a worry that even if particularists could provide a satisfying account of their notion of a reason for
action, there would never be any point in appealing to these things particularists call "reasons for action"
anyway. To see this, let us return to the particularistic version of the simplified Newtonian model.
Suppose this model were a true description of the actual world, so that that the physical world were
entirely composed of massive point particles such that (1) the individual force each particle exerts on
another is dependent on the position and mass of every single other particle in the universe (holism), and
(2) the total force acting on each particle cannot be determined from the individual forces acting on it
according to some finitely expressible formula, whether additive or otherwise (non-combinatorialism). In
addition, suppose it were possible (perhaps per impossibile) for us to construct a device for measuring both
the individual and total forces acting on a given particle. If this were the case, then it should be clear that
given the particularistic Newtonian framework for the way the laws of nature work, the first use of the
measuring device would be absolutely useless. Why would one ever bother measuring the individual force
exerted on one particle by some other particle? Because of the holist element in the laws of nature, there is
no assurance that the same individual force will be exerted on the first particle by the second in all
situations in which the particles have exactly the same mass, position, velocity, and so on. And because of
the non-combinatorialist element in the laws of nature, it is not possible for us to calculate the total force
acting on a particle from the values of the individual forces acting on it. So what would be the point in
ever measuring the individual forces acting on a given particle?
On the particularists' conception of how reasons for action behave, the moral realm operates just
as the physical realm does in the particularist version of the Newtonian model, and the morally astute
person is precisely such a device for measuring both the individual and total reasons for action present in a
given circumstance. But then what use is the morally astute person's knowledge of the individual reasons
for and against action that are present in a given situation? It is not as if knowledge of those individual
reasons is a useful stepping stone to working out what it would be right and wrong to do in that situation,
for according to the particularists' non-combinatorialism, the individual reasons do not combine to yield
our overall moral obligations in a finitely expressible manner, additive or otherwise. And it is not as if the
knowledge of which reasons are present in the case at hand could be usefully applied to other cases, for
according to the particularists' holism the functioning of a reason in one situation cannot be predicted
from its functioning in another. So why even bother making note of the individual reasons for and against
action? By positing individual reasons to be so irremediably context-dependent, the particularist seems to
have given up the very possibility of practical reasoning and to have rendered all knowledge of reasons for
action otiose. 68
10. Giving Up Non-Combinatorialism? Or Moving Beyond Weighing?
I have just argued that if particularists accept both holism and non-combinatorialism, they are left with no
coherent notion of a reason for action. One natural line of response to this argument is as follows:
"According to you, particularists can't endorse holism and non-combinatorialism at the same time. But
who says they need to endorse both theses? Indeed, it seems that particularists can get most of what they
68 Some particularists might try to deny that the particularistic Newtonian model described in this section is really analogous
to a particularistic theory of reasons for action. However, all parties should agree that a non-particularistic theory of reasons for
action is analogous to the non-particularistic Newtonian model. Moreover, I put forward that the ways in which a particularistic
theory of reasons for action deviates from a non-particularistic one are exactly analogous to the ways in which the particularistic
Newtonian model deviates from a non-particularistic one. It follows that particularists must concede that their theory of reasons is
analogous to the particularistic Newtonian model.
want out of their position by accepting one of those two theses while denying the other. So in particular,
since particularists spend a good deal more time discussing holism than they do discussing non-
combinatorialism, why can't particularists maintain their allegiance to holism, but give up any
commitment to non-combinatorialism?"
It is indeed open to particularists to adopt such a position, but I doubt that many true
particularists would. One of the main forces driving some philosophers to become particularists is a
general suspicion about the usefulness and value of the traditional quest for true and exceptionless moral
principles, and if holism is true but non-combinatorialism is not, then there remains a significant place in
ethics for at least one portion of that traditional quest. Given the three-level generalized weighing model
of morality to which particularists are committed, there are three basic categories of moral principles
explaining how the facts at one of the model's three levels are determined in general by the facts at one of
the more basic levels:
underlying-to-contributory principles: principles specifying how in general the non-normative facts at
the underlying level determine the facts about the valences and weights of individual
reasons at the contributory level;
contributory-to-overall principles: principles specifying how in general the facts about the valences and
weights of individual reasons at the contributory level determine the facts about the
rightness and wrongness of the available actions at the overall level;
underlying-to-overall principles: principles specifying how in general the non-normative facts at the
underlying level determine the facts about the rightness and wrongness of the available
actions at the overall level.
Thus if particularists give up their non-combinatorialism, they must admit the existence of true and
exceptionless contributory-to-overall principles. Moreover, debates about which contributory-to-overall
principles are the correct ones will be instances of precisely the sort of moral theorizing that particularists
are loath to engage in.
For example, suppose particularists concede that there is an additive combinatorial function. That
does not yet settle the question of what the proper contributory-to-overall principles are, for there are
many different additive combinatorial functions-many different ways of assigning rightness and
wrongness to the actions available in a given context on the basis of comparing the total sum of reason in
favor of each. This leaves us with questions like the following. Is the true additive combinatorial function a
maximizing combinatorial function (so that the right actions in a given context are those with the greatest
sum of reason in their favor), or is it a satisficing combinatorial function (so that the right actions are those
with a suitable amount of total reason in their favor)? If the true combinatorial function involves
satisficing, does it involve absolute-level satisficing (so that how much total reason in favor of an action makes
for rightness is the same in every context), or comparative satisficing (so that an action is right in a given
context if and only if the total reason in its favor is greater than the total reason in favor of a reasonable
percentage of the other available actions)? If the true combinatorial function involves maximizing, how
does it handle situations in which the total reason function has no maximum (so that for every action that
the agent might perform, there is another available action with a greater sum of reason in its favor)?
Should we be worried that a maximizing additive combinatorial function would make morality too
demanding (since for almost every action that any of us actually perform, there exists an alternate action
with a slightly greater sum of reason in its favor that we could have performed instead)? And so on: these
types of questions should look familiar, for they are exactly the sorts of issues that face consequentialists when
they try to settle, for a given set of available actions, the connection between the total intrinsic value of
each action's consequences and the overall rightness and wrongness of those actions. 69 Moreover, just as
particularists are dubious of the analogous debates in the consequentialist literature, so too are they likely
to be deeply suspicious of this sort of back and forth over the most plausible version of an additive
combinatorial function.
Matters are not helped if instead particularists insist that there exists a finitely expressible
combinatorial function that is not additive in structure. To see this, consider two examples of works that
spend some time searching for a non-additive combinatorial function. In the penultimate chapter of The
Possibility ofAltruism, Thomas Nagel goes through great effort to show that the theory of reasons defended
in his book need not be a version of consequentialism, and he does this by proposing various non-additive
69 On maximizing versus satisficing versions of consequentialism, see Slote (1985), ch. 3. On absolute-level versus
comparative satisficing, see Hurka (1990). On the worry that a maximizing version of consequentialism might make morality too
demanding, see Kagan (1989).
"combinatorial principles" that specify how the reasons present in a given situation determine one's
overall duty-or in other words, does so by proposing various non-additive, finitely expressible
combinatorial functions. And in What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon develops an elaborate
contractualist theory of how rightness and wrongness is determined by the reasons present in a given
circumstance-or in other words, develops a distinctively contractualist combinatorial function. But again,
these works are instances of exactly the kind of moral theorizing that particularists are supposed to be
suspicious of. What particularists really want is to insist that there is something misguided about Nagel
and Scanlon's quest for true and illuminating contributory-to-overall principles, not to engage in a debate
with Nagel and Scanlon over the particular merits and faults of their respective positions.
For this reason, I doubt that many true particularists would be content to simply renege on their
non-combinatorialism. What recourse does this leave them, then, if they accept what I have argued here?
I think a better option-though ultimately a far more radical one-would be for particularists to turn
their back on the generalized weighing framework all together. What underwrote that framework was a
certain analogy, either with a literal weighing of elements on a scale, or with physical forces acting on
particles. Particularists want to move as far from those two analogies as possible while still working within
the generalized weighing framework, but if my arguments are correct, there is a certain sense in which
those analogies are essential to the weighing framework, a certain sense in which talk of reasons combining
to determine the overall status of actions commits one to preserving those analogies, at least to some degree.
Deviate too far from a strict analogy with weighing or with physical forces, and the framework falls apart.
So perhaps particularists, if they want to preserve their general skepticism about our ability to limn the
true and ultimate structure of the moral realm, should abandon talk of individual reasons, or at least
should give up the idea that reasons are the fundamental normative units that determine all other
normative properties and relations.
Indeed, there is something truly bizarre about the picture of the moral realm that particularists
wind up endorsing at the end of the day. On their picture, we can be completely confident that the proper
metaphysics of morals has exactly three layers to it: the underlying level consisting in the non-normative
facts; the contributory level consisting in the facts about reasons and their valences and weights; and the
overall level consisting in the facts about whatever normative properties and relations (such as rightness
and wrongness) are determined by the interplay of those reasons. Also on this picture, we can be
completely confident that we will never be able to fully discern the way in which the second level depends
on the first, and the third level on the second. But why should there only be three layers to the picture?
Why couldn't there be four levels, so that the values of the being-a-reason-for relation at the second level
determine the values of some other normative relation at a third level, which in turn determine the overall
moral status of the available actions at the final level? And if four, why not five, or six, or seven levels?
And once we have started adding new levels to the picture, why aren't we on the road toward explicating
the moral world, in the way in which natural science explains molecules in terms of atoms, and atoms in
terms of quarks, and quarks in terms of ... ?
Thus I think it would be more in keeping with the general sentiment behind particularism to cut
out the middleman and drop all talk of individual reasons, or at least drop the claim that properties of
reasons always determine the rightness and wrongness of actions. If one really wants to be a holist, in the
true sense of that term, about normativity and claim that what normative properties a given feature has
depends on every other feature of the situation at hand (on the whole situation, as we might put it), then
any attempt to isolate individual normative elements--call them "reasons"-in that situation will be
artificial at best; really it is the entire situation, not any subportion of it, that gives a particular action the
overall normative status that it has. (Recall the claims of holists about confirmation that it is an entire
system of belief that is confirmed or disconfirmed, not individual portions of that system.) So perhaps what
particularists really want, rather than the sort of three-level view they defend, is a two-level view according
to which we have first the underlying level consisting of the non-normative facts, and then a second level
consisting of whatever normative facts there may be, which obtain in virtue of the facts at the underlying
level in an uncodifiable manner.
The problem with adopting this line, though, is that it deprives particularists of the existing
arguments for their view-if we give up the generalized weighing framework and its assumptions that
there are such things as individual reasons that determine other normative properties like rightness and
wrongness, we lose the particularists' way of establishing (or at least attempting to establish) that there are
no true and exceptionless moral principles. But this, I am sometimes inclined to think, is the fundamental
problem with the particularist program. The guiding thought behind particularism is that ultimately the
normative is incapable of being codified in an illuminating way; but how can we learn enough about the
normative to know this without codifying the normative in at least one way? What particularists need is to
provide enough structure to the moral realm for their arguments to get a grip, without thereby
undermining their eventual conclusion that finite minds such as ours can never completely discern the
true nature of that realm, and how to achieve that balancing trick is not easy to see. Thus in the end I
suspect that problems analogous to those raised in this chapter will face any attempt to give a positive
argument for a view that is true to the spirit of particularism. That, by itself, does not mean that such a
view must be false; but it does suggest that if the real position particularists are after is true, there is no way
we could ever establish its truth.
Chapter 2: General Processes, Specific Maxims
1. Introduction
Consider the generality problem for process reliabilism. In its crudest form, process reliabilism holds that
a belief is justified if and only if the process through which it was formed is reliable (in the sense of being
truth-conducive). Now suppose I look out my window one night and form the belief that it is snowing.
What is the relevant process through which that belief was formed? Is it the process of forming a belief on
the basis of perception? The process of forming a belief about the weather on the basis of visual
perception in bad lighting conditions? The process of forming a belief that it is snowing on the basis of
such-and-such retinal stimulations at 8:02 PM on Tuesday, February 13, 2007? Depending on which
process we choose as the relevant one to test for reliability, process reliabilism yields different answers as to
whether my belief is justified. And the more general worry for process reliabilism is that every non-ad-hoc
way of specifying the relevant belief-forming process for a given belief leads to counterintuitive results:
either some beliefs that intuitively count as justified are deemed to be unjustified, or some beliefs that
intuitively count as unjustified are deemed to be justified.
There is a familiar problem for Kantian ethics that is strikingly similar in form to the generality
problem for process reliabilism. According to the first formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative, one
should act only in accordance with that maxim which one can at the same time will to be a universal law.
Now suppose an axe-murderer comes to my door and says, "I wish to murder your friend-is he here in
your house?" If I respond by lying about my friend's whereabouts, what is the relevant maxim in
accordance with which I have acted? Is it the maxim "I will tell an untruth in order to deceive my
interlocutor"? The maxim "I will tell an untruth about my friend's whereabouts in order to save his life"?
The maxim "I will tell an untruth about the whereabouts of Seth Yalcin in order to save him from being
axe-murdered at 8:02 PM on Tuesday, February 13, 2007"? Depending on which maxim we choose as the
relevant one to test for universalizability, the categorical imperative yields different answers as to whether
my action is morally permissible. And the more general worry for Kantian ethics is that every non-ad-hoc
way of specifying the relevant maxim for a given action leads to counterintuitive results: either some
actions that intuitively count as permissible are deemed to be impermissible, or some actions that
intuitively count as impermissible are deemed to be permissible.
Thus we have two theories, one a theory of epistemic justification, the other a theory of moral
permissibility, both of which face a similar problem. And once one notes the generality problem as it
arises for reliabilist theories in epistemology and Kantian theories in ethics, one begins to see similar
problems cropping up throughout philosophy. In epistemology, it is well known that most (if not all)
externalist theories of knowledge and justification face some version of the generality problem; more
recently, though, some epistemologists have argued that something like the generality problem arises even
for internalist theories of epistemic justification.' In ethics, one finds versions of the generality problem
besetting crude forms of rule-consequentialism, several versions of contractualism, and some varieties of
virtue ethics. Outside of ethics and epistemology, the generality problem for reliabilism bears a striking
resemblance to the so-called problem of the reference class for frequentist interpretations of probability.
And even Hume's constant-conjunction theory of causation faces a kind of generality problem: if we think
that event ei causes event e2 if and only if ei is a member of a group of events that are constantly conjoined
with members of a second group of events that includes e2, how do we fix on the relevant groups?
Though I am interested in each of these variants of the generality problem, in this chapter I will
be restricting my discussion to the generality problem as it arises for process reliabilism and for Kantian
ethics. I have chosen to focus on these two theories because, despite their marked difference in content (if
anything, process reliabilism is the epistemic analogue of a kind of rule-utilitarianism, not of Kantianism),
both clearly face a version of the generality problem. For this reason, examining these two quite dissimilar
theories side by side will help bring out what is really doing the work in generating a generality problem
for each. And once we have a better handle on what gives rise to the generality problem in these two
cases, we can bring this insight to bear on the other manifestations of the problem.
I I have heard this line argued in conversation by Ralph Wedgwood, Thomas Kelly, and Juan Comesafia, among others.
Wedgwood also briefly argues the point in his (2002), pp. 286-287.
2. The Generality Problem for Reliabilism: An Initial Characterization
Our first order of business is to get clearer on what the generality problem is for both process reliabilism
and Kantian ethics. Let us start with process reliabilism (which I hereafter refer to simply as "reliabilism").
The guiding thought behind reliabilism is that, much as a thermometer is a device for
determining the temperature in some region, our belief-forming mechanisms are cognitive devices for
acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones. So,just as a thermometer qualifies as reliable when it tends,
in a suitable range of (actual and counterfactual) circumstances, to give the correct temperature, a belief-
forming process is taken to count as reliable when it tends, in a suitable range of (actual and
counterfactual) circumstances, to yield a high ratio of true beliefs to false ones. But it is here that the
generality problem comes creeping in. To yield a ratio of true to false beliefs that is other than 0 or 1, a
belief-forming process must be repeatable: it must be possible for it to occur on more than one occasion.
The specific process token by which a given belief token is formed is a sequence of datable events--event
tokens, that is--which either does or does not result in a true belief. That, surely, is not what reliabilists
mean to be assessing the reliability of. Rather, what they mean to be evaluating is whether (the instances
of) a certain belief-forming process type on average result in a high ratio of true to false beliefs in a suitable
range of circumstances. But then the generality problem is thrust upon us: when on a given occasion one
comes to believe that p, the process token by which that belief was formed is an instance of ever-so-many
process types; which of these is the relevant process type whose reliability we are to evaluate when
determining whether one's belief is justified?
With these distinctions in mind, we can formulate reliabilism as follows:
reliabilism: S's token belief that p is epistemically justified if and only if the process token by which
it was formed is a process token whose relevant process type is reliable (i.e. results in a
sufficiently high ratio of true to false beliefs in a suitable range of circumstances).2
The generaliy problem for reliabilism, then, is to specify in a non-ad-hoc manner the relevant process type to
2 Actually, this formulation of reliabilism is not entirely accurate: a more complete formulation would make a distinction
between belief-dependent processes that take as input at least some other belief tokens, and belief-independent processes that do not; see
Goldman (1979), p. 117. However, distinguishing between belief-dependent and -independent processes would bring in
distracting complications that are largely orthogonal to the main issues raised by the generality problem, so throughout this
chapter I will implicitly assume that all beliefs under discussion are formed via belief-independent processes.
test for reliability when assessing whether a given belief token is justified.
It is standard to distinguish the generality problem from two related, but distinct, problems for
reliabilism. 3 The first of these we can call the problem of extent. This is a problem that arises in determining
the boundaries of the process token that results in one's coming to believe a given proposition: how far
back in the causal ancestry of the belief should we go? Consider again the case in which, as a result of
looking out my window, I form a belief that it is snowing. What is the extent of the relevant process token
by which that belief token was formed? Does it begin with the event of the snow falling? With the event of
certain photons bombarding my sensory organs? With the event of its seeming to me as if there is snow
falling outside my window? Settling on an answer to this question is no trivial matter, but for the purposes
of this chapter I will simply assume that reliabilists have an adequate response to it; my main concern lies
elsewhere.
A second problem that is standardly distinguished from the generality problem we can call the
problem of the scope of assessment. Suppose that-having solved the problem of extent-we fix on the relevant
process token by which a given belief token is formed, and that-having solved the generality problem-
we fix on the relevant process type of which that process token is an instance. Now we wish to assess
whether, on average, instances of that process type yield a high preponderance of true beliefs. What range
of cases do we consider in order to determine this average? Do we consider every possible situation in
which the process type is (or would be) instantiated? Or do we restrict ourselves only to some suitable
range of cases, and if so, how do we determine the restriction? As with the problem of extent, settling this
question is no trivial matter, but once again I will simply assume that reliabilists have an adequate
response to it.4
3 In fact, it is not entirely clear that these two problems are distinct from the generality problem, rather than two further
manifestations of it. However, even if they are additional aspects of the generality problem, I am going to follow the general
practice in the literature of treating them as distinct problems, and set them aside for now. (For more on this issue, see n. 24.)
4 There is a related problem that is worth mentioning, if only because it is not often stressed. It seems likely that any solution
to the problem of the scope of assessment will result in there being an uncountab~y infinite number of situations in which the token
instance of the relevant process type results in a true belief, and an uncountably infinite number of situations in which the token
instance of the relevant process type results in a false belief-even if, intuitively, there are "many more" of the former type of case
than the latter. The additional problem, then, is to figure out how to determine a precise ratio when we are comparing infinities
in this manner. (In their casual talk of the ratio of cases in which a process yields a true belief to those in which it yields a false
one, reliabilists seem to be assuming that the space of possible worlds is a measure space, but this is a highly nontrivial assumption.)
To get a feel for how difficult it is for reliabilists to solve the generality problem, let us consider
one attempt at a solution. Taking a hint from the naturalistic aspirations of reliabilism, one might propose
that the relevant type for any belief-forming process token is the natural kind to which it belongs.
However, this will not do. As Earl Conee and Richard Feldman point out, "every belief-forming process
token is categorized in multiple ways by laws in each of several sciences," so each process token is an
instance of an abundance of natural kinds. 5 For example, in the case in which I come to believe that it is
snowing, the process token by which my belief is formed is plausibly an instance of the following natural
kind process types: physical process, electrochemical process, perceptual process, visual process resulting
in a belief, visual process resulting in a belief characterizing the environment around me, and so on. There
is no single process type that we can single out as the natural kind to which the process token belongs, and
hence appealing to natural kinds provides no solution to the generality problem.
There have been a multitude of alternate proposals for how to solve the generality problem for
reliabilism, but in each case the following pattern has held: the solution is proposed in the literature, and
then someone (usually Conee and Feldman) comes along and points out either that the proposal does not
isolate a single type for each process token, or else that it does isolate a single type but the type it fixes on
yields counterintuitive results. Often the advocates of the solution do not agree that their proposal has
these consequences, but I side with Conee, Feldman, and the other critics of reliabilism in holding that, at
least so far, no successful solution to the generality problem has been offered.6 If this is correct, then
reliabilism at this point in time is crucially incomplete: until a (defensible) way of fixing on the relevant
process type for a given process token is filled in, it is not even clear what the implications of the theory
are. And the deeper worry is that, as William Alston insightfully puts it, "the assignment of each token to a
unique type has been rigged to fit an antecedent decision as to the epistemic status of the belief, thereby
giving rise to the suspicion that reliability is not the most basic determinant ofjustification after all." 7
5 Conee & Feldman (1998), p. 10.
6 For effective criticism of nearly every solution to the generality problem on offer in the literature, see Feldman (1985),
Conee & Feldman (1998), Feldman & Conee (2002), and the afterword to the reprint of Conee & Feldman (1998) in their (2004).
7 Alston (1995), p. 6.
3. The Generality Problem for Kantian Ethics: An Initial Characterization
Such is the generality problem for reliabilism; what, exactly, is the analogous problem for Kantian ethics?
My discussion here will focus only on the problem as it arises for one formulation of Kant's Categorical
Imperative, namely the Formula of Universal Law, which reads: "act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." 8 Moreover, in order to avoid
getting bogged down in issues of Kant exegesis, I will concentrate my attention on a recently influential
reading of Kant due to John Rawls and his students Onora (Nell) O'Neill, Barbara Herman, and
Christine Korsgaard, a group I will occasionally refer to as the neo-Kantians.
One of the central tenets of the neo-Kantian interpretation is that, for Kant, all action is purposive:
action is not mere behavior--not merely a string of observable events in the external world-but rather
essentially involves an agent willing that some end or purpose be achieved. 9 A second central neo-Kantian
tenet is that all action is in accordance with maxims: whenever one acts, one acts in accordance with a
subjective principle of volition called a "maxim" that specifies what one is doing, why one is doing it (the
end or purpose that one hopes to further through the action), and in what circumstances one would do
what one is doing. Thus, on the neo-Kantian interpretation, all maxims can be expressed in the form,
"When in circumstances C, I will do act A in order to achieve end E." 10 The term "act" here refers to a
piece of mere behavior; following Korsgaard, it will be helpful to reserve the term "action" for the
compound consisting of an act, done for the sake of some end, in some circumstances." One need not
8 Kant (1785/1997), AK 4:441 (emphasis suppressed). All references to Kant's work will use the standard practice of
referring to the page numbers of the Germany Academy (AK) edition of Kant's complete works.
Some might question my decision to focus on the Formula of Universal Law, since several recent commentators have
argued that the Formula of Universal Law is merely a provisional formulation of Kant's supreme moral law that yields
indefensible conclusions about moral permissibility. (I am thinking here of Allen Wood in particular; see his (1999), ch. 3.)
However, not only do I believe that the Formula of Universal Law plays a more crucial role in Kantian ethical theory--and, in
particular, in the positive arguments for Kantian ethical theory-than these commentators think, but, moreover, if the object of
assessment for both the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends is the maxim of one's action (as surely
must be the case), then every formulation of the Categorical Imperative faces a version of the generality problem.
'J See Nell (1975), p. 37; Herman (1990), pp. 15-19; Korsgaard (1989a), p. 57; and Korsgaard (1989b), p. 176.
10 See Rawls (2000), p. 168; Nell (1975), pp. 34-37; Herman (1993c), p. 134; and Korsgaard (1997a), p. xviii. Rawls gives the
form of a maxim as "I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z," but the "unless Z" clause can be
combined with the "in circumstances C" clause to make a more complex circumstances clause "in circumstances C-unless-Z."
Korsgaard usually omits the "in circumstances C" clause in her formulation of a maxim, but that clause is needed to avoid the
absurd result that, when one imagines the world of the universalized maxim while running the CI-procedure, one must imagine
everyone in that world attempting at every instant of time to act on the maxim being tested.
II Korsgaard (forthcoming-a), lect. 1, p. 11 (although, as mentioned in the previous footnote, Korsgaard usually omits the
explicitly rehearse a given maxim in one's head before acting, but whenever one performs an action-as
opposed to a mere act-there is always, on this interpretation of Kant, some maxim in accordance with
which one acts. 12
A final central tenet of the neo-Kantian interpretation is that the object of moral assessment for
the Formula of Universal Law is the maxim of one's action: on this reading, the Formula of Universal
Law provides a test for the moral permissibility of an action by evaluating that action's maxim in a certain
way. When deliberating about whether to do something, one is to run through the following five-step
procedure, which Rawls and Herman call the CI-procedure:
1. Formulate the maxim M of the proposed action. The maxim can be expressed in the form
"When in circumstances C, I will do act A in order to achieve end E."
2. Imagine what Korsgaard calls the world of the universalized maxim (WUM): a world in which
everyone acts according to M. Also imagine yourself in that world, attempting to act on M.
3. If either WUM is inconceivable (the logical contradiction interpretation of this step), or your
attempt to act on M in WUM is bound to be frustrated (the practical contradiction
interpretation of this step), then M fails the contradiction-in-conception test. 13
4. If there are ends that you are bound to have simply in virtue of being a finite, rational agent
but that would necessarily be frustrated in WUM, then M fails the contradiction-in-the-will test.
5. If M fails either test, then the proposed action is morally impermissible; otherwise the proposed
action is morally permissible. 14
An example will help us get a feel both for the CI-procedure and for how the generality problem arises for
it. Earlier I mentioned the case of the axe-murderer at the door for familiarity's sake, but we can also
apply the CI-procedure to less well-worn examples.
Suppose I would like to own a copy of the latest release by my favorite band. However, being
stingy by nature, I am unwilling to buy the album through legitimate means. My friend tells me of an
reference to a circumstance). Ross (1930), p. 7, makes a similar distinction between "actions" and "acts." I bypass here a difficulty
about whether an action should be considered a distinct entity from its act or merely the same entity under a different description.
12 Could there be, for a single action, multiple maxims in accordance with which one acts? Throughout this chapter I will
assume-as Kant's frequent talk of the maxim of an action strongly suggests-that there is always a single maxim for each action.
13 I have formulated the contradiction-in-conception test disjunctively to gloss over an internecine dispute among the neo-
Kantians about the proper interpretation of that test: Herman (1993c), for example, advocates the logical contradiction
interpretation, whereas Nell (1975) and Korsgaard (1985) advocate the practical contradiction interpretation. It will not matter
for our purposes which interpretation is correct.
14 For similar summaries of the steps in the CI-procedure, see Rawls (2000), pp. 167-169; Nell (1975), pp. 59-63; Herman
(1984), pp. 46-47; Korsgaard (1997a), pp. xviii-xxi; and Millgram (2003), pp. 526-527.
online computer server from which I can download, for free, a pirated copy of the album. I ask myself,
"Would it be morally permissible for me to do so?" Running through the CI-procedure, I first formulate
the maxim M of my proposed action: "When I don't feel like spending money on a music album that I
want, I will download a pirated copy of that album in order to obtain a copy of it to listen to." Next I
imagine the world of the universalized maxim: a world in which (i) everyone, when they wish to obtain a
music album but don't feel like buying it, downloads a pirated copy of the album, and in which (ii) I am
also in that world, attempting to act on M. Let us suppose that, in such a world, downloading of pirated
music is so rife that the entire music industry collapses. 15 Then either we have a logical contradiction,
since it is inconceivable that there be an album for me to attempt to download when the music industry
has collapsed, or we have a practical contradiction, since my intent to download the album would of
necessity be frustrated if there is no album to download; thus on either interpretation, our maxim M fails
the contraction-in-conception test. So it appears that, according to Kant's Formula of Universal Law, it is
impermissible for me to download a pirated copy of the album. 16
Not so fast, though--who says that the maxim of my action is M? For example, my maxim might
really be the more specific maxim M': "When I don't feel like spending money on music album X, I will
download a pirated copy of X in order to obtain a copy of it to listen to." Presumably no contradiction,
logical or practical, exists in the world of this universalized maxim: even if we assume that most people in
that world want to hear the album in question and would rather not purchase it through legitimate
means, the widespread downloading of a single album would hardly overthrow the entire music industry.
So while perhaps it might take me a bit longer to download that specific album since so many others are
downloading it as well, it seems safe to assume that no logical or practical contradiction arises in a world
in which M' is a universal law of nature. And presumably a similar results applies if the maxim of my
action is instead the slightly less specific maxim M": "When I don't feel like spending money on a music
15 Note that in making this assumption, we face another vexed issue in Kant interpretation, namely to what degree it is
acceptable (and perhaps necessary) to make empirical assumptions when determining whether there is a contradiction of one
form or another in the world of the universalized maxim.
16 Almost every step of the preceding application of the CI-procedure requires additional defense and/or clarification.
However, since I am more concerned with what we input into the CI-procedure than with how the CI-procedure works once we have an input, I
will for the most part be ignoring such interpretative details.
album of musical genre G that I want, I will download a pirated copy of that album in order to obtain a
copy of it to listen to." Moreover, let us assume (as seems plausible) that there are no ends that I am bound
qua finite, rational agent to have and that would be frustrated by everyone's downloading that specific
album, or albums of that specific genre, so that neither M' nor M" fails the contradiction-in-the-will test,
either. Then depending on which maxim (M, M', M", or some other) is the true maxim of my action, we
get different results as to whether it is morally permissible for me to download the album in question. 17
Earlier I appealed to a distinction between process tokens and process types in formulating the
generality problem for reliabilism, and we can do the same when formulating the analogous problem for
Kant's Formula of Universal Law. When deliberating about whether to download the album, what I am
pondering is whether, in a given token circumstance, to perform a given token act for a given token end.
Maxims, on the other hand, must advert to circumstance, act, and end types, or else it could not be the
case that more than one person acts on the same maxim in the world of the universalized maxim: really a
maxim is of the form, "When in circumstance type C, I will do act type A in order to achieve end type E."
But now the generality problem is thrust upon us: a specific circumstance, act, or end token is an instance
of ever-so-many circumstance, act, or end types; which of these types are the relevant ones to put in the
maxim whose universalizability we are to be assessing when running through the CI-procedure?
4. The Need for a Deeper Characterization of Each Problem
The similarities between the two problems facing reliabilists and Kantians are striking, but almost as
striking are the differences in their respective attitudes toward their respective versions of the problem.
Reliabilists are terrified of the generality problem; probably the only solution to it in the literature
generally thought to have much chance of succeeding is a proposal of William Alston's, but as we shall
see, Alston's proposal faces grave difficulties. On the other hand, Kantians-particularly those of the neo-
Kantian persuasion-tend to think of their variant of the generality problem as already having been
solved. During the early and middle parts of the 20th century, it was widely held that there are
17 Onora O'Neill has called this the "problem of relevant descriptions" (1975, p. 12), but I will continue to call it the
generality problem to emphasize its similarity to the analogous problem for reliabilism.
insurmountable problems with taking Kant's Formula of Universal Law to be a workable principle that
yields plausible moral verdicts.' 8 However, thanks largely to the work of neo-Kantians such as O'Neill,
Herman, and Korsgaard, many contemporary Kantians take these problems for the Formula of Universal
Law to have been addressed, including--it is usually assumed-the generality problem. Given how much
effort, in particular, was spent in the early work of O'Neill and Herman attempting to answer the
generality problem, mention of the problem tends to elicit an exasperated tone from neo-Kantians. "Not
this again," they seem to say. "Wasn't this problem solved years ago?"
But despite the neo-Kantians' confidence that a solution to their version of the generality problem
has already been found, in my experience the vast majority of non-Kantians are convinced that the
Kantian generality problem has not been solved-indeed, are convinced that the Kantian generality
problem could not be solved, at least not on the Kantian's terms. So even if the neo-Kantians are correct
that a solution to their problem is on offer, they still need to diagnose why so many intelligent individuals
resist accepting that solution.
In fact, I think that both sides to both debates are in need of a deeper characterization of the
generality problem if they are to fully make their case. Critics of reliabilism need a deeper characterization
because, so far, their case has largely consisted in finding problems with every existing solution to the
generality problem. As such, all they have shown is that a solution has notyet been found, not that a solution
could not be found, and one is left with the lingering feeling that maybe reliabilists have simply not been
clever enough in their attempts at solving the generality problem. To forestall such suspicions, the critics
of reliabilism need to do a better job than they have explaining why, exactly, the problem arises. Defenders
ofreliabilism need a deeper characterization of the generality problem because they seem fresh out of ideas
for how to answer it, and no doubt the best route to a solution to a philosophical problem is a deeper
understanding of what gives rise to the problem in the first place. Critics of Kantianism need a deeper
characterization of the Kantian version of the generality problem if they are to convince the neo-Kantians
18 Besides the generality problem, the problems for the Formula of Universal Law that I have in mind here are the charge
that it is an empty formalism and the charge that it is overly rigoristic. For discussion of these latter two charges, see Korsgaard
(1985), O'Neill (1984), and O'Neill (1985).
that a solution to that problem has not, in fact, been found-and more importantly, if they are to
convince the neo-Kantians that a solution to that problem cannot be found. And defenders ofKantianism need
a deeper characterization of the problem to help persuade their critics that they have indeed solved the
generality problem, and to help diagnose why acceptance of their favored solution has faced such
resistance.
The main purpose of this chapter will be to attempt such a deeper characterization-of what the
generality problem for each theory is, of why it arises, and of whether there is any hope for a solution to it.
My guiding idea is that by looking at these two variants of the generality problem in parallel, we can gain
better insight into each. So in particular, the chapter's next few sections (§§5-6) will be devoted to
reformulating the reliabilist and Kantian versions of the generality problem so as to emphasize the
similarities between the two and iron out irrelevant differences of detail. I will do this by a somewhat
circuitous route: first (§5) I will consider Alston's proposed solution to the generality problem for
reliabilism, both because I do not think its faults have been adequately addressed in the literature, and
because Alston's way of casting the problem will provide a clue for how to bring our formulations of the
problem for reliabilism and Kantianism closer to one another, which I will attempt to do in the section
that follows (§6). Then I will use this way of characterizing what is common to the problem besetting both
theories to argue that the three main strategies utilized by the neo-Kantians to resist the generality
problem do not succeed (§§7-10). Finally, lessons learned from this discussion will allow me to close (§11)
by positing a general theory as to why reliabilism and Kantianism both face a generality problem, and to
speculate about what hope they each have of ever solving it.
5. Alston's Attempted Solution to the Generality Problem for Reliabilism
As mentioned earlier, William Alston's proposed solution to reliabilism's generality problem in his article
"How to Think about Reliability" is widely regarded as the most successful attempt at solving that
problem. Alston's proposal has two basic ingredients. First, following a suggestion of Goldman's, Alston
recommends that we think of each belief-forming process type as a function (in the mathematical sense)
mapping certain token states-the "inputs"-to certain other token states-the "outputs." So in
particular, each output of such a function consists in the token state of one's believing some proposition.
Second, Alston insists that it follows from an assumption he calls "psychological realism" that whenever
one comes to hold a given belief token, there is a unique "psychologically real" function that is activated
in the formation of that belief token. This gives us a nice, tidy solution to the generality problem: the
psychologically real function determines the relevant process type, and we can evaluate whether that type
is reliable by seeing whether, in a suitable range of (actual and counterfactual) cases, the ratio of cases in
which the function's output is a true belief token to those in which its output is a false belief token is
sufficiently close to 1.
Several simplifying assumptions will make it easier to both understand and assess Alston's
proposal. First, let us ignore cases in which the input states to a given function include belief states-such
functions correspond to what Goldman calls "belief-dependent processes" and give rise to additional
complications that need not concern us. Second, let us follow Alston in assuming a particular solution to
the problem of extent. In particular, let us follow Alston in assuming that when one forms a given (token)
belief via perception (such as: a belief in the proposition that there is a tree to one's right), the relevant input
state is one's having a certain (token) experience (such as: an experience as of a tree being to one's right).19
Finally, let us make one last assumption so that we can overlook a slight mistake in Alston's
proposal. Alston's use of the term "function" in the mathematical sense ignores a crucial element in the
desired process type: once a given domain and range are fixed, mathematical functions are individuated
solely by <input, output> ordered pairs, so if some function F maps experiential input x to belief output b,
19 Throughout this chapter, I will talk about experiences as of certain things being the case, but in doing so, I do not intend to
commit myself to any particular theory concerning the nature of perceptual experience, or to any particular view about the
admissible contents of such experience. For ease of exposition, I will usually assume that fairly robust contents such as that there is a
tree to my right can be part of the content of experience, but if one disagrees with this assumption, all of my examples could (with a
bit of work) be reformulated in terms of much thinner contents. Similarly, I do not intend to commit myself to any particular view
about which perceptual processes are belief-dependent and which belief-independent. For ease of exposition, I will usually assume
that processes like one's coming to believe via perception that there is a tree to one's right are belief-independent, but if one
disagrees with this assumption, all of my examples could (with a bit of work) be reformulated in terms of whatever the true belief-
independent processes end up being. (Note that process reliabilists are committed to there being at least some belief-independent
processes.)
It is also worth noting that Alston's solution to the problem of extent requires making some potentially contentious
assumptions about the connection between experience and belief. In particular, his solution commits him to the claim that
perceptual experiences cause perceptual beliefs about the content of those experiences, but one might doubt that perceptual beliefs
and experiences are, in this way, entirely distinct existences. For more on this subject, see §6 of chapter 3 of this dissertation.
then any process token that begins with the event token of one's coming to have x and ends (by whatever
deviant means) with the event token of one's coming to have b qualifies as an instance of the type
associated with function F. However, we might think that only certain ways of getting from the having of x
to the having of b should count as instances of the relevant process type. In effect, then, Alston's proposal
ignores anything that might occur in the middle of a given process. So let us follow Alston in making the
assumption that what happens at the middle stages of a process type is irrelevant to its reliability;
conceding this to Alston will not matter much, for (as we shall soon see) Alston has a difficult enough time
pinning down what happens at the beginning and end of a given process type.20
With these assumptions in place, Alston's proposal can be formulated in the abstract as follows.
Suppose one comes to believe a certain proposition on the basis of a certain perceptual experience that
one has. This gives us an ordered pair of state tokens <x, b> = <a certain token experience, a certain token belief>
which (since we are ignoring what happens in the middle of a given process type or token) we can identify
with the process token by which b was formed. Alston's suggestion is that the assumption of psychological
realism gives us a unique function that is activated in the formation of b. We can identify this function
with a set F of <experience token, belief token> ordered pairs such that (i) no two ordered pairs share the
same first member (i.e. the function maps every input to a unique output), and (ii) <x, b> E F (i.e. the
function maps x to b). Let X be the function's domain: the set of experience tokens such that one of the
ordered pairs in F has that experience token as its first member. And let B be the function's range: the set of
belief tokens such that one of the ordered pairs in F has that belief token as its second member. Then we
can assess the reliability of F by seeing whether, in a suitable range of circumstances in which one is in
token states x* and b* such that x* E X, b* E B, and <x*, b*> E F, the ratio of cases in which b* is a belief
token with a true content to those in which b* is belief token with a false content is suitably close to 1. If
this is so, then the original belief token b counts as justified; otherwise, it counts as unjustified.
20 How to amend Alston's proposal once one discharges this assumption is not entirely clear. The natural suggestion is to
consider a string of functions composed with one another, but this proposal raises a host of worries. For example, how do we
determine how many--and which-intermediate stages to take into account when formulating the string of functions? But more
importantly, adding additional intermediate stages does not address the main worry, since for each intermediate function we will
still need some way of ruling out deviant ways of getting from a given input to a given output of that intermediate function.
However, to phrase Alston's proposal in this way is to immediately see what is wrong with it. If we
are somehow given a domain X of relevant token experiences and a range B of relevant token beliefs, we
can all agree with Alston that his thesis of psychological realism fixes the map F from elements of X to
elements of B: given that one's having experience token x causes one to have belief token b, it might well
be true that one's psychological mechanisms fix the fact that if one were to have somewhat similar
experience token x*, one would come to have somewhat similar belief token b* = F(x*); that if one were to
have somewhat similar experience token x**, one would come to have somewhat similar belief token b* =
F(x**); and so on. The problem, however, is: nothing in Alston's proposal gives us any guidelines for how to fix the
relevant domain X and range B. What is the extent of the somewhat similar <experience token, belief token>
ordered pairs (<x*, b*>, <x*, b**>, etc.) that have a bearing on the reliability of the process by which b was
formed? By itself, Alston's proposal gives us no way to answer this question.
For example, suppose I am playing with a collection of colored blocks. I have an experience as of
a red block being to my right, and as a result I form a belief that a red block is to my right. Thus we have
an ordered pair of state tokens <x, b> = <my token experience as of a red block being to my right, my token belief that
a red block is to my right> that we can identify with the token process by which b is formed. What is the
relevant function F whose reliability we are to assess when judging whether b is justified? Suppose that,
given the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms I happen to have, the following facts all hold true:
* if instead I were to have token experience xl = a token experience as of a red block being slightly more to my
right, I would have had a different token belief with the same content, namely bi = a token
belief that a red block is to my right;
* if instead I were to have token experience x2 = a token experience as of a reddish-orange block being to my
right, I would have had a different token belief with the same content, namely b2 = a token
belief that a red block is to my right;
* if instead I were to have token experience x3 = a token experience as of a red block being to my left, I
would have had a different token belief with a different content, namely b3 = a token belief
that a red block is to my left; and
* if instead I were to have token experience x4 = a token experience as of a green block being to my right, I
would have had a different token belief with a different content, namely b4 = a token belief
that a green block is to my right.
Given these facts, it seems plausible that ifxl, x2, x3, and x4 are all members of F's domain X, and ifbl, b2,
b3, and b4 are all members of F's range B, then <xi, bl>, <x2, b2>, <x3, b3>, and <x4, b4> are all members of
F. However, how do we determine whether xl, x2, x3, and x4 are all members of X? And how do we
determine whether bi, b2, b3, and b4 are all members of B? When evaluating whether my perceptual belief
in the proposition that a red block is to my right is the outcome of a reliable process, do we count instances in
which I seem to see a block in a different position, or seem to see a block of a different hue, as instances of
the same process, and if so, how great a difference in position or hue is allowable? It should be clear that
to answer these questions just is to answer the generality problem for reliabilism, and thus an appeal to
"psychologically real" functions cannot be the complete solution to that problem.
One reply on Alston's behalf would be to claim that, at least with regards to the selection of range
B, the choice is obvious: we pick the set of all token beliefs that share the same content with our original
belief token b. An initial problem with this reply is that, as Conee and Feldman point out, if we use this as
a general strategy for how to select the relevant function for every belief-forming process, we are saddled
with the absurd result that any process resulting in a belief in a necessary truth or a self-confirming belief
(such as the belief that someone has beliefs) is perfectly reliable, since on the proposed account it is impossible
for the function associated with that process to yield an output state whose content is false. 21 A bigger
worry for this reply, though, is that even if it helps us fix the range of our function, we are still left with the
issue of how to select the proper domain. For example, in the case just mentioned, do we include
experience tokens xi and x2 in the domain? If we do, then each would be mapped to a belief token with
the same content as b, but it is far from clear what constraints are in play to rule them in or out.
At this point it is extremely tempting to insist that, in each case, there is a certain "natural"
domain that is fixed by the way the cognitive and psychological mechanisms in question work; indeed,
there is good evidence that this is what Alston intended to propose from the outset. However, to fill in
Alston's proposal in this way is just to slide back into an appeal to natural kinds as a way of attempting to
solve the generality problem: the suggestion, in effect, is that there are certain joints in nature that help us
21 Conee & Feldman (1998), p. 14. Comesafia (2006)'s recent attempt at solving the generality problem for reliabilism also
has this absurd consequence.
fix the relevant domain-certain natural ways of carving up sets of experiential input states into the right
groups. The problem, though, is that there are too many joints in nature for this suggestion to be of any use.
In the example we have been considering, should the domain X be the set of all token experiences as of
something red being to one's right? The set of all token experiences as of something colored being
somewhere in one's field of vision? The set of all token experiences as of something exactly such-and-such
shade of red being in exactly such-and-such spot in one's field of vision? Each of these sets seems as
natural as the rest.
Thus I conclude that Alston's suggested solution to the generality problem for reliabilism fails. His
central mistake is that he has conflated the input/output of a function with its domain/range. It is true that if
one's coming to have token experience x causes one to come to have token belief b, then this fixes one input
and one corresponding output of the function that Alston seeks. However, this fact by itself gives us no way of
determining the entire domain of inputs that the function takes and the entire range of outputs that it can yield,
which is what we would need to solve the generality problem. 22
6. Structural Similarities Between the Two Generality Problems
As a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism, Alston's proposal is unsuccessful. However, Alston's
way of formulating his would-be solution brings out an important parallel between the generality problem
for reliabilism and the analogous problem for Kantian ethics.
In the case of perceptual beliefs formed via belief-independent processes, Alston's proposal is as
follows. Belief token b formed on the basis of experience token x is epistemically justified if and only if the
function F which is activated in the formation of that belief token is reliable. Let X be F's domain and B
be F's range, where x E X and b E B. Then the problem that Alston's account leaves unsolved is how to
get from a given input/output token <x, b> to the relevant ordered pair <X, B>. The analogous
generality problem for Kantianism can be formulated as follows. According to the Formula of Universal
22 Adler & Levin (2002)'s recent defense of Alston's proposal against Conee & Feldman (1998)'s criticisms faces a similar
problem: Adler & Levin argue that Alston's psychologically realized functions relate variables, not values, but then provide no way
of determining the relevant range of these variables.
Law, the (token) action of performing act token a for the sake of end token e in circumstance token c is
morally permissible if and only if that action's maxim is universalizable. Moreover, the action's maxim
can be represented as an ordered triple <act type A, end type E, circumstance type C>, where token a is
an instance of type A, token e is an instance of type E, and token c is an instance of type C. The problem
left unsolved is how to get from a given action token <a, e, c> to the relevant maxim <A, E, C>.
The similarities here should be noticeable. However, with several additional assumptions and
simplifications, we can bring these formulations even closer to one another. First, let us assume that types
are sets of tokens. This involves taking a stand on the metaphysics of types, but for our purposes the
assumption is harmless, and it will greatly simplify our notation. Second, we should notice that in the case
of Kantianism, it is <act token, end token, circumstance token> ordered triples that are the object of
moral evaluation, whereas in the case of reliabilism, it is only the belief token itself-rather than the
<experience token, belief token> ordered pair-that is the object of epistemic evaluation. However, this
difference does not seem to be one of great consequence. As Goldman stresses in his seminal defense of
process reliabilism, reliabilism is a historical (as opposed to a current time-slice) theory of epistemic justification
according to which every belief token is the outcome of some (token) causal process, and it is in virtue of
certain properties of its causal history-that is, in virtue of certain properties of the process token by which
it was formed--that the belief token is or is not justified. 23 Thus whether we say that the belief token itself
is epistemicallyjustified due to its being formed by a process token with certain properties, or whether we
instead say that it is the entire process-token-ending-in-the-formation-of-a-belief-token that is epistemically
justified, seems largely a matter of terminological convention. So hereafter, let us take it to be the
<experience token, belief token> ordered pair (our proxy for the process token) that is the object of
epistemic evaluation according to reliabilism.
Third, let us ignore the circumstance portion of maxims, and treat maxims as <act type, end
type> ordered pairs rather than <act type, end type, circumstance type> ordered triples. A full solution to
the generality problem for Kantianism would include a way of determining the relevant circumstance type
23 Goldman (1979), p. 117.
for a given action token. However, determining how to select the relevant act and end types is already a
difficult enough problem, and presumably whatever technique is used to select the relevant act and end
types can also be extended to select the relevant circumstance type.24
Finally, let us make one last rather large simplification, and identify the relevant process type for a
given process token with the ordered pair <X, B> consisting of the domain X and range B of the function
F activated by that process token. This might seem like an egregious over-simplification of our problem,
since we are in effect ignoring the actual function mapping inputs to outputs, but I have already conceded
to Alston that if we can find a way of selecting the pertinent domain X and range B in a given case, we
can appeal to his thesis of psychological realism to fix the relevant function F.25
With all of these qualifications in place, let us now restate each theory's version of the generality
problem. Suppose belief token b is formed on the basis of experience token x. Then reliabilism holds the
following:
<x, b> is epistemically justified iff <X, B> is reliable,
where x E X, b E B, and <X, B> is the epistemically relevant process type for process token <x, b>. The
generality problem for reliabilism-modulo the simplifications we have made-is to find a defensible, non-ad-
hoc way of selecting the relevant process type <X, B> for every process token <x, b>.26
24 In many ways, the problem for Kantians of selecting the relevant circumstance type is analogous to what I called the
problem qf the scope of assessment for reliabilism: the problem of selecting the relevant range of actual and counterfactual situations to
consider when assessing the reliability of a given process type. Moreover, this parallel should confirm something that many
readers no doubt suspected from the outset: the scope of assessment problemjust is another aspect of the generality problem for
reliabilism, not a separate problem that needs an alternate treatment. However, I will continue to neglect the problem of the
scope of assessment (and the corresponding problem of circumstance type selection for Kantianism) in order to keep the
discussion manageable.
25 The need for a way of selecting the relevant function F might suggest at least one point of disanalogy between the
generality problem as it arises for reliabilism and the generality problem as it arises for Kantian ethics. However, appearances are
deceiving: in fact, a full-blown solution to the Kantian generality problem would include a component that plays the same role as
function F, in the form of an instance of the Hypothetical Imperative that connects the specified means to the specified ends. For a
given maxim <act type A, end type E>, it is not true that any action token <act token a*, end token e*> such that a* E A and
e* E E counts as a pertinent action to have someone doing in the world of the universalized maxim: that action token will only be
relevant if act a* really is a means to end e*. (For more on the complicated issue of how the Hypothetical Imperative interacts with
the Categorical Imperative within Kantian ethics, see Herman (1990), ch. 3, and Korsgaard (1997b).)
26 This way of formulating the generality problem for reliabilism reveals an important mistake in Conee and Feldman's
favored way of arguing against potential solutions to that problem. Conee and Feldman most often argue that a given proposal
falls prey to what Feldman (1985) calls the "No-Distinction Problem": the problem of selecting a process type for a given process
token which is such that, intuitively, some of the belief tokens formed as a result of an instance of that type are justified, and some
of the belief tokens formed as a result of that type are unjustified (so that the proposal fails to make a distinction where intuitively
there should be one). However, it is a mistake to assume that just because <X, B> is the relevant process type for process token
<x, b>, therefore every process token <x*, b*> such that x* E X and b* E B has <X, B> as its relevant process type.
Suppose act token a is performed for the sake of end token e. Then Kant's Formula of Universal
Law holds the following:
<a, e> is morally permissible iff <A, E> is universalizable,
where a E A, e E E, and <A, E> is the morally relevant action type (= the maxim) for action token <a, e>.
The generality problem for Kantian ethics-modulo the simplifications we have made-is to find a defensible,
non-ad-hoc way of selecting the relevant action type <A, E> for every action token <a, e>.
7. Desiderata for a Successful Solution to Either Generality Problem
Our reformulations and simplifications have revealed a certain structural similarity between the two
versions of the generality problem, but we still have further to go before reaching the desired
characterization of the problem and what gives rise to it. However, in the next few sections I want to
consider one pay-off from our characterization of the problem so far: it will allow us to fairly easily show
why the three main neo-Kantian solutions to the generality problem are all unsatisfactory. Our discussion
of the failings of these would-be solutions will in turn motivate my attempt at a deeper characterization of
the generality problem in the chapter's final section. But before we launch into an assessment of the neo-
Kantians' attempted solutions to the generality problem, it will help to have on the table certain
desiderata for a successful solution to either theory's version of the generality problem.
In their classic statement of the generality problem as it arises for reliabilism, Conee and Feldman
list three conditions for the adequacy of a proposed solution to the generality problem. First, the solution
should be principled and not just an ad hoc, case-by-case selection of the relevant process type for a given
process token. Second, the solution should remain true to the naturalistic spirit of reliabilism (so, for
example, the account should not smuggle in a non-reliabilist term of epistemic evaluation into the
specification of the relevant type). And third, the solution should make intuitively plausible epistemic
classifications (i.e. it should, for the most part, deem as justified those beliefs which intuitively count as
justified, and deem as unjustified those beliefs which intuitively count as unjustified).27
27 Conee & Feldmman (1998), pp. 4-5.
A fully adequate solution to the generality problem as it arises for Kant's Formula of Universal
Law would meet three parallel conditions. First, the solution should not be an ad hoc, case-by-case
selection of the relevant maxim for a given action. Second, the solution should remain true to the spirit of
Kantianism; so, for example, the account should not appeal to an independent standard of moral salience in
weeding out extraneous or inapposite bits of detail in the formulation of a given maxim. After all, the
Categorical Imperative is supposed to be what fixes which items of a given situation are morally pertinent
and which are not; to appeal to an independent criterion of moral appropriateness over and above the
Categorical Imperative would give rise to the worry that the Categorical Imperative is not, after all, the
most basic determinant of moral justification. 28 And third, the solution should make defensible moral
classifications, though crucially the Kantian is not as beholden to our intuitions about cases as the
reliabilist is. The reliabilist's primary (if not exclusive) method of arguing for her theory is to appeal to our
intuitive judgments about whether a given scenario, real or imagined, counts as a genuine case of justified
belief, and then to insist that reliabilism does the best job of fitting that data. 29 Thus if reliabilism ends up
yielding the verdict that, say, a large number of cases that we intuitively deem to be cases of justified belief
are in fact cases of unjustified belief, this raises serious doubts as to whether reliabilism really does do the
best job of capturing the intuitive data. Kantianism, on the other hand, has the potential to be much more
revisionary about our case-specific intuitions. Although Kant's argument in the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals opens with, in effect, an appeal to our intuitions about whether various things are or
are not good under certain conditions, by the time he has argued for both the form and existence of the
Categorical Imperative by the Groundwork's end, Kant takes himself to have discharged his appeal to those
intuitions. For this reason it is perfectly open to the Kantian who faces a recalcitrant moral intuition to
stand her ground and simply insist that the case at hand is one in which our intuitions go wrong. So while
the results of the CI-procedure should not be wildly implausible, they also need not comport with our
28 For this reason, I do not consider Herman's suggestion in her (1985) that Kantians need to find a place within their moral
theory for so-called "rules of moral salience" that "determine which facts it is legitimate to include in a maxim" to constitute an
adequate solution to the generality problem for Kantian ethics (p. 75).
29 For example, this is how Alvin Goldman argues for reliabilism in his reliabilist manifesto, Goldman (1979).
moral intuitions in all cases.30
With these desiderata in mind, I now want to consider three different general strategies that have
been pursued by neo-Kantians as a way of resisting the generality problem.
8. First Neo-Kantian Strategy: Privileging a Certain Level of Generality
Perhaps the most tempting strategy in responding to the Kantian generality problem is to pick a certain
level of generality in action type, and then to insist (for whatever reason) that the maxim of an agent's
token action is always at that privileged level of generality. For example, in her early attempt to solve the
generality problem for Kantianism (or the "problem of relevant descriptions," as she called it then),
Onora O'Neill proposed identifying the relevant maxim to test for universalizability with the agent's
specific intention when acting: on this suggestion, the morally pertinent act, end, and circumstance type
are the descriptions of the specific act, end, and circumstance tokens under which the agent intends the
action.3 ' In her later work, O'Neill has rejected this account in favor of privileging a different level of
generality: O'Neill now holds that maxims consist in general "underlying or fundamental principles" by
which we control our more specific intentions.3 2 Similarly, Riidiger Bittner and Otfried H6ffe have argued
that maxims should be understood as higher-order Lebensregeln ("rules of life") that structure the lower-level
particularities of how we live our daily lives.33 And Barbara Herman has insisted that the CI-procedure
should only be applied to what she calls "generic maxims," which are the "most general form of a given
kind of maxim."3 4
30 While the Kantians' positive arguments for the Categorical Imperative make this third condition on an adequate solution
to the generality problem less demanding, they also give rise to a fourth condition: the solution to the generality problem must not
undermine the force of those positive arguments. One cannot take any old theory of maxims and append it to a statement of
Kantian ethics; the theory of maxims must be compatible with the Kantian arguments for the form of the Categorical Imperative
given in Section II of the Groundwork, and for the existence of a Categorical Imperative given in Section III of the Groundwork (but
later revised in the Critique ofPractical Reason). However, the exact structure of these arguments is a complicated matter that would
take several additional chapters to address properly, so I will not have much more to say, at least in the current work, about this
fourth condition for an adequate solution to the generality problem for Kantianism.
31 Nell (1975), pp. 40-42.
32 O'Neill (1984), pp. 151-152; (1985), pp. 84-85; and (1989b), pp. 129, 141.
33 Bittner (1974) and H6ffe (1977).
34 Herman (1989), p. 117; see also her (1993c), p. 147. Herman deviates from the other neo-Kantians in that she does not
think that a generic maxim's failing the contradiction-in-conception or contradiction-in-the-will test makes action tokens falling
under that generic maxim morally prohibited. Rather, she thinks failing these tests only establishes a deliberative presumption against
performing action tokens falling under the generic maxim-a presumption that may be rebutted in certain cases in which an
omission of the action token falls under a more stringent generic maxim that also fails the contradiction-in-conception or
One problem for each of these interpretations is finding textual evidence for the proposed
restriction to the possible content of maxims. Kant himself provides examples of maxims at various levels
of generality. Some of the maxims he mentions are amusingly specific, such as his proposed maxim for a
pleasant dinner party (from Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View): "not to allow deadly silences to set in,
but only momentary pauses in the conversation." 35 Other maxims mentioned by Kant are at a much
higher level of abstraction, including the Categorical Imperative itself, which in Religion within the Limits of
Reason Alone is claimed to be the "supreme" maxim of one's action. 36 So endorsing any of these proposed
restrictions of maxim content to a fixed level of generality involves doing a certain amount of damage to at
least some of Kant's texts.
Another problem with these proposals is that, despite their intent, they almost always fail to pin
down a unique level of generality for maxims to have. For example, intentions-especially intentions
construed as particular descriptions that an agent takes an action to fall under-can occur at any number
of levels of generality. Similarly, while requiring that maxims tested by the CI-procedure be "underlying
principles," "rules for life," or "generic maxims" excludes extremely specific maxims such as "I will
download a pirated copy of music album M from computer server S in order to obtain a copy of it to
listen to," there are still any number of more fundamental maxims that could fairly be said to be the
maxim of my action when I download a particular album on a particular occasion, from the moderately
general ("I will download a pirated copy of a music album in order to obtain a copy of it to listen to") to
the ultra unspecific ("I will do what it takes to get what I want"). So on all of these proposals, we are still
left wondering at which level of generality we should look for the relevant maxim to test for
universalizability when assessing the permissibility of a particular action.
However, the major problem with these proposals is not their inability to select a unique level of
contradiction-in-the-will test; see Herman (1989), pp. 116-117, and (1993c), pp. 147-157. However, it is far from clear how
Herman has the resources to explain why one deliberative presumption trumps another in a given context without greatly
deviating from the spirit of Kantianism, so I will not discuss this portion of her view in what follows. (For more on the sorts of
substantive assumptions about the structure of morality that underlie talk of one moral consideration "trumping" or
"outweighing" another, see chapter I of this dissertation.)
35 Kant (1798/2006), AK 7:281-282; cited in Kitcher (2003), p. 221. Other dinner party maxims recommended by Kant: "to
choose topics for conversation that interest everyone and always provide someone with the opportunity to add something
appropriate," and "not to change the topic unnecessarily orjump from one subject to another."
36 Kant (1793/1960), AK 6:48; also cited in Kitcher (2003), p. 221.
generality; rather, the major problem is their assumption that selecting a unique level of generality would
constitute a solution to the generality problem. It is not uncommon for people to attempt to summarize
the generality problem for Kantianism by asking the question, "How broad or narrow do we make the
maxim of one's action?" This way of phrasing the problem makes it seem as if there is a continuum of
successively broader maxims that we must somehow choose between. However, things are much more
complicated than that: for each action token, we do not have a linear ordering of more and more general
action types that the action token falls under. Rather, we have a partial ordering of action types, some of
which arefidly contained by another candidate action type (in the sense that every instance of the one is also
an instance of the other), but others of which merely intersect each other. So restricting ourselves to a certain
level of generality in action type does not solve the generality problem: for a designated level of generality,
there will always be multiple types at that level which the action token falls under, and moreover, there is
no reason to think that all of these types yield the same result when run through the CI-procedure.
This point is most easily illustrated if we momentarily switch back to discussing the generality
problem for reliabilism. Recall my example in which, while playing with some colored blocks, I form b = a
token belief that a red block is to my right on the basis of x = a token experience as of a red block being to my right.
Consider the following candidates for process token <x, b>'s epistemically relevant process type:
<XI, B2 > = < {experiences with content that a red block is to my right},
{ beliefs with content that a C block is to my right, for some color C}>
<X 2, B1> = < (experiences with content that a C block is to my right, for some color C},
{beliefs with content that a red block is to my right }>
<X 2, B2> = < {experiences with content that a C block is to my right, for some color C},
{beliefs with content that a C block is to my right, for some color C} >
<X3 , B3> = < {experiences with content that a red block is to direction D ofme, for some direction D},
{beliefs with content that a red block is to direction D ofme, for some direction D }>
Since domain X 1 and range Bi are at the same level of generality, and domain X2 and B2 are also at the
same level of generality, process types <Xi, B2> and <X 2, B 1> are presumably both at the same level of
generality, yet neither entirely contains the other. Moreover, we can also generate such intersecting
process types even when each type's domain and range are at the same level of generality, as in the case of
process types <X 2, B2> and <X3 , B3 >. So it is simply a mistake to assume that the various process types of
which <x, b> is an instance are all nested within one another in a linear fashion; instead, what we have is a
series of crisscrossing process types of various different levels of generality.
A similar result holds when we are trying, for a given action token, to select the appropriate action
type on which to run the CI-procedure. Consider a case in which I perform a = my (token) downloading of a
pirated copy of music album M from computer server S for the sake of e = my (token) obtaining of music album M so as to
listen to it. The following are both plausible candidates for action token <a, e>'s morally relevant action
type:
<Ai, Ei> = < {downloadings of a pirated copy of music album M from some computer server},
{obtainings of something to listen to } >
<A2 , Ei> = < {downloadings of a pirated copy of some music album from computer server S},
{ obtainings of something to listen to } >
As act types A1 and A2 are presumably at the same level of generality, action types <Ai, Ei> and
<A2, Ei> must also be at the same level of generality. So we do not have a series of nested action types to
choose between; instead we have a series of crisscrossing action types at various different levels of generality.
For this reason, talk of the level of generality of a maxim is a red herring. If we are to solve the generality
problem for Kantian ethics, we need a more precise means of maxim individuation.
9. Second Neo-Kantian Strategy: Counterfactual Tests
Another extremely tempting strategy for fixing on the right action type for a given action token is to
appeal to various counterfactual tests in order to sift out morally irrelevant features of the specific act and end
tokens. Here is Herman's way of formulating such a counterfactual test:
Extraneous detail is pared from the description in a maxim by asking counterfactually, 'Were this feature of
the description not part of the circumstances of the action, would you still act as you proposed?' If the
answer is yes, the descriptive element is rejected as extraneous to the agent's conception of his action.37
O'Neill calls such an appeal to counterfactuals an "isolation test," 38 but "removal test" would be a more
appropriate label: one is evaluating what would happen were one to remove some feature from an action,
37 Herman (1990),p. 257.
38 O'Neill (1984), p. 152, and (1985), p. 85.
not what would happen were one to isolate that feature by itself.39 We can formulate one version of such a
removal test as follows:
the removal test for the act component of a maxim:
If the following is true:
if act token a didn't have feature F, the agent would still perform <a, e>,
then the maxim <A, E> for action token <a, e> can't be such that for every a* E A, a*
possesses F.
Clearly we could also formulate an analogous removal test for the end component of a maxim. The
suggestion I now want to consider is whether an appeal to removal tests of this sort would be enough to
solve the generality problem for Kantian ethics. 40
The answer, of course, is "No." As is often the case with counterfactual tests, the removal test
yields both false negatives and false positives-yields both cases in which the test rejects some feature as
being part of the act component of an agent's maxim when intuitively it should not, and cases in which the
test does not reject some feature as being part of the act component of an agent's maxim when intuitively it
should. Here is an example of a false negative:
deadly medicine: Medicine X is a pharmaceutical wonder that completely cures an eye infection
within hours when administered directly into the eye. However, Medicine X also causes
severe kidney failure in a small percentage of the population, all of whom share a rare
gene. Now suppose I am an eye doctor, and a patient who I know possesses that rare gene
comes into my office with a minor eye infection. I administer three drops of Medicine X
into his eye, thereby curing his eye infection but also irrevocably damaging his kidney.
However, if the patient hadn't possessed that rare gene, I still would have administered
three drops of Medicine X into his eye.
Applying the removal test, we get the result that the following cannot be the maxim of my (token) action
of administering three drops of Medicine X into the eye of my patient in order to cure his eye infection:
<A, E> = < {administerings of a medicine to someone in whom it will cause kidney failure},
(curings of that person's eye infection}>.
After all, I would have given Medicine X to my patient even if he hadn't possessed the rare gene that
39 This distinction between isolation and removal tests parallels the distinction between isolation and removal conceptions of reasons for
action discussed in §8 of chapter 1 of this dissertation.
40 The earliest appeal to removal tests as at least a partial solution to the generality problem occurs in Nell (O'Neill) (1975),
pp. 41, 72. Herman also endorses using such tests to help solve the generality problem in her (1990), pp. 64, 67-70, 117-119, 257.
However, in their later work both O'Neill and Herman raise worries for the thought that such counterfactual tests can serve as
the basis for a solution to the generality problem: see the O'Neill references cited in n. 38, and Herman (1993b), p. 219.
makes him susceptible to Medicine-X-induced kidney failure. But, intuitively, the fact that I administered
a medicine to someone in whom it causes kidney failure is precisely the sort of morally relevant
consideration we want to build into the act component of my maxim when assessing its universalizability.
Here is an example of a false positive for the removal test:
striking resemblance: I am in a candy store looking at their display of fudge. To my surprise, I notice
that one of the pieces of fudge bears an uncanny resemblance to my late uncle. So I steal
that piece of fudge in order to show it to my father (the brother of my uncle). However, if
the piece of fudge hadn't looked like my late uncle, I wouldn't have stolen it.
In this case I perform token act a = my token stealing of a piece of fudge that looks like my late uncle for the sake of
token end e = my token showing of that piece of fudge to my father. Intuitively, the fact that the piece of candy
resembles my late uncle is morally irrelevant, but the removal test does not bar that fact from being part
of the content of my action's maxim. And more worryingly, if it is part of my action's maxim, then that
maxim is almost certain to be universalizable (since cases in which a piece of fudge bear a striking
resemblance to one's uncle are so rare), despite the fact that my pilfering of the piece of candy would
appear to be a canonical example of an impermissible action. But surely doing what would otherwise be a
morally prohibited action for overly specific reasons does not absolve one from wrongdoing!
Thus the proposed counterfactual test is far too blunt a tool to use as a way of solving the
Kantian's generality problem. Once again we are left looking for a more precise means of maxim
selection.
10. Third Neo-Kantian Strategy: The First-Person Perspective
The third neo-Kantian strategy involves denying the very presupposition that what we are after is a means
of maxim selection. On this third view, we shouldn't think of the CI-procedure as a way of assessing, after
the fact, whether a particular action performed by a particular agent in the past was right or wrong; rather,
we should think of the CI-procedure as essentially a way, from the first-person perspective, of determining
what one should or should not do in the future. Moreover, the claim is that once we construe the CI-
procedure in this way, the generality problem dissolves, since then there is no issue of selecting the proper
maxim for a given action token that has already been performed.
It will help to have a certain distinction on the table before assessing this proposal. We can
distinguish between two roles that a moral principle like the Categorical Imperative might play.41 The first
is as a third-personal standard: a criterion for the applicability of a moral term such as "right" or "wrong,"
usually in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is this sort of principle that one uses when
making theoretical evaluations of an action from a third-person perspective (incluhding theoretical
evaluations of one's own past actions). The second role a moral principle might play is as afirst-personal
guide: a tool for choosing the right or wrong action when, from the first-person perspective, one is
deliberating about what to do. A principle that is well suited for one of these roles might be ill suited for
the other; most famously, the act-utilitarian principle "An action is right iff it produces at least as much
net utility as any other action available at that time" is usually put forward by act-utilitarians as a third-
personal standard but not as a first-personal guide. The neo-Kantians' apparent claim is that the reverse
holds for the Categorical Imperative (and the CI-procedure by which one implements it): it is meant to be
a first-personal guide, not a third-personal standard. As Korsgaard puts it, Kantian ethics always proceeds
from "the standpoint of practical reason" (the standpoint from which one reasons about what to do); in
O'Neill's terminology, Kantianism is concerned with "the context of action or decision," not "the context
of assessment." 42
Suppose we grant that the Categorical Imperative is essentially a first-personal guide, rather than
a third-personal standard; how does this help with the generality problem? Here is O'Neill on the matter:
[]n practicaljudgment we are not judging a particular act. The task in practical judgment is to shape action
that is notyet done. ... Practical judgment, including ethical judgment, does not encounter the problem of
relevant descriptions [i.e. the generality problem] because it is not directed at individual act[ion]-tokens.
Whereas [theoretical] judgment aim [s] tofit the world or some possible world, practical judgment aims in some
measure to shape the world .... The different direction of fit shields practical judgment from the problem of
relevant descriptions. 43
O'Neill's idea is this: when one is deliberating about what to do in a given situation, there is no individual
action token <a, e> about which to ask what its morally relevant action type <A, E> is, since one has notyet
41 This sort of distinction is commonplace in contemporary discussions of moral principles; for a slightly older appeal to such
a distinction, see Bales (1971), and for a more recent appeal, see McKeever & Ridge (2005), pp. 84-87. Interestingly, reliabilists
sometimes draw a parallel distinction between types of epistemic principles, usually in order to stress the fact that, for them,
epistemic principles are purely third-personal standards, rather than first-personal guides; see, for instance, Goldman (1980).
42 Korsgaard (1996), p. xi; Nell (O'Neill) (1975), p. 127.
43 O'Neill (2004), pp. 312-313.
performed any action. Instead, what one directly considers is a given action type <A, E>. 44 But what does it
mean to say that one directly considers an action type <A, E> from the first-person perspective? Here is
Korsgaard on the matter:
Roughly speaking, what happens when an agent chooses an action is something like this: the agent is
attracted on some occasion to promoting some end or other. The end may be suggested by the occasion, or
it may be one he standardly promotes when he can. He reasons about how he might achieve this end, or
what he might do in its service, and he arrives at a possible maxim .... That is to say, he considers an
action [type], and he asks himself whether it is a thing worth doing. And he determines the action [type] to
be . . . morally worthy or at least permissible. Kant thinks he makes this determination by subjecting the
maxim to a test, the categorical imperative test .... Determining the action [type] to be ... a thing worth
doing for its own sake, he does the action [i.e. he performs an action token which has that type as its
maxim] .45
Korsgaard's idea is this: in a given situation, an agent is tempted to promote some end type, E.46 So the
agent faces a practical problem; from the first-person perspective, his question is, "How can I promote E
in a morally permissible way?" The agent reasons about possible ways to achieve that end, and proposes
various maxims of the form <A, E>, <A*, E>, <A*, E>, etc. He then determines whether any of these
maxims are universalizable. If one is, then the Categorical-Imperative-as-first-personal-guide deems that it
is morally permissible for him to act on that maxim-or more precisely, deems that it is morally
permissible for him to perform an action token which has that action type as its maxim.
On this way of understanding the role of the Categorical Imperative in practical deliberation, the
generality problem never arises. Rather than facing the problem of how-as theorists occupying the third-
person point-of-view-we are to "move up" from an action token to its relevant action type, instead we
start-as agents occupying the first-person point-of-view-with a given action type, and only after it has
been found to be universalizable do we "move down" to an instance of that type by then acting on it.
But our problem is not yet solved, for the proposal as formulated has blatantly unacceptable
moral consequences. Suppose I am in need of $50. So from the first-person perspective, I face a practical
problem: "How can I obtain $50 in a morally permissible way?" Suppose, also, that my good friend
44 In making the claim that there is no individual action token about which to deliberate, O'Neill seems to be taking a stand
on the metaphysics of future actions; in particular, she seems to be assuming that judgments about entities that do not yet exist
must always be general rather than singular. For more on this issue, see William Godfrey-Smith (1978).
45 Korsgaard (forthcoming-b), pp. 25-26.
46 If we are to take to heart O'Neill's point about actions that are not yet performed, it must be an end type, rather than an
end token, that the agent is tempted to promote.
Ignatz McGillicuddy has $50 in his wallet, and that he is an extremely gullible fellow. Seeking to solve my
practical problem, I consider the following maxim: "I will make a lying promise to Ignatz McGillicuddy in
order to dupe him out of $50." I test the maxim and find that-due to its excessive specificity-it is fully
universalizable. So it appears that, from the first-person perspective, the Categorical Imperative deems it
to be morally permissible for me to act on that maxim, and hence deems it to be morally permissible for
me to swindle poor Ignatz out of his hard-earned cash. I take it that a moral verdict this wildly implausible
constitutes a reductio of the current proposal.47
The only hope is to emend the proposal in some way. The main neo-Kantian strategy for doing
so involves distinguishing between the maxim that one tests with the CI-procedure and the maxim that one is actually
tempted to act on: the idea is that, even if I run the CI-procedure on an overly specific maxim such as "I will
make a lying promise to Ignatz McGillicuddy in order to dupe him out of $50," really I am tempted to act
on a much more general maxim such as "I will make a lying promise in order to secure some ready cash."
Moreover, the neo-Kantian might add, "it is no objection to a moral theory that it has a principle of
judgment which can be employed dishonestly." 48 But this variation of the original proposal will not do.
First, there might well be a situation in which I am genuinely tempted to act on the maxim "I will make a
lying promise to Ignatz McGillicuddy in order to dupe him out of $50"; it would be far too convenient a
coincidence if it just happened to turn out that every sort of maxim that yields counterintuitive results when
plugged into the CI-procedure from the first-person perspective is also the sort of maxim that we are
never, in fact, tempted to act on. Second, the standard neo-Kantian way of revealing the genuine maxim
that one aims to act on is to appeal to counterfactuals ("You can't really be tempted to act on such an
overly specific maxim, since you'd still be tempted to make a lying promise to get the money even if you
had to make it to Stan Spatz III instead of Ignatz McGillicuddy"), but as we saw earlier, appeals to
counterfactual tests in order to determine the true content of a maxim are hopeless: sometimes they rule
47 Note that this sort of counterintuitive result is not restricted to cases in which one contemplates whether to act on an overly
specific maxim. In the same situation in which I am on the verge of bilking Ignatz out of his money, I might instead consider the
maxim "I will say something to someone in order to suit a purpose of mine." Presumably a maxim this general is fully
universalizable, so the Categorical Imperative seems to yield the verdict that, from the standpoint of practical reason, saying what
I am about to say to Ignatz McGillicuddy is morally permissible.
48 Herman (1990), p. 258.
out too much, sometimes they rule out too little, and sometimes they rule out both too little and too much
at the same time. Third, and most importantly, this talk of applying the Categorical Imperative
"dishonestly"-of running a rigged up, morally permissible maxim through the CI-procedure but then
subsequently acting on a different, morally impermissible one-is to go back on the neo-Kantian's
original idea that the Categorical Imperative is only a first-personal guide, not a third-personal standard,
for now we have slid back into talk of the moral status of a performed action, rather than restricting
ourselves to talk of the moral status of a proposed action. But then, when on a given occasion a given agent
has performed a given action token, we are left with the question of which, of all the action types under
which that action token falls, is the maxim on which the agent acted, and the generality problem is thrust
upon us once again.
Indeed, upon further reflection, the very idea that there might be a first-personal guide without a
third-personal standard for the item toward which it guides us is of dubious coherence. What is the point
of directing us, from the first-person perspective, to act in certain ways, unless, once we have done so, we
will satisfy some third-person requirement? What exactly is the Categorical Imperative guiding us toward,
if as soon as we are done using it as a guide, actions cease to have that property (moral impermissibility)
that it is supposedly helping us seek? Thus I conclude that Kantians need to find a place for both a third-
personal standard and a first-personal guide within their moral system. Moreover, the candidates for such
a standard and guide have been staring us in the face from the outset: the Categorical Imperative is the third-
personal standard, and the CI-procedure is the first-personal guide. It is the Categorical Imperative that
gives Kantians a criterion for what makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong. And it is the CI-
procedure that gives them a procedure for figuring out, from the first-person perspective, which of the
actions available to them are right and which are wrong. But if this is correct, then emphasizing the
"standpoint of practical reason" does not dissolve the generality problem; it merely defers it. 49
49 The typical explanation given by neo-Kantians of why the Categorical Imperative cannot be a third-personal standard
appeals to the opacity of an agent's maxim: according to Kant, we often are mistaken about what the true maxim of our action is;
indeed, Kant holds that the human heart is so "unfathomable" that we cannot tell with certainty whether a single morally
permissible action has ever been performed. (See Kant (1785/1997), AK 4:406-407, and Kant (1797/1996), AK 6:446-447.)
However, this is a bad reason to reject the claim that the Categorical Imperative is a third-personal standard. It is no objection to
11. Toward a General Hypothesis on the Origins of the Generality Problem
We have found that the neo-Kantians' attempt to stress the practical nature of Kantian ethics does not
help solve the generality problem. However, one feature of O'Neill's proposal will help point the way to a
more unified explanation of why the generality problem arises for both reliabilism and Kantian ethics.
Recall that, in making out what separates the theoretical from the practical, O'Neill emphasizes
the different direction offit that each evinces: the theoretical, she insists, aims to fit the world, whereas the
practical aims to shape the world. One way to apply this distinction involves distinguishing between two
different "perspectives": from the theoretical perspective, so the story goes, one aims to form beliefs that fit
the world, whereas from the practical perspective one aims to perform actions that shape the world. We
saw that putting undue weight on these two perspectives proved to be a dead end, at least as far as finding
a solution to the generality problem goes. But another way to apply the theoretical/practical distinction is
to the object of evaluation in each case: the theoretical realm is concerned with beliefs, which attempt to fit
the world, whereas the practical realm is concerned with actions, which attempt to shape the world.
This difference in the direction of fit between belief and action manifests itself in the way that
each relates to the reasons there are for and against them. There are reasons for belief, and there are
reasons for action. Moreover, in both cases, it is possible for there to be a reason for someone to
believe/do something, and for that person to believe/do that thing, but not believe/do itfor that reason. Or
to appropriate some useful Kantian terminology, one can act in accordance with a given reason for action
(that is, one can act as that reason recommends), without so actingfor the sake ofthat reason for action. And
similarly, one can believe in accordance with a given reason for belief, without so believing on the basis of that
reason for belief. Note the difference, in these two cases, in the orientation of the connection between
one's action/belief and the reason for which one is acting/believing. Acting for a reason is forward-looking:
the criterion "Two lines are parallel if and only if the distance between them is constant" that, given the inexactness of human
measuring devices, we can never tell with certainty whether the distance between two actual lines is constant. Similarly, it is no
objection to the principle of utility being a third-personal standard that we can never tell with certainty whether a given action
does in fact produce at least as much net utility as each of its alternatives, since every action has indefinitely many consequences.
Indeed, the standard reply to worries about the immeasurability of all of an action's consequences is to insist that the principle of
utility is meant to be a third-personal standard, not a first-personal guide. In general, the issue of what it takes for a standard to apply is
not the same as the issue of what it takes for us to know that a standard applies. So the opacity of an agent's maxim is no reason to reject
the possibility of a third-person standard for right and wrong within Kantian ethics.
when one acts for a reason, one commences a course of conduct in order to shape the world in some
way-or in other words, one actsfor the sake of achieving some end (so we have an act-to-end direction of
fit). Believing for a reason, on the other hand, is backward-looking: when one believes for a reason, one forms
a belief in order to fit the evidence, experiential and otherwise, that one has about the world-or in other
words, one forms a belief on the basis of some piece of evidence that one has (so in the case of experiential
evidence, we have an experience-to-belief direction of fit).
This should all start to look familiar. Recall that when act token a is performedfor the sake of end
token e, neo-Kantians deem the compound <a, e> (they call it an action token) to be morally permissible
iff <A, E> is universalizable, where <A, E> is token <a, e>'s morally relevant type. And when belief token
b is formed on the basis of experience token x, reliabilists deem the compound <x, b> (they call it a process
token) to be epistemically justified iff <X, B> is reliable, where <X, B> is token <x, b>'s epistemically
relevant type. But now we can reformulate each theory's proposal in terms of action or belief for a reason.
We can view the compound <a, e> as a neo-Kantian's way of glossing a token instance of an agent acting
in some way for a reason. And we can view the compound <x, b> as a reliabilist's way of glossing a token
instance of a subject believing something for a reason. Reformulated in this way, the two proposals now
run as follows. Neo-Kantians deem a token instance <a, e> of an agent acting for a reason to be morally
permissible iff <A, E> is universalizable, where <A, E> is token <a, e>'s morally relevant type. And
reliabilists deem a token instance <x, b> of a subject believing something for a reason to be epistemically
justified iff <X, B> is reliable, where <X, B> is token <x, b>'s epistemically relevant type.
There are three particularly salient similarities between these two proposals once we reformulate
them in this manner. In both cases, we have the following:
1. The most basic object of normative appraisal (whether moral or epistemic) is a token instance
of acting/believing for a reason.
2. Acting/believing for a reason is not cashed out in normative terms.
3. The means of normative appraisal is in terms of a non-normative property (universalizability,
reliability) that can only be applied to types, not tokens.
I find these similarities between the two accounts far too suggestive to chalk up to mere coincidence.
Indeed, I now want to argue-in a somewhat speculative and very much preliminary way-that the
second and third of these points of similarity both ultimately stem from the first.
Showing that the first point of similarity entails the second is fairly straightforward. Suppose that a
given account of moral (or epistemic) appraisal cashes out the notion of acting (or believing) for a reason
in normative terms; for example, maybe we have an independent account of normative reasons for action
(or belief), which we then define acting (or believing) for a reason in terms of. But then the most basic
object of moral (or epistemic) appraisal cannot be a token instance of acting (or believing) for a reason,
since presumably the most basic object of normative appraisal within a given domain must itself be devoid
of all normative content (or else it would not be the most basic such object). Thus the denial of point 2
entails the denial of point 1, so by contraposition, point 1 entails point 2.
Showing that the first point of similarity entails the third is a more delicate affair, and at this stage
in my thinking I can only gesture at how it might be done. Let us call a property that can only be applied
to types a typal propery, and let us call a property that can be applied to instances of types an instantial
property. Now suppose that the most basic object of moral appraisal is a token instance <a, e> of someone
acting for a reason, and that <a, e> is appraised by means of some non-normative instantial property, F.
For example, if our favored term of moral appraisal is moral permissibility, we might have the following:
<a, e> is morally permissible iff <a, e> is F.
But then there is nothing to stop us from defining, in the following manner, a notion of morally permissible
act token, in addition to our notion of morally permissible act-for-a-reason token:
a is morally permissible iff(3e)(a is performed for the sake of e, and <a, e> is F).
However, once we do this, then it is no longer true that token instances of someone acting for a reason are
the uniquely most basic objects of moral appraisal, for act tokens can now be morally appraised without
appeal to any additional normative notions beyond those used to appraise acting-for-a-reason tokens. (I
intend basicness qua object-of-normative-appraisal to be determined by the degree to which normative
notions must be appealed to in the explanation of why that object has the normative status that it does.)
Thus the assumption that token instances of acting-for-a-reason are the most basic object of moral
appraisal and that those instances are appraised by means of a non-normative instantial property entails a
contradiction. That is, point 1 and the denial of point 3 entails a contradiction, so point 1 entails point 3.50
A slightly more concrete example will help make this line of argument a bit more perspicuous.
Consider a moral theory according to which (i) token instances of someone acting for a reason (in the
Kantian sense of performing an act token for the sake of an end token) are the most basic objects of moral
evaluation, and in which (ii) those instances are evaluated in terms of the instantial property being approved
of by God (or more precisely: being an act-for-a-reason token that is approved of by God). Then in a case in which I
perform the token act of making a lying promise for the token end of obtaining $50, we have the following
biconditional: "My token act a of making a lying promise for the token end e of obtaining $50 is morally
permissible iff God approves of my performing a for the sake of e." But in this case it seems we can easily
extend the notion of moral permissibility so that it attaches to my act token in addition to my act-for-an-
end token, in the following manner: "My token act a of making a lying promise is morally permissible iff
God approves of my performing a for the sake of whatever end I performed it for." The basic point is this:
when we are evaluating token instances of someone acting for a reason in terms of a property that directly
applies to such tokens, there is nothing to stop us from "detaching" the act token from its act-for-the-sake-of-an-end
conglomerate and then evaluating that act token by itself So if we wish to hold on to the idea that it is the entire act-
for-the-sake-of-an-end package that is the most fundamental unit of moral evaluation, we cannot evaluate
token instances of that package in terms of an instantial property. And similarly, in the epistemic case, if
we wish to hold on to the idea that it is the entire belief-plus-its-causal-history package (the reliabilist's way
of explicating belief for a reason) that is the most fundamental unit of epistemic evaluation, we cannot
evaluate token instances of that package in terms of an instantial property. Conclusion: our first point of
similarity entails the third.
If the argument I have been sketching here is on track, then point 1 is the essential point of
50 There are a number of places in which this argument-or better yet, argument-sketch-needs refining. More could be
said about what distinguishes normative from non-normative accounts of acting/believing for a reason. What makes for basicness
qua object-of-normative-assessment needs greater clarification. The crucial difference between typal and instantial properties
could use further elaboration. And finally, the argument as presented assumes that a person only believes or does a thing for one
reason, whereas cases in which people believe or do things for multiple reasons are clearly possible. In later work, I hope to fill in
these lacunae.
similarity between process reliabilism and Kant's Formula of Universal Law: the essential link between the
two is that, in both cases, it is token instances of acting or believing for a reason that are the most basic
objects of normative appraisal. This leads me to propose the following hypothesis:
a modest proposal: Any theory that takes token instances of -ingfor a reason (where this is construed
non-normatively) as the most basic object of normative appraisal within a given domain
faces a version of the generality problem.
Why would this fobllow? If token instances of ý-ing for a reason are the most basic unit of normative
appraisal, then (if what I have been suggesting is correct) this appraisal must be done by means of a typal
property. But since typal properties apply to types, not tokens, we are left with the following question: of all
the types under which a given token instance of 4-ing for a reason falls, which is the relevant type to apply
our typal property to when evaluating that token instance of ý-ing for a reason? The generality problem is
upon us.51
Moreover, my modest proposal leads to a less modest one:
a less modest proposal: The generality problem is unsolvable, unless one appeals to an additional
normative relation linking a token instance of 0-ingfor a reason to its relevant type.
In other words, the non-normative typal property is not enough: in order to get from the token instance of
ý-ing for a reason to the relevant (normatively relevant, that is) type to which we are to apply our typal
property, we need an additional normative relation that itself requires explication in non-normative terms.
Thus insofar as one of our desiderata for a successful solution to the generality problem is that additional
normative standards over and above those provided by the relevant typal property (such as reliability or
universalizability) not be brought in, the generality problem is-I put forward-unsolvable.
But this also means that the generality problem can be solved if we relax our standards for what
would constitute an adequate solution to it. If we allow ourselves to appeal to an additional normative
relation in moving from a token instance of ý-ing for a reason to its normatively relevant type, there is
nothing to bar us from eventually finding a solution to the generality problem. The problem for
51 Contemporary epistemologists often make a distinction between propositional justification (which concerns the degree to
which one is justified in believing a given proposition, regardless of whether or not one actually holds that belief) and doxastic
justification (which concerns the degree to which a belief that one actual holds, for the reasons that one actually holds it, is justified).
In terms of this distinction, my modest proposal runs as follows: any epistemic theory that takes doxastic justification to be
explanatorily prior to propositional justification faces a version of the generality problem.
reliabilism and Kantianism, however, is that once we allow in this additional normative relation, we lose
much of the motivation for holding those views in the first place. One of the primary attractions of
Kantian ethics is its positive arguments for the form and existence of the Categorical Imperative, but these
positive arguments do not seem to leave any room for an additional normative element over and above
universalizability in a specification of the content of the moral law. On other hand, one of the primary
attractions of reliabilism is its aspirations toward being a truly naturalistic theory of epistemic evaluation
that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for epistemic justification in wholly non-normative terms.
The central reliabilist gambit is that, as it were, we get truth for free: appealing to truth, and other
properties built out of truth such as that of being a truth-conducive (i.e. reliable) process, is seen as a
naturalistically respectable way of grounding epistemic properties like justification. However, if we now
need an additional normative relation in order to evade the generality problem, the reliabilist must come
up with a new trick for how to explicate that extra normative relation in wholly non-normative terms, and
the worry is that she ultimately will be unable to do so. Thus I think that both the Kantian and the
reliabilist should be extremely hesitant to countenance an additional normative relation that moves us
from a token instance of acting/believing for a reason to its normatively relevant type. But if what I have
argued is correct, they must do so in order to resolve the generality problem. 52
In this section I have proposed, in an admittedly tentative and provisional way, the following
hypothesis: a version of the generality problem arises for any theory that takes its most basic object of
normative evaluation to be token instances of someone ý-ing for a reason (in a purely non-normatively
sense of that notion). Like any hypothesis, this one yields a variety of predictions: it predicts, for example,
that any moral theory that takes an agent's acting for a particular reason to be the most basic object of
moral appraisal will face a version of the generality problem. And it predicts that some sort of generality
52 Thus there is a certain sense in which I think that Herman is on the right track when she insists in her (1985) on the need
for "rules of moral salience" fixing which facts it is appropriate to include in the content of a maxim (see n. 28), though it is
important to emphasize that this move represents a major departure from Kant's original theory, and hence threatens to
undermine the positive arguments for that theory. Similarly, in her recent work Korsgaard appeals to a robust Aristotelian
metaphysics according to which all entities, including human action, have an essential function, partially-I suspect-to combat
the generality problem; however, it is far from clear how Korsgaard can include this Aristotelian element in her theory without it
swamping the Kantian elements that she wishes to hold onto, and without it undermining the Kantian arguments that she
continues to make use of.
problem will beset any epistemic theory that takes a subject's believing something for a particular reason
to be the most basic object of epistemic assessment. So the obvious next step in refining and defending this
hypothesis is to see how these predictions hold up-to see to what degree my hypothesis succeeds in
demarcating at least one fault line between those theories that confront a kind of generality problem and
those that do not. Alas, however, this is a project that will have to wait for another day.53
I would like to close by noting one interesting feature of the hypothesis I have been putting
forward. Neo-Kantians often stress that what is unique to Kantian ethics is its insistence on the act-for-
the-sake-of-a-end compound being the fundamental object of moral assessment.54 And Goldman, in his
seminal defense of process reliabilism, argues vigorously that what allows process reliabilism to avoid the
problems besetting traditional internalist theories of epistemic justification is its attention to the causal
history of a belief (to the reason for which it was formed, in a non-normative sense) when determining the
fundamental epistemic status of that belief-plus-causal-history pair.55 So if what I have argued here is
correct, the fact that a generality problem arises for both Kantian ethics and process reliabilism is not an
accidental artifact of an inessential way in which those two theories have been formulated thus far; rather,
it is one of the defining characteristics of those theories that generates the generality problem. But if this is so,
then the generality problem is not an irritating quibble that requires little more than an additional theory
of process individuation or maxim selection to fend off. Quite the contrary: the generality problem for
Kantian ethics and process reliabilism is a troubling worry that cuts to the core of what makes each theory
unique as an account of moral permissibility or epistemic justification.
53 One initial worry for my hypothesis is that its focus on objects of normative appraisal and on the notion of 0-ing for a
reason makes it ill suited for diagnosing why something like the generality problem arises for frequentist interpretations of
probability and for Hume's constant-conjunction theory of causation, since neither of these two types of philosophical theory
seems essentially normative, and since neither appeals in an obvious way to a notion of someone (or something) |-ing for a
reason. My hope is that further refinement of the hypothesis broached here will yield a yet-more-abstract characterization of the
origins of the generality problem in the case of reliabilism and Kantianism-a characterization that could then be extended to the
versions of the generality problem confronted by frequentist interpretations of probability and Hume's constant-conjunction
theory of causation.
54 For example, Herman (1992), p. 94, takes this feature "as defining of Kantian ethics," and throughout her (forthcoming-a),
Korsgaard makes a similar claim.
55 Goldman (1979), pp. 112-113.

Chapter 3: Luminous Conditions
1. Introduction
In the ongoing skirmishes between internalists and externalists in epistemology, one notion that seems
particularly resistant to an externalist treatment is that of rationality. Perhaps I can fail to know or even be
justified in believing that p without having epistemic access to whatever it is that deprives me of knowledge
or justification. However, can it be irrational for me to believe that p when part of what makes that the case
is outside my cognitive grasp, when from my first-person perspective everything indicates that it would be
perfectly appropriate for me to so believe? Rationality seems to involve doing the best one can with what
one has, and to posit an externalist standard of rationality according to which it can be irrational for one
to believe a given proposition despite one's not being able, even upon reflection, to realize that this is so at
best sounds like a strained use of the word "irrational," and at worst appears to be changing the subject.
Not so, according to Timothy Williamson. In Knowledge and Its Limits,' Williamson provides a
sorites-like argument for the conclusion that no plausible standard of rationality meets the constraint that
its demands are always accessible to the subject. In Williamsonian parlance, the fact that it would be
irrational of one to believe that p is not luminous, for that fact can obtain without one's being in a position
to know that it obtains. So not only is an externalist notion of rationality fully coherent, but it is the only
game in town: even if we posit two notions of rationality, one of which (rationalityi) is claimed to be
externalist and the other of which (rationality2) is claimed not to be, the latter will be just as susceptible to
Williamson's argument as the former. Therefore those who cling to the idea that rationality is inherently
internalistic should cast off their prejudices and learn to love the bomb; sometimes we lack access to the
demands of rationality, but such is our lot, and to hope for things to be otherwise is to quixotically yearn
after an impossible cognitive standard.
Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has further consequences. If sound, not only would it show
that it can be irrational for one to believe a given proposition without one's being in a position to know
that it is, but it would also establish that one can be in pain without one's being in a position to know that
I Williamson (2000). All page references in the text are to this book.
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one is; that one can seem to see a certain color without one's being in a position to know that one does; that
two words can mean the same thing in one's idiolect without one's being in a position to know that they do;
and that a given proposition can be part of one's evidence without one's being in a position to know that it is. In
other words, the argument would show that one's current mental life, the meanings of one's words, the
extent of one's evidence, and the dictates of rationality are all non-luminous--that each can, at least in
principle, be epistemically inaccessible to a given subject. If Williamson is right, then we are (as he puts it)
"cognitively homeless": there is no substantive domain of mental or semantic or normative facts to which
we have guaranteed access, no subportion of our mental or semantic or normative lives within which
everything lies open to view.
However, we need not accept Williamson's argument. Luminosity is a kind of epistemic privileged
access: it involves a subject's always being in a position to know that a given fact obtains, whenever it does
obtain. I will argue that Williamson's argument only succeeds if he assumes that we do not have a kind of
doxastic privileged access (as we might put it) to the facts in question, for his argument presupposes that
there does not exist a certain sort of constitutive connection between the obtaining of the given facts and
our beliefs about the obtaining of those facts. The exact nature of this connection will depend on the
version of Williamson's argument that one is considering-as we shall see, there are two versions of the
anti-luminosity argument, depending on whether one defends the argument's crucial premise in terms of
"all or nothing" belief or in terms of degrees of belief. But in either case, the thesis at the level of belief that
Williamson must deny in order to secure his results at the level of knowledge is one that is independently
plausible, and one to which defenders of luminosity will readily help themselves; to simply assume its falsity
would beg the main question at issue. Only those who follow Williamson in his radical claims about how,
even after ideal reflection, our beliefs about our mental lives, the meanings of our words, and the demands
of rationality can swing free from the truth of these matters need accept his equally radical claims about
our inevitable cognitive homelessness.
2. Williamson's Core Argument
In Williamson's terminology, a condition C is luminous if and only if the following holds:
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(*) For every case a, if in a condition C obtains, then in a one is in a position to know that C
obtains.
What Williamson calls cases are what Lewis, following Quine, calls centered possible worlds: possible
worlds with a designated subject and a designated time. Williamsonian conditions, on the other hand, are in
effect centered states-of-affairs: a condition either obtains or fails to obtain in a given case, and each
condition can be specified by a that-clause in which the pronoun "one" refers to the case's designated
subject and the present tense refers to the case's designated time. So, for example, the condition that one has
hands obtains in a case a if and only if in a the subject of a has hands at the time of a. The expression "in
a position to know" in (*) is potentially obscure, but for our purposes we only need the following:
according to Williamson, "if one is in a position to know p, and one has done what one is in a position to
do to decide whether p is true, then one does know p" (p. 95). The basic idea of (*), therefore, is that if a
luminous condition obtains in a given case, then if one does not already know that the condition obtains,
one could come to know that it does merely by taking the time to carefully reflect on the matter.
There are many conditions that are uncontroversially non-luminous, such as that one has hands
(someone who is blind and paralyzed might have hands but not be in a position to know that she does).
But there are also many conditions that it is extremely natural to take to be luminous, such as:
that one is in pain;
that one feels cold;
that it appears to one that p;
that one believes that q;
that words X and Y have the same meaningfor one;
that one's evidence includes the proposition that r;
that one's evidence appears to include the proposition that s;
that it is rationalfor one to believe that t;
that it is rationalfor one to do 0.
Williamson argues that each of these conditions is not luminous; as he sees it, the only conditions that
might, perhaps, be luminous are trivial conditions that either obtain in every case (such as the condition
that one exists) or obtain in none (such as the impossible condition, for which (*) vacuously holds).2
2 Although the details of his position have changed over the years, the philosopher who comes closest to explicitly endorsing
a set of luminosity claims that play a central role in his epistemology is Roderick Chisholm; see his (1956), pp. 725-731; (1977),
pp. 20-23; (1982), pp. 9-13; and (1997), pp. 27-29. However, most epistemological internalists are also committed to luminosity
claims of one form or another.
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Williamson's central anti-luminosity argument has the following form. 3 Let us fix on the condition
that one feels cold, which Williamson takes to be as good a candidate for a luminous condition as any; later
the argument will be generalized so as to apply to almost any putatively luminous condition. Williamson
begins by asking us to "consider a morning on which one feels freezing cold at dawn, very slowly warms
up, and feels hot by noon" (p. 96). We can stipulate that during this entire process, one does everything
one can to decide whether or not one feels cold. We can also suppose that there is no other relevant
change in the situation over time: all one does for the entire morning is sit there focusing on how hot or
cold one feels as the temperature slowly gets warmer. Moreover, we can make the plausible assumption
that one's feelings of hot and cold change so gradually during the course of the morning that one is not
aware of any change in those feelings from one millisecond to the next. Let to, ti, t2, . . . t, be a series of
times at one-millisecond intervals from dawn to noon. For each integer i such that 0 < i r n, let cci be the
case at time ti on the morning in question. Finally, let C be the condition that one feels cold, let KC be the
condition that one knows that one feels cold, and let PKC be the condition that one is in a position to know that one
feels cold. Williamson's argument then proceeds as follows.
First, Williamson has us assume for reductio that the condition that one feels cold is indeed luminous.
It follows that, for each integer i (0 s i < n), if in ca one feels cold, then in ai one is in a position to know
that one feels cold:
(LUM) (Vi, 0 : i s n)(C obtains in ai D PKC obtains in ai).
Second, Williamson notes that since in each ac one is doing everything one can to decide whether one
feels cold, it follows from his stipulation about the meaning of the expression "being in a position to know"
that if in ai one is in a position to know that one feels cold, then in ai one does in fact know that one feels
cold. Thus we have the following:
(POS) (Vi, 0 : i 5 n)(PKC obtains in at D KC obtains in ai).
Third, Williamson appeals to what is perhaps the single most important assumption in his entire book.
According to Williamson, knowledge requires safety from error: in order for one to know something, one must
3 See Williamson (2000), ch. 4. An earlier version of the argument can be found in Williamson (1996).
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not have been easily wrong in coming to believe it. Much more will be said about Williamson's safety
requirement in §§4-5 below, but for now the following comments will suffice. Suppose that in case aoi one
believes that one feels cold. Williamson insists that in order for one's belief in cai to be safe enough to
constitute knowledge, one's belief must not be false in any similar case that one cannot discriminate from
ai. Now one such case is ac+1, the case one millisecond later, so it follows that if one knows in case ai that
one feels cold, it must still be true in ari+ that one feels cold. As this reasoning will work just as well for any
integer i such that 0 : i < n, the safety requirement on knowledge plus one's limited discriminatory
capabilities give us the following margin-for-error principle:
(MAR) (Vi, 0 s i < n)(KC obtains in a1 D C obtains in axi+1).
Finally, we have two last assumptions that follow merely from the description of the case:
(BEG) C obtains in ao.
(END) C does not obtain in a,.
That is: at dawn one feels cold, and at noon one does not feel cold.
However, now contradiction looms. By (LUM), if C obtains in co, then PKC obtains in ao. By
(POS), if PKC obtains in ao, then KC obtains in ao. By (MAR), if KC obtains in ao, then C obtains in al.
Therefore from these three conditionals and (BEG) it follows that C obtains in Cal. Moreover, by a similar
chain of reasoning, we may conclude that C obtains in a2, that C obtains in as, and so on, until we reach
the conclusion that C obtains in an. But this contradicts (END). Thus one of the argument's five premises
must be false. Williamson claims that (POS), (MAR), (BEG), and (END) are all unassailable, so he infers that
(LUM) is the premise responsible for our reaching a contradiction. Conclusion: the condition that one feels
cold is not luminous-one can feel cold without being in a position to know that one feels cold.
All the above argument assumes about the condition that one feels cold is that there exists a
continuum of cases, starting from a case in which that condition obtains and ending with a case in which
it does not, such that the underlying basis for the condition's obtaining or not obtaining changes so
gradually that one cannot discriminate a change in that basis from one case to the next. Thus we can run
a parallel argument on any condition for which such a continuum exists. We could argue that the
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condition that one is in pain is not luminous by considering a series of cases in which one feels an agonizing
pain that gradually subsides until one feels nothing at all. We could argue that the condition that it appears
that there is a computer in front of one is not luminous by considering a series of cases in which one at first
clearly sees a computer but then one's eyesight gradually gets blurrier and blurrier. Perhaps we could even
argue that the condition that words X and r have the same meaning is not luminous by considering a series of
cases in which "two synonyms ... gradually diverge in meaning, as a mere difference in tone grows into a
difference in application" (p. 106). And so on: although the details of how we construct these continua of
cases will vary depending upon the condition in question, it seems plausible that if Williamson's argument
succeeds in showing that the condition that onefeels cold is not luminous, analogous arguments could show
that almost any other condition is not luminous. In particular, as a process of gradual change can take one
from circumstances in which it is rational for one to believe that p to circumstances in which it is irrational
for one to believe that p, we can establish that, for any sense of "rational," the condition that it is rationalfor
one to believe that p is not luminous: it can be rational, in that sense, for one to believe a given proposition
without one's being in a position to know that it is. 4
Williamson's anti-luminosity argument forms the backbone of Knowledge and Its Limits: not only
does he take it to show that no non-trivial condition is luminous, but he also uses the argument (or
variants of it) to reply to an important objection to his claim that knowledge is a mental state (ch. 4); to
contest Dummett's argument for an anti-realist theory of meaning (ch. 4); to argue against a version of the
KK-principle according to which one is always in a position to know when one knows a given proposition
(ch. 5); to provide a solution to the surprise examination paradox (ch. 6); to rebut any argument for
skepticism about the external world that assumes that we and the envatted versions of ourselves possess
the same evidence (ch. 8); and to buttress his claim that our evidence is all and only what we know (ch. 9).
Moreover, similar uses of a safety requirement on knowledge to derive margin-for-error principles play a
crucial role in Williamson's theory of vagueness. 5 And more generally, Williamson's anti-luminosity
4 Williamson insists that such a continuum of cases exists for it is rational fir one to believe that p at Williamson (2004),
p. 315; see also Williamson (2005), pp. 4 8 1 -4 8 2 .
5 It is these margin-for-error principles that allow Williamson to explain why, even though on his epistemicist theory of
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argument constitutes a novel way of criticizing a venerable philosophical tradition-a way which
Williamson uses to lay the foundation for a radical new theory of (as he puts it) knowledge and its limits.
3. Narrowing the Target
Such is Williamson's core anti-luminosity argument; but is it sound? The argument works by generating a
contradiction from the five premises (LUM), (POS), (MAR), (BEG), and (END). The last two of these are
undeniable: they follow directly from the set-up of the scenario. (POS), on the other hand, one might
doubt: it depends on assuming that in each case one has done everything one can to decide whether one
feels cold, and some might insist that doing this takes longer than one millisecond. However, we can easily
avoid this worry by extending the amount of time between successive cases while keeping the total
number of cases the same (so that the entire process takes longer than a single morning), and once we
change the set-up in this way, (POS) seems fine. 6 Thus the crucial question when evaluating Williamson's
argument is whether (MAR) is more plausible than (LUM).
Many people, when first encountering Williamson's argument, find (MAR) independently
plausible and so not in need of any further justification. However, resting content with the prima facie
plausibility of (MAR) reduces Williamson's argument to a mere battle of intuitions over which of (LUM)
and (MAR) one finds more plausible, and it would then be open to the defender of luminosity who finds
(LUM) compelling to simply tollens Williamson's ponens. Moreover, we should be wary of trusting our
intuitions about principles that involve applying vague predicates to very similar cases: after all, the typical
sorites premise "One hair can't make the difference between being bald and not bald" is intuitively
extremely compelling. So if the only grounds we had in support of (MAR) were our bare intuitions about its
seeming plausibility, those would be very thin grounds indeed, particularly in light of the wide variety of
radical consequences that Williamson takes to follow from his anti-luminosity argument.
vagueness each vague predicate has a sharp cut-off point, we can never know where those sharp cut-off points lie. See Williamson(1992a), §5; Williamson (1992b), §6; and Williamson (1994), ch. 8.6 Actually, matters are slightly more complicated than that, for as long as one's feeling of cold is continually changing
between successive cases, we might worry that one will not be coming to a decision about a constant feeling of cold. So if we want
to completely avoid this type of worry, we should make one more change to the set-up and, instead of having one's feeling of cold
change continuously over a given interval, have it change in incremental steps.
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What we want is an independent motivation for (MAR). As mentioned before, Williamson defends
(MAR) by appealing to a safety requirement on knowledge. A recurring theme in the Williamsonian oeuvre,
from his early work on indiscriminability and vagueness on through his recent material more directly
concerned with epistemological matters, is that in cases in which we have imperfect abilities to
discriminate between alternatives, a safety requirement on knowledge plus our limited powers of discrimination yield
margin-for-error principles.7 A margin-for-error principle is any principle that, like (MAR), is of the form "If in
case a one knows that p, then in sufficiently similar case 3 it is true that p." And the safety requirement is
Williamson's way of cashing out the idea that reliability is a necessary condition for knowledge: although
in earlier work Williamson talks exclusively of a reliability constraint on knowledge without mentioning
the word "safety," by Knowledge and Its Limits he passes freely back and forth between talk of reliability and
talk of safety.8
What exactly is Williamson's safety requirement? And how exactly does it lead to the margin-for-
error principle (MAR)? Unfortunately, this matter is complicated by the fact that Williamson explicates the
safety requirement in two different ways, the first involving a coarse-grained, "all or nothing" conception
of belief, the second involving a more fine-grained conception in terms of degrees of confidence. So in
order to assess the case Williamson makes for (MAR), we should consider each of these ways of filling out
the safety requirement in turn.
4. Coarse-Grained Safety
Williamson often expresses the idea that knowledge requires safety from error in terms of one's not easily
being wrong in similar cases: "if one believes p truly in a case a, one must avoid false belief in cases
sufficiently similar to a in order to count as reliable enough to know in a" (p. 100); "in case a one is safe
from error in believing that C obtains if and only if there is no case close to a in which one falsely believes
that C obtains" (pp. 126-127); "if one knows, one could not easily have been wrong in a similar case. In
7 See Williamson (1990), pp. 104-106; (1992a), pp. 223-226; (1994), pp. 226-230; and (2000), pp. 17-18.
8 Note that Williamson's identification of reliability with safety is very different from the process reliabilist's identification of
reliability with truth-conducivity. For more on the process reliabilist's notion of reliability and some of its pitfalls, see chapter 2 of
this dissertation.
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that sense, one's belief is safely true" (p. 147). Passages such as these strongly suggest that the safety
requirement involves the following necessary condition on knowledge:
(C-SAFETY) In case ac one knows that p only if, in all sufficiently similar cases in which one
believes thatp, it is true thatp. 9
When so construed, the safety requirement has an undeniable air of plausibility: if it easily could have
been the case that one falsely believes that p-if in an extremely similar way the world might have been,
one believes that p and this belief is false-then one's actual belief that p, even if true, does not seem
secure enough to constitute knowledge. Suppose I ask you to think of a number between 1 and 10 and
correctly guess that you are thinking of 6; my true belief about which number you are thinking of does not
count as knowledge. Why? Plausibly because there is a very similar case in which I still guess that you are
thinking of 6, but my belief is wrong since you are really thinking of, say, 4. Suppose I decide, out of mere
pessimism, that the lottery ticket I just purchased is not a winning ticket; even if I end up being right, my
belief that the ticket is not a winner does not count as knowledge. Why? Plausibly because there is a very
similar case in which I still believe out of pessimism that the ticket is not a winner, but the balls
determining the winning ticket number bounce slightly differently so as to make my ticket a winner. Of
course, how one fixes the similarity relation between cases and what determines the threshold beyond
which two cases do not count as sufficiently similar will no doubt be murky matters, but there seems little
point in denying that (C-SAFETY) has much to be said in its favor.' 0
It is crucial to notice that (C-SAFETY) is not itself a margin-for-error principle. According to a
given margin-for-error principle, one does not know that p in some case if, in a certain sufficiently similar
9 This coarse-grained version of a safety requirement on knowledge is roughly equivalent to one that Ernest Sosa has
endorsed in a recent series of articles; see Sosa (1996), (1999a), (1999b), (2000), (2002), and (2004). Note, however, that Sosa's
formulation of the safety requirement involves ascribing non-standard truth conditions to the subjunctive conditional "S would
believe that p only if it were the case that p"-truth conditions that Williamson does not necessarily endorse: see Williamson
(2000), p. 149.
10 Several recent articles have attempted to provide counterexamples to (C-SAFETY) as a way of resisting Williamson's anti-
luminosity argument; see Brueckner & Fiocco (2002), Neta & Rohrbaugh (2004), Comesafia (2005), and Conee (2005). For
Williamson's reply, see §I of his (forthcoming). I agree with Williamson's assessment that the alleged counterexamples offered by
these authors are not convincing: each aims to describe two sufficiently similar cases such that one knows a given proposition in
the first case and falsely believes that same proposition in the second, but for each pair of cases, either it is far from clear that the
first case is a genuine case of knowledge, or it is far from clear that the two cases are sufficiently similar in the relevant respects.
(This is all the more true when the safety requirement is modified so that one must have sufficiently similar bases of belief in the
two cases: see n. 15.)
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case, it is false that p. According to (C-SAFETY), one does not know that p in some case if, in a sufficiently
similar case, it is false that p and one believes that p. For all (C-SAFETY) says, one might know that p in
some case a despite its being false that p in an extremely similar case a*, provided that one does not
believe that p in a*. It is only nearby false belief that, according to (C-SAFETY), blocks one from having
knowledge, not nearbyfalsity of what is actually believed.
Recall that the margin-for-error principle needed for Williamson's anti-luminosity argument to go
through is as follows:
(MAR) (Vi, 0 r i < n)(KC obtains in ai D C obtains in a2i+).
How can one derive (MAR) from (C-SAFETY)? Let us concede to Williamson that each case ai is
sufficiently similar to the case ae+l one millisecond later. Then ifBC is the condition that one believes that one
feels cold, straightforward substitution into (C-SAFETY) yields the following:
(SAF) (Vi, 0 : i < n)[KC obtains in ai D (BC obtains in ai+1 D C obtains in ai+l)].
So in order for us to be able to use the coarse-grained version of the safety requirement to justify the
crucial premise of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument, we must somehow get from (SAF) to (MAR).
How to do so is not difficult to see. Williamson's guiding thought is that for cases in which we
have limited discriminatory capabilities, the safety requirement on knowledge gives rise to a margin-for-
error principle. So what we need is some premise encapsulating our subject's inability to discriminate the
cases ac from one millisecond to the next. The most obvious candidate is as follows:
(BEL) (Vi, 0 r i < n)(BC obtains in ai D BC obtains in a i+i).
The basic idea behind (BEL) is that because the change from ti to ti+1 in the underlying basis for one's
belief that one feels cold is beyond the threshold of one's discriminatory capacities, one's belief at 4t+l as to
whether one feels cold will be the same as one's belief at 4. (BEL) is a natural way of articulating the idea
that one cannot discriminate case ai from case ai+l with regards to how cold one feels-that, as
Williamson puts it, there is "limited discrimination in the belief-forming process" (p. 127). Moreover, once
we have (BEL), (MAR) follows from (SAF), given the additional assumption that knowledge implies belief.
So have we managed to adequately justify (MAR)? No, we have not-for the crucialpremise (BEL) is a
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sorites premise. Indeed, (BEL) by itself is enough to generate a sorites paradox from the undeniable
assumptions that (i) one believes that one feels cold in case ao (i.e. at dawn), and (ii) one does not believe
that one feels cold in case an (i.e. at noon): with n uses of modus ponens on an instance of (BEL), we can get
from the first of these assumptions to the negation of the second. So we should reject any argument that
appeals to (BEL); depending on one's theory of vagueness, the principle is either less than perfectly true or
outright false. And if Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does indeed implicitly appeal to (BEL), then
that argument is open to the charge of illicitly exploiting the vagueness of the term "believes," in much the
same way as a typical sorites argument illicitly exploits the vagueness of a term such as "bald" or "heap." "
However, might not Williamson derive (MAR) from (SAF) by means of some principle other than
(BEL)? Another obvious candidate is
(KNO) (Vi, O : i < n)(KC obtains in aci D BC obtains in a~i+).
(KNO) and (SAF) together yield (MAR), without our even having to assume that knowledge implies belief.
But what is the independent motivation for (KNO), other than its being what Williamson needs in order to
derive (MAR)? It's not as if (KNO) encapsulates some dictum about the subject's inability to discriminate
between successive cases-or if it does, it only does so derivatively, in virtue of being implied by (BEL) and
II A similar objection applies to attempts to save Williamson's argument by appealing to a modalized version of (BEL). It
might be insisted that if one believes that one feels cold in case ac, then even if one does not believe that one feels cold in the case
ai+l one millisecond later, there must exist at least one other possible case A similar to ai in which one has the same qualitative
feeling of cold as in ai+l and in which one believes that one feels cold; in symbols:
(BEL') (Vi, 0 s i < n)(BC obtains in ai D (3P similar to ai)[Q(p)=Q(ai+,) A BC obtains in P]),
where Q(a)=Q(3) signifies that one's qualitative feeling of cold is the same in cases a and P3. (Cf. Williamson (2000), p. 127.)
Moreover, it is extremely plausible that whether one feels cold in a given case is determined by one's qualitative feeling of cold, so
if one has the same qualitative feeling of cold in two cases, one feels cold in one of those cases if and only if one feels cold in the
other:
(QUAL) (Va, P)[Q(a)=Q(1) D (C obtains in a iff C obtains in P)].
From (BEL'), (QUAL), (C-SAFETY), and the assumption that knowledge implies belief, we can derive (MAR). However, just as
repeatedly iterating (BEL) leads to unacceptable consequences, repeatedly iterating (BEL') leads to unacceptable-or at least highly
controversial-consequences. Given the undeniable assumption that one believes that one feels cold in ao, repeated applications
of (BEL') yields the result that there exists some case 1 in which one feels as hot as one does in a,, (the case at noon in our original
scenario), and yet one nonetheless believes that one feels cold. Indeed, if we tweak our original scenario and stipulate that in the
final case things have heated up to such a degree that one's qualitative feeling of hot is the same as it would be were one at the
center of the sun, then the defender of (BEL') is saddled with the result that there is a possible case 3 such that one feels as if one were
in the center of the sun, andyet one believes that onefeels cold. Of course, since the similarity relation is not transitive, 1 will be very distant
from any case in the actual world. But I think we should have serious doubts that such a case is even possible-serious doubts that
there could exist a being who counts as having beliefs and experiences, and yet whose beliefs and experiences are as wildly at odds
with one another as they would be in P. To think otherwise is to think that the cognitive and phenomenal realms can come apart
from each other to an unacceptable degree. (Compare the discussion of Sosa's thought experiment in §6 below.)
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the claim that knowledge implies belief. And it doesn't seem plausible that (KNO) follows from some more
general claim that knowing that p in some case requires that one believe that p in all sufficiently similar
cases. Suppose I know a given proposition in the actual case; in a very similar case I might be suspending
judgment on the matter, or irrationally clinging to a belief in the proposition's negation-why should that
bar me from knowing in the actual case? Though knowledge might indeed require a protective belt of
cases in which one does not falsely believe, it is extremely implausible to suppose that, in addition,
knowledge requires a protective belt of cases in which one believes.
But more importantly, and independent of the specific failings of (BEL) and (KNO), the more
general point is this: if one knows that p in some case, (C-SAFETY) has nothing to say about similar cases in
which one does not believe that p; at some point during the morning one will stop believing that one feels
cold; so (C-SAFETY) has nothing to say about whether one really does feel cold from that point on. In
particular, as it is incontestable that BC does not obtain in case an, (SAF)-and hence (C-SAFETY)--will be
completely useless in deriving the conditional "KC obtains in a,-1 D C obtains in an,," which is one of the
instances of (MAR). The basic purpose of (MAR) in Williamson's anti-luminosity argument is as a bridge
principle between cases. From (LUM) and (POS) it only follows that if some condition obtains in a given
case, then some other condition obtains in that same case; with (MAR), on the other hand, we can deduce
that because a certain condition obtains in case cai, a certain other condition must obtain in the successive
case ai+1.However, (C-SAFETY) will be unable to fully undergird (MAR), since (C-SAFETY) can act as a
bridge principle between successive cases ai and ai+l only if one believes that one feels cold in both; as this
will not be true for all integers i such that 0 r i < n, we will need some other bridge principle to secure
(MAR) in those cases, and I claim that whatever this additional principle is, it will be implausible.
One might reply on Williamson's behalf: all we need in order to run the reductio is a single case in
which one falsely believes that one feels cold, so we don't need to go all the way to an. Suppose there is
some integerj such that: (i) for every non-negative integer i < j, both C and BC obtain in ai, and (ii) BC
obtains in aj but C does not. Then we could use (BEG), (LUM), (POS), and (SAF) to generate the
contradictory result that C both does and does not obtain in aj. However, who is to say that such aj
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exists-that as one gradually gets warmer and warmer during the course of the morning while carefully
attending to how cold one feels, one stops feeling cold before one stops believing that one feels cold?
Williamson appears willing to grant to his opponent that there might be "a constitutive connection
between the obtaining of the condition [that one feels cold] and one's judging it to obtain" (p. 100), and
some candidates for such a constitutive connection rule out the possibility that our subject stops feeling
cold before she stops believing that she feels cold.12 The weakest version of a constitutive connection that
has this result is the following:
(CON) If one has done everything one can to decide whether one feels cold, then one
believes that one feels cold only if one feels cold.
Since on the morning in question our subject has done everything she can to decide whether she feels
cold, it would follow from (CON) that she never believes that she feels cold on that morning without in fact
feeling cold. Of course one might doubt that there exists a constitutive connection of this form between
feeling cold and believing that one feels cold, but then we need some independent argument against the
possibility of such a connection, which the anti-luminosity argument by itself does not provide. Indeed, as
Williamson himself notes (p. 100), typically it is precisely because they think that there is a tight connection
between certain mental states and beliefs about those states that some philosophers claim the mental states
in question to be luminous.' 3 So to simply assume that (CON) is false would beg the question against the
defender of luminosity.14
I conclude that (C-SAFETY) is unable by itself to motivate the margin-for-error principle (MAR).
However, at times Williamson talks as if (C-SAFETY) is only a first approximation to the proper coarse-
grained version of the safety requirement. "A more elaborate account on such lines," he writes, "would
12 A number of authors in the philosophy of mind literature have recently defended accounts according to which there is a
constitutive connection between experience and (the exercise of) certain so-called phenomenal concepts, which in turn gives rise
to a corresponding constitutive connection between experience and certain phenomenal beliefs that employ those concepts: see
Papineau (2002), ch. 4; Chalmers (2003); Block (2006); and Balog (forthcoming).
'~ See, for example, Chisholm (1956), p. 725, and (1982), p. 10.
14 In his (2004), Brian Weatherson reaches a similar conclusion that a coarse-grained version of Williamson's anti-luminosity
argument would be blocked if on the morning in question one believes that one feels cold only if one feels cold. Weatherson
makes the point by considering the possibility that the very same brain state might constitute the state of one's feeling cold and the
state of one's believing that one feels cold, but we need not make so strong an assumption in order to block the argument: all we
need is the much weaker claim (CON). Moreover, Weatherson fails to consider how this insight can be extended to Williamson's
official defense of (MAR) in terms of a fine-grained version of the safety requirement.
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qualify '[one] believes p' in the conditional to exclude cases in which [one] believes p on a quite different
basis from the basis on which [one] believes p in the case in which [one] putatively knows p" (p. 149).
Williamson seems to be suggesting that a more accurate version of the coarse-grained safety requirement
would read as follows:
(C-SAFETY') In case a one knows that p on basis b only if, in any sufficiently similar case a* in
which one believes thatp on a sufficiently similar basis b*, it is true thatp.
Suppose that in some case a one believes that p on a given basis, and in a sufficiently similar case 3 one
believes that p on a very different basis (perhaps one believes that p by perception in case a and by
testimony in case P3). Then (C-SAFETY') captures the very natural idea that if one's belief is true in a and
false in 3, one's false belief in P should not impugn the reliability (and hence the status as knowledge) of
one's true belief in a-after all, one came to believe thatp on a very different basis in each case.
Thus the shift from (C-SAFETY) to (C-SAFETY') lends more plausibility to the claim that safety is
indeed a necessary condition for knowledge. 15 However, once we have made this move, we are now owed
an account of what makes one basis for belief sufficiently similar to another. Suppose I come to believe
that there is a cup on the table on the basis of visual perception in dim lighting. Does every sufficiently
similar case in which I believe the same thing on the basis of visual perception count as a case in which I
believe that proposition on a sufficiently similar basis? Or only cases in which the retinal image on my eye
is approximately the same? Or only cases in which the source of the retinal image is approximately the
same? Or only cases in which the lighting conditions are approximately the same? Depending on how we
answer these questions, the safety of my belief-and hence its status as knowledge-will vary. And as
readers of chapter 2 of this dissertation should be well aware, this issue is nothing more than the dreaded
generality problem for reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification, which is just as much a problem for
Williamson's safety requirement as it is for any other reliabilist view. Williamson concedes that his appeal
to the safety requirement opens him to the generality problem, but he seems to be confused about what
15 The shift to (C-SAFETY') also provides one more tool in resisting the would-be counterexamples to the safety requirement
mentioned in n. 10, since many of those examples fix on two cases in which the bases of one's belief are not sufficiently similar
(especially if we individuate bases of belief externally, so that phenomenologically indistinguishable bases of belief need not count
as sufficiently similar).
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implications this has for his argument. Williamson writes that if the generality problem is insoluble, then
the upshot is merely that "the concept of reliability cannot be defined in independent terms" (p. 100);
however, the upshot is much more dire than that: if the generality problem is genuinely insoluble, then
every reliabilist theory-Williamson's included-either is unacceptably ad hoc, or else gives rise to wildly
counterintuitive results about what counts as knowledge.' 6
That reliabilist theories of knowledge face the generality problem is nothing new. Thus I propose
that we set this worry aside and pretend that Williamson has a response to it. I also propose that we grant
Williamson the truth of (C-SAFETY'). There is enough flexibility in what counts as both a sufficiently
similar case and a sufficiently similar basis of belief that one can probably avoid any putative
counterexample to the principle (indeed, it is this very flexibility that gives rise to the generality problem).
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there is something undeniably attractive about this way of cashing out
the safety requirement. So let us concede to Williamson that (C-SAFETY') holds. I shall now argue that,
even if (C-SAFETY') is true, it provides no help with the criticisms raised earlier against the possibility of
deriving the needed margin-for-error principle (MAR) from a coarse-grained version of the safety
requirement.
In order to use (C-SAFETY') to derive (MAR), we need it to be the case that if in some case ai on
the morning in question one knows that one feels cold on a given basis for belief, then in the case ai+l one
millisecond later one believes that one feels cold on a sufficiently similar basis. But if one believes on a
sufficiently similar basis that one feels cold, then afortiori one believes simpliciter that one feels cold. Thus,
just as in our attempt to derive (MAR) using (C-SAFETY) as the only bridge principle between cases, in
order to derive (MAR) using (C-SAFETY') as the only bridge principle it must be true that one believes that
one feels cold in each successive case. And as this is not true for the morning in question, it will be
impossible to use (C-SAFETY') to motivate (MAR) without appealing to some sorites-premise-like principle
to the effect that if one believes that one feels cold on a given basis in case ct, then one believes that one
feels cold on a sufficiently similar basis in the subsequent case ai+l. But we should reject any argument
16 See chapter 2 of this dissertation for further discussion.
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that appeals to such a principle. So moving to (C-SAFETY') is of no help in attempting to derive (MAR)
from the safety requirement.7,' 18
5. Fine-Grained Safety
For most of Knowledge and Its Limits, when Williamson discusses the safety requirement it is the coarse-
grained version of the safety requirement that is explicitly mentioned. And when Williamson provides a
formal model of how luminosity might fail (pp. 127-130), his model invokes a conception of safety
formulated in terms of coarse-grained, "all or nothing" belief. However, during Williamson's official
defense of (MAR), he instead appeals to a more fine-grained notion of safety-as Williamson puts it, his
17 At one point Williamson mentions in passing a third version of a coarse-grained safety requirement, one that provides even
less support for (MAR) than the other two. Williamson writes, "If at time t on basis b one knows p, and at a time t* close enough t
on a basis b* close enough to b one believes a proposition p* close enough to p, then p* should be true" (p. 102). This quotation
suggests the following version of a coarse-grained safety requirement:
(C-SAFETY") In case a one knows that p on basis b only if, in any sufficiently similar case ca* in which one believes a
sufficiently similar proposition that p* on a sufficiently similar basis b*, it is true that p*.
(C-SAFEIY") avoids one problem that potentially faces (C-SAFETY) and (C-SAFETY'): we might want to use the safety requirement
to rule out lucky guesses about necessary truths from being knowledge, but if I correctly guess, say, that 853 is prime, there will be no
sufficiently similar cases in which I falsely believe that 853 is prime, since what I believe is true in every possible case. (Cf.
Sainsbury (1995), p. 595; Weatherson (2004), p. 378; Williamson (2000), pp. 181-182; Williamson (2005), p. 472.) However, as a
means of motivating (MAR), (C-SAFETY") fares even worse than (C-SAFETY) and (C-SAFETY'). As one gradually feels warmer and
warmer on the morning in question, eventually one will stop believing that one feels cold and instead believe a proposition that
one might express by saying, "I feel coldish." So (C-SAFETY"), plus various background assumptions about the sufficient similarity
of both the propositions believed and the bases on which one believes them, will yield the result that if in the previous case one
knew that one felt cold, then in the present case it must be true that one feels coldish. And repeated appeals to (C-SAFETY") in this
way will eventually yield the result that in a,, one feels hot-hardly an absurd conclusion!
18 The recurring problem in these attempts to motivate (MAR) by means of a coarse-grained version of the safety requirement
is that, in each case, we need some way of ensuring that one continues to believe that one feels cold from one millisecond to the
next on the morning in question. Thus we might ask: can we abandon these attempts to derive (MAR) from a coarse-grained
safety requirement, and instead attempt to derive it from a safety-like requirement that makes no reference to belief? The safety-
like requirement that readily springs to mind is the following:
(SIM) In case a one knows that p only if, in all sufficiently similar cases, it is true that p.
However, (SIM) is extremely implausible, for reasons similar to those given against (KNO): why should its not being the case that p
in nearby cases obstruct my knowing that p in the actual case if I don't believe that p, or even engage in any belief-forming process
vaguely similar to that which I used in forming or retaining my belief that p, in those nearby cases? Indeed, unless we severely
restrict what counts as a sufficiently similar case, (SIM) would appear to block almost any belief from counting as knowledge. For
example, suppose I am gazing at a leaf on a nearby tree and truly believe that I am seeing a green leaf. Presumably a case whose
only difference from the actual one consists in the leaf in question being brown, or in its not being in front of my gaze since it has
already fallen to the ground, is similar in nearly all respects to the actual one; yet if we count such cases as sufficiently similar, we
are saddled with the absurd consequence that I do not know that I am seeing a green leaf in the actual case. Of course, we could
deem these cases as not being sufficiently similar, but then we lose the ability of (SIM) to explain the examples used to motivate a
safety-like requirement in the first place-for instance, in the lottery example there are any number of differences between the
actual case in which my lottery ticket is a winner and the counterfactual case in which my lottery ticket is a loser that are far
greater than a difference in the color or position of one mere leaf. As such we would need some new motivation for taking (SIM) to
be a genuine necessary condition on knowledge, and how we provide such a motivation is not readily apparent. But more
pressingly, the defender of (SIM) who counts the counterfactual leaf cases as not sufficiently similar to the actual case presumably
does so partially in virtue of the differences in one's beliefs between the actual and counterfactual cases, which would imply that a
counterfactual case only counts as sufficiently similar if one has all the same beliefs in that case as in the actual case; however, this
makes (SIM) a mere notational variant of (C-SAFETY), and thus all the same problems will arise as before when one attempts to use
(SIM) to derive (MAR).
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argument here "depends on applying reliability considerations in a subtler way to degrees of confidence"
(p. 127).19 I suspect that Williamson constructs the official argument in terms of a fine-grained version of
the safety requirement specifically because he wants the argument to hold even if something like (CON) is
true: the real anti-luminosity argument is supposed to be one that even the staunchest defender of
constitutive connections must accept. The problem, however, is that whereas the coarse-grained
conception of safety is at least somewhat compelling as a way of articulating the general idea that
knowledge requires reliably true belief, the fine-grained version has no such appeal. Or so I shall argue.
It will help if I quote Williamson's initial justification of (MAR) in terms of degrees of confidence in
its entirety (p. 97):
Consider a time 4 between to and t,, and suppose that at 4 one knows that one feels cold. Thus one is at least
reasonably confident that one feels cold, for otherwise one would not know. Moreover, this confidence must
be reliably based, for otherwise one would still not know that one feels cold. Now at ti+1 one is almost equally
confident that one feels cold, by the description of the case. So if one does not feel cold at 4t+l, then one's
confidence at 4 that one feels cold is not reliably based, for one's almost equal confidence on a similar basis
a millisecond earlier that one felt cold was mistaken. In picturesque terms, that large portion of one's
confidence at 4ti that one still has at 4ti+ is misplaced. Even if one's confidence at 4 was just enough to count
as belief, while one's confidence at ti+i falls just short of belief, what constituted that belief at ti was largely
misplaced confidence; the belief fell short of knowledge. One's confidence at ti was reliably based in the way
required for knowledge only if one feels cold at 4t+l.
In this argument, Williamson appears to be implicitly appealing to the following principle: 20
(F-SAFETY) In case a one's belief that p with degree of confidence c is reliably based in the
way required for knowledge only if, in any sufficiently similar case ca* in which
one has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* that p, it is true that p.
Moreover, merely in virtue of the description of the scenario, the following holds for the cases at under
discussion:
(CONF) For every integer i (0 5 i < n), if in at one has degree of confidence c that one feels
cold, then in ai+l one has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* that one
feels cold.
19 Williamson has a very peculiar notion of degrees of confidence: although one's degree of confidence in a given proposition
is that which, when there is enough of it, constitutes outright belief in that proposition, Williamson insists that degrees of
confidence "should not be equated with subjective probabilities as measured by one's betting behavior" (p. 98). A better indicator
of one's degree of confidence in a given proposition, he claims, is the degree to which one is willing to use that proposition as a
premise in practical reasoning (p. 99). Nothing I say in what follows turns on the distinction between Williamsonian degrees of
confidence/belief and degrees of confidence/belief more traditionally construed.
20 More precisely, Williamson appears to be appealing to a principle according to which one's belief that p with a certain
degree of confidence constitutes knowledge in a given case only if, in any sufficiently similar case in which one believes thatp with
a sufficiently similar degree of confidence and on a sufficiently similar basis, it is true that p. (Compare the discussion of (C-SAFETY') at
the end of §4.) However, for ease of exposition I shall ignore this complication in what follows, since nothing in my criticism of
Williamson's argument depends on issues concerning the basis of one's belief.
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(F-SAFETY) and (CONF), together with our usual assumption that each case a, is sufficiently similar to its
subsequent case ai+i, imply the desired margin-for-error principle, (MAR):
(MAR) For every integer i (0 < i < n), if in ai one knows that one feels cold, then in a;+i one
feels cold.
Unlike (BEL) or (KNO), (CONF) seems indisputable, given the description of the situation at hand.
However, why should we believe (F-SAFETY)?
The crucial step in Williamson's justification of (F-SAFETY) is his insistence that if in case a one
has a degree of confidence that p just barely enough to constitute full-fledged belief, then that belief is not
safe/reliable enough to constitute knowledge whenever it is false that p in some sufficiently similar case a*
in which one has a slightly less degree of confidence that p, even if one's degree of confidence that p in a* is not
enough to constitute full-fledged belief. It is this feature that allows (F-SAFETY) to be a bridge principle where
(C-SAFETY) could not be-that allows us to continue to conclude that one feels cold in successive cases ai
even after one's belief that one feels cold has given out. But why should we withhold the honorific
"reliable" in the kinds of cases Williamson describes? What if one's degree of confidence in its being the
case that p perfectly tracks the underlying basis for its being the case that p, so that one's degree of
confidence that p falls just short of belief at the precise point at which things fall just short of making it the
case that p? Why would that be a situation in which one's initial belief that p is not reliable enough to
constitute knowledge? Or slightly more realistically-since Williamson seems to be making the
contentious assumption that there is a precise cut-off point above which one's degree of confidence always
constitutes full-fledged belief and below which one's degree of confidence always does not constitute full-
fledged belief-what if one's belief that p tapers off (as it were) just as its being the case that p tapers off,
and in precisely the same way? In such a situation, why should one's lower degree of confidence that p
when it is not the case that p in any way impugn the reliability of one's slightly higher degree of confidence
that p when it is the case that p? Of course, how one cashes out this "tapering off' metaphor will depend
upon one's theory of vagueness, but the main point remains: (F-SAFETY) deems as unreliable belief-
forming mechanisms that appear to be as reliable as they could possibly be.
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To illustrate this point, we can use a slightly altered version of Williamson's own example of a
subject gradually feeling warmer on a given morning. The basic idea is that if we are going to go fine-
grained with respect to belief, we should also go fine-grained with respect to one's feelings of hot or cold.
So let us suppose it were possible to measure the intensity of one's subjective feeling of cold using some set
of units-call these units "freezons." To fix on some numbers, let us say that, on the given morning, one's
feeling of hot or cold is at a level of 50 freezons at time to (dawn) and a level of -50 freezons at time t,
(noon). Let us also suppose that the following is true of our subject: at any time one's degree of confidence
that one feels cold on that morning directly correlates to one's subjective feeling of cold as measured in
freezons (see figure 1). If we wanted to be precise, we could encapsulate this correlation with the following
equation: if c(ti) is one's degree of confidence at time ti that one feels cold (measured on a scale from 0 to 1),
and iffti) is one's feelings of hot or cold at t; as measured in freezons, then fti) = 100 c(ti) - 50 freezons. 21
Maybe human subjects who are carefully considering how cold they feel would have this sort of a
correlation in their freezon/degree-of-confidence levels; maybe they wouldn't. For the purposes of my
example it doesn't matter--all I need is for it to be possible that there could exist a being with such a
correlation between its freezon and degrees-of-confidence levels, which surely is the case.
Finally, let us make one last supposition about the subject of our scenario. Let our subject's
21 This assumes that one's degree of confidence that one feels cold is 1 at dawn and 0 at noon, but we could easily adjust the
equation so that one's degree of confidence that one feels cold is nearly 1 at dawn and nearly 0 at noon.
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confidence in how cold she feels that morning be so well-attuned that the following penumbral connection22
obtains between the vague expressions "believes" and "feels cold" whenever "one" refers to our subject on
that morning: one believes that one feels cold if and only if one feels cold. Then if we sharpen "believes"
and "feels cold" such that there is a precise cut-off point between the cases in which one does and does not
feel cold and a precise cut-off point between the cases in which one does and does not believe that one feels
cold, the penumbral connection ensures that those cut-off points are the same. Again, it seems evident
that there could exist a being for whom this is the case.
But now the crucial point comes: if our subject is such that all of the above is true of her, then
according to (F-SAFETY), at some point during the morning her belief that she feels cold is too unreliable
to constitute knowledge. However, this just seems wrong: our subject's beliefs about whether she feels cold
appear to be as reliable as they possibly could be. This point is most easily illustrated if we sharpen the
terms "believes" and "feels cold" so that they do, in fact, have sharp cut-off points. 23 Suppose that the
sharp cut-off for belief is at 0.8 degrees of confidence: whenever one has a degree of confidence that p
greater than 0.8, one counts as believing that p, and whenever one has a degree of confidence that p less
than or equal to 0.8, one counts as not believing that p. It follows from our penumbral connection
between "believes" and "feels cold" that the sharp cut-off for feeling cold is 30 freezons. Now let cc be the
last case during the course of the morning such that, on our sharpening of "believes," one counts as
believing that one feels cold. Then in c%, one's degree of confidence that one feels cold is 0.8 + 8 (for some
small real number 6 > 0), and one's feeling of cold is at a level of 30 + e freezons (for some small real
number E > 0). In case cgj+ one millisecond later, one's degree of confidence that one feels cold is 0.8 - 6'
(for some small real number 6' > 0), and one's feeling of cold is at a level of 30 - e' freezons (for some
small real number E' > 0). So (assuming that cyj is sufficiently similar to cj+l and that 0.8 + 8 and 0.8 - 6'
22 See Fine (1975), p. 124.
23 Does doing so stack the deck against Williamson? No, it does not. First, as Williamson himself points out (p. 103), if the
argument for (MAR) is no longer cogent when we sharpen the relevant vague expressions, then that gives us reason to suspect that
(MAR) only seems plausible because it exploits in an illicit manner the vagueness of its key terms (just as the fact that a typical
sorites premise becomes obviously false when "bald" or "heap" is sharpened reveals that the premise is only plausible because it
exploits in an illicit manner the vagueness of "bald" or "heap"). And second, on Williamson's own epistemicist theory of
vagueness each of the relevant terms already has a sharp cut-off point, so there is no need to sharpen.
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are sufficiently similar degrees of confidence), Williamson's fine-grained safety requirement (F-SAFETY)
implies that one's degree of confidence that one feels cold in ct is too unreliable to constitute knowledge,
since in caj+ one's level of cold as measured in freezons slips just below the threshold of what counts as
feeling cold (so that it will be false in case ctj+l that one feels cold). However, this charge of unreliability
seems daft: in %cj+1 one's level of cold as measured in freezons does indeed slip just below the threshold of
what counts as feeling cold, but at precisely the same point one's degree of confidence that one feels cold slips
just below the threshold of what counts as believing that one feels cold. Should we then follow Williamson in
saying that, "in picturesque terms," the large portion of one's confidence at ti that one still has at ti+l is
misplaced? I think not.
Now one might have legitimate qualms about the notion of freezons that I have helped myself to
in this example. How do we measure these freezons? How do we fix their value both inter-personally, and
intra-personally across time? And what entitles us to move, from the familiar fact that some feelings of
cold are more intense than others, to the more substantive claim that there is a linear ordering of feelings
of cold by their intensity, let alone a linear ordering that has the same structure as an interval on the real
line? However, we should note that people can-and have--raised these exact same worries about degrees
of belief. Freezons are problematic; but so too, in my opinion, are degrees of belief/confidence.
A better objection would be to insist that, once we have sharpened "believes" and "feels cold," the
ideal epistemic state for our subject is not one in which (as in figure 1) one's degree of confidence that one
feels cold directly correlates to one's feeling of cold as measured in freezons, but rather one in which (as in
figure 2) one is absolutely certain that one feels cold until the first case in which one stops feeling cold, at
which point one's degree of confidence suddenly drops to 0 and stays that way for the remainder of the
morning. But then, the objection continues, since the degree-of-confidence profile given in figure 1 fails to
come close enough to the ideally reliable degree-of-confidence profile given in figure 2, it is perfectly
acceptable to insist that if one's degree-of-confidence profile were as in figure 1, one's degree of confidence
in case aj that one feels cold would not, in fact, be reliable enough to constitute knowledge. In this way the
counterexample to (F-SAFETY) can be avoided.
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It is not clear to me that, even after sharpening the relevant terms, the degree-of-confidence
profile given in figure 2 represents the ideal epistemic state that one might have on that morning. 24
However, let us grant to the objector that it does; even then we have not managed to save (F-SAFETY).
The objector concedes that if one's degree-of-confidence profile during the course of the morning
were as in figure 2, then in every case in which one's degree of confidence that one feels cold is above the
threshold for believing that one feels cold, that degree of confidence would be reliable enough to
constitute knowledge. The reason that this possibility is not a problem for Williamson's argument is that,
given (CONF), we know that human beings could not have such a degree-of-confidence profile, for that
would involve having drastically different degrees of confidence in the same proposition in two successive
cases. However, this leaves open the possibility that other conceivable beings could have degree-of-
confidence profiles that, while not as perfectly accurate as that in figure 2, still are reliable enough to
present a problem for (F-SAFETY). For surely it is not the case that any deviation whatsoever from the degree-
of-confidence profile given in figure 2 results in there being at least one case on the given morning in
which one believes that one feels with a certain degree of confidence, but that degree of confidence is not
reliably enough based to constitute knowledge. To insist upon that would be to insist not just that reliability
is required for knowledge, but moreover that perfect reliability is required, and that way skepticism lies. So
24 Whether this is so depends on issues outside the scope of this chapter, such as whether truth is both the aim of belief and the
aim of degree qf belief, or whether instead there is something else (degree of truth? objective chance?) that stands to degree of
belief/confidence as truth stands to belief.
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there must be some degree-of-confidence profiles differing from that of figure 2 such that, for every case in
which one has sufficient degree of confidence that one feels cold to count as believing that one feels cold,
that degree of confidence is sufficiently reliable to qualify as knowledge.
Another salient feature of the degree-of-confidence profile in figure 2, other than the fact that it
depicts a perfectly reliable belief-forming mechanism, is the fact that the profile is discontinuous: at the point
at which one goes from feeling cold to not feeling cold, there is a sudden, discontinuous jump from one's
having degree of confidence 1 that one feels cold to one's having degree of confidence 0 that one feels
cold. Non-idealized physical systems rarely-if ever-exhibit discontinuous phenomena at the
macroscopic level, so it seems plausible that, among the degree-of-confidence profiles for which one's
belief that one feels cold always counts as being suitably reliable, some of those degree-of-confidence
profiles are continuous. One likely candidate for such a profile is that given in figure 3: in it, one's degree
of confidence over time is nearly as in figure 2, but the corners of the profile are "rounded off' so as to
make the degree-of-confidence function c(t) continuous for all t such that to < t < tn. Note that at this point
no assumption is being made that a normal human could have such a degree-of-confidence profile; all that is
being assumed, at least for now, is that some possible creature could.
However, now we have trouble, for the degree-of-confidence profile given in figure 3 is a
counterexample to (F-SAFETY). As before, let aj be the last of our cases in which one counts as believing
that one feels cold, and let aj +I be the first case in which one does not count as believing that one feels cold.
n
.
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Assuming as before a penumbral connection between "feels cold" and "believes," %c* will also be the last
case in which one feels cold, and q 1+i the first case in which one does not feel cold. Moreover, because the
degree-of-confidence profile is continuous, we can always choose our otj and cij+l such that one's degree of
confidence that one feels cold in c.j+i is slightly lower than one's degree of confidence that one feels cold in
acj; if this isn't the case when the interval between cases is one millisecond, we can make it so by choosing a
smaller interval, such as one microsecond or one nanosecond. Then in c% one believes that one feels cold
with a given degree of confidence, and in sufficiently similar case cj+l one has a slightly lower degree of
confidence that one feels cold, despite its no longer being true that one feels cold. So according to
(F-SAFETY), one's belief in c% that one feels cold is not reliable enough to constitute knowledge. However,
by assumption the degree-of-confidence profile in figure 3 is one such that one's belief that one feels cold
always meets, for as long as it lasts, the minimum degree of reliability required for knowledge. So, lest we
hold that only discontinuous, perfectly reliable degree-of-confidence profiles such as that found in figure 2
allow one's belief that one feels cold to be reliably based in the way required for knowledge for the entire
time it lasts, we must give up (F-SAFETY).
Could one resist this conclusion by insisting that, in order for one's belief that one feels cold to be
suitably reliably based for the entire morning, one's degree of confidence that one feels cold must indeed
take a discontinuous drop once one stops feeling cold? Such a response is available, but it would divorce
reliability talk in the case of knowledge from reliability talk in other domains. A common way of
motivating reliability constraints on knowledge is first to note our practice of rating devices (such as
thermometers) as reliable when they generally serve their purpose, and then to extend that idea to humans
by thinking of our belief-forming mechanisms as nothing more than complex, biological devices for
attaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.2 5 However, by the criterion of reliability being proposed,
almost no physical device would count as always being reliable enough for our purposes. For example, if a
certain light is built to turn red whenever the temperature in some room is above 320F, then in order for
25 Cf. Williamson (2000), p. 101: "The use of the concept is reliable here is a way of drawing attention to an aspect of the case
relevant to the application of the concept knows, just as one might use the concept is reliable in arguing that a machine ill serves its
purpose."
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that light to qualify as sufficiently reliable for the entire time that it is in use, the light would have to
discontinuously change in color at the precise instant at which the temperature in the room rises above
32 0 F; as no physically implemented light could ever do that, no real-world version of such a light would
ever count as reliable in this way. But that seems far too demanding a standard of reliability: we can easily
imagine a light built for this purpose that we would rely on, and be right to do so, without its color ever
making such a discontinuous jump; indeed, we could even build such a light if we wanted.2 6 And if a
requirement of discontinuity is too demanding when ascribing the label "reliable" to physical devices, why
should it fail to be too demanding when ascribing that label to human cognitive systems and their outputs?
Thus I take the various versions of the freezons example to show that (F-SAFETY) does not specify
a genuine necessary condition on knowledge. One reply on Williamson's behalf would be to concede the
point, but then try to find some alternative to (F-SAFETY) that could still do the work necessary in
justifying (MAR). The basic idea would be to argue that, even if figures 1 or 3 depict the freezon and
degree-of-confidence profiles of a creature for whom the condition that one feels cold is luminous, humans
can never have such profiles, even when they do everything they can to decide whether they feel cold, so
the condition in question is not luminous for creatures like us. However, I have grave doubts about the
possibility of such a strategy ever succeeding. First, notice that it depends upon our being able to find a
new criterion for sorting the freezon/degree-of-confidence profiles that result in one's belief that one feels
cold being reliable enough for knowledge during its entire duration from those that do not. How to decide
upon this new criterion is a delicate affair: it's just not clear what sort of constraints are in play that would
allow us to sort the profiles in a suitably precise, and yet non-arbitrary, manner. But more importantly,
once we have this new criterion in hand, we would then need an additional argument establishing that
humans always fall on the unreliability side of the divide-that their degree-of-confidence curves over
time are of necessity too far from the sorts of curves given in figures 1 or 3 for them to have a belief that they
26 Williamson might insist that, at the precise instant at which the room's temperature is (say) 31.990 F, our light does not
qualify as reliable, though it might well have qualified as reliable several seconds earlier when the room's temperature was (say)
31.5 0 F. However, why say that? Why not say instead that the light was reliable enough for our purposes the entire time, though of
course it could have been a bit more reliable when the temperature was 31.990 F? To repeat a point made earlier: Williamson
seems to be conflating sufficient reliability at a given time with perfect reliability at that time.
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feel cold that is reliable for the entire time it lasts.
It is here that we run into a familiar problem. We saw in §4 that no version of Williamson's anti-
luminosity argument that attempts to derive (MAR) from a coarse-grained version of the safety
requirement would succeed if there exists a certain kind of constitutive connection between the coarse-
grained states of feeling cold and believing that one feels cold. However, there might also exist an
analogous constitutive connection at the fine-grained level between one's feeling of cold as measured in
freezons and one's degree of confidence that one feels cold. And moreover, this constitutive connection
might be such that, whenever one has done everything one is in a position to do to decide whether one
feels cold, the graphs over time of one's feeling of cold measured in freezons and one's degree of
confidence that one feels cold would be as in figures 1 or 3, or at least close enough to those graphs for
one's belief that one feels cold to count as reliable enough for knowledge during its entire duration. Of
course, one might doubt that such a constitutive connection exists. But to simply assume that it does not,
without offering any arguments in support of that assumption, would once again beg the main question at
issue, since defenders of luminosity are typically motivated by the thought that there is a tight connection
between the obtaining of certain conditions and our beliefs, at least upon reflection, about the obtaining of
those conditions. So even if a suitable replacement for (F-SAFETY) could be found-which itself is highly
doubtful-then the brunt of the argumentative work in establishing that conditions such as that one feels cold
are not luminous would still be left to be done.
6. Do the Relevant Constitutive Connections Obtain?
I have presented two ways of attempting to derive the crucial premise in Williamson's anti-luminosity
argument from a safety requirement on knowledge: the first attempted to derive that premise from a
coarse-grained safety requirement formulated in terms of "all or nothing" belief, the second attempted to
derive it from a fine-grained safety requirement formulated in terms of degrees of confidence. In each
case, the original version of the argument ran into problems-in the coarse-grained case, it proved
impossible to derive the needed premise (MAR) from the coarse-grained safety requirement without
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appealing to a dubious sorites-premise-like bridge principle between successive cases, and in the fine-
grained case, the proffered fine-grained safety requirement failed to specify a genuine necessary condition
for knowledge. Moreover, in each case the best attempt at resuscitating a version of the argument-
whether in the coarse-grained case by only running the argument until the first case in which it is false
that one feels cold, or in the fine-grained case by proposing an alternative to the original (putative) fine-
grained safety requirement-was blocked by the possibility that there might exist a certain sort of
constitutive connection between feeling cold and believing that one feels cold (in the coarse-grained case),
or between the degree to which one feels cold and the degree to which one believes that one feels cold (in
the fine-grained case).
Settling to what extent, if any, there is a constitutive connection-whether at the coarse-grained
or fined-grained level-between feeling cold and believing that one feels cold is beyond the scope of the
current chapter. But this much seems evident to me: there must be some sort of modal connection,
constitutive or otherwise, between one's phenomenal experiences (such as one's feeling cold) and one's
cognitive states (such as one's believing that one feels cold)-the phenomenal and the cognitive cannot
swing apart from each other any which way one likes. This is brought out by considering a thought
experiment once proposed by Ernest Sosa in a very different context. Sosa has us imagine a subject who
"has a beautifully coherent and comprehensive set of beliefs," yet through the interference of a group of
Cartesian evil demons, the subject's sensory experiences are "wildly at odds with his beliefs." So, for
example, the subject "believes he has a splitting headache, but he has no headache at all; he believes he
has a cubical piece of black coal before him, while his visual experience is as if he had a white and round
snowball before him," and so on.27 Sosa takes this case to be a counterexample to any theory of
justification that makes reference only to one's beliefs and the relations between them, since presumably
that theory would deem the subject's beliefs to be fully justified, whereas Sosa insists that there still seems
to be something epistemically blameworthy about our subject. However, my reaction to this example is
quite different: I fail to see why Sosa's case should trouble anyone, since it seems clear to me that the
27 Sosa (1991),pp. 135-136.
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scenario as described is impossible-that there could not exist a being who counts as having experiences and
beliefs, yet those experiences and beliefs are radically disjoint from one another in the way Sosa imagines.
Moreover, once one tries to explain why such a being could not exist, one soon finds oneself using phrases
like "constitutive connection." Of course, it is one thing to say that a subject cannot have a fully coherent
set of beliefs that are wildly at odds with most of her experiences, and quite another to say that, after ideal
reflection, a subject cannot believe that she feels cold without really feeling cold. But I take Sosa's example
to strongly motivate the idea that there must be some sort of modal connection between the phenomenal
and the cognitive realms. Whether that connection is a constitutive one, and whether it is a tight enough
connection to block Williamson's argument, is a topic for another day.
Note, however, that even if Williamson were somehow able to prove that the relevant constitutive
connection does not hold between the obtaining of the condition that one feels cold and one's believing that
the condition obtains, in order to extend his anti-luminosity argument to other conditions he would need
to argue, on a case by case basis, that an analogous constitutive connection does not exist for each
condition to which he applies the argument. For example, in order to use a coarse-grained version of the
anti-luminosity argument to show that the condition it is rational for one to believe that p is not luminous,
Williamson would have to establish that the following is not the case:
(R-CON) If one has done everything one can to decide whether it is rational for one to believe
that p, then one believes that it is rational for one to believe that p only if it is, in fact,
rational for one to believe thatp.
But for those who have internalist persuasions, the idea that in the limit of inquiry one cannot be wrong
about what it is rational for one to believe is extremely plausible. So it will be dialectically difficult, if not
impossible, to use a coarse-grained version of the anti-luminosity argument to motivate an externalist
conception of rationality according to which it can be rational for one to believe that p despite one's not
being in a position to know that it is rational for one to so believe. And similar comments apply to
attempts to use the anti-luminosity argument (whether in its coarse-grained or fine-grained form) to show
that various other conditions, such as that it appears to one that q or that words X and r have the same meaning for
one, are not luminous: the constitutive connection that Williamson must deny in order to make his
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argument work is often precisely what is at stake in claiming that the given condition is luminous.
Few would doubt that a version of Williamson's argument can establish that an external-world
condition such as that the temperature outside is less than 90 TF is not luminous. We can imagine a morning on
which the outside temperature starts at 700 F and then slowly warms up to 110 0 F, all while a given subject
does nothing but carefully attend to whether the temperature outside feels to be less than 90 0F. In this
case, the analogue of (MAR) obviously holds: if at any time on the given morning one knows that the
temperature outside is less than 90TF, then one millisecond later the temperature must still be less than
90TF. Even if somehow one stops believing that the temperature outside is less than 90'F at precisely the
point at which the temperature first reaches 90TF, or even if one's degree of confidence in that proposition
suddenly takes a sharp drop when the proposition first becomes false, such an occurrence would seem to
be nothing more than a fortuitous accident: given the inexactness of our abilities to detect the external
temperature around us, there must be some sufficiently similar situations in which one does not stop
believing (or in which one's degree of confidence does not significantly drop) at that first point at which
the outside temperature stops being less than 900 F. It is only a short step from there to concluding that,
regardless of what one's coarse- or fine-grained beliefs are like in the actual world, on the given morning
one does not know that the temperature outside is less than 90oF if one millisecond later it is not.
However, for the defender of luminosity, it is not a fortuitous accident that, when one carefully
considers the matter, one's beliefs about whether one feels cold perfectly line up with the facts about
whether one feels cold. That this could happen would seem miraculous if one holds an inner perception model
of self-knowledge according to which introspection is fundamentally no different from perception via the five
senses: if our faculty for forming beliefs about our own mental states were essentially just an eye turned
inward, then given the inevitable inexactness of our external perceptual faculties, it would seem that our
inner belief-forming mechanisms must be irremediably inexact as well. But few, if any, of Williamson's
targets hold such a conception of self-knowledge. 28 Thus for most defenders of luminosity claims there is
an important disanalogy between Williamson's argument as applied to the condition that the temperature
28 For a survey of the various views of self-knowledge that do not involve an inner perception model, see Gertler (2003).
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outside is less than 90 oF and his argument as applied to a condition such as that one feels cold: in the latter case
it is one's own mind that one is forming beliefs about, and one does not do this by standing outside of
oneself, as it were, and using a quasi-perceptual faculty to detect the goings-on within. 29
One of the upshots of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument is supposed to be that, because we
have no cognitive home of mental states whose obtaining we are always in a position to know of, the type
of epistemic access we have to our own mental states is qualitatively no different from the type of
epistemic access we have to external-world conditions-the difference is a matter of degree, not of kind.
But if my arguments are correct, then there is a sense in which for Williamson's anti-luminosity argument
to have any chance of succeeding, he must already assume that conclusion, since he must assume that
there is not a special, tight connection between, say, our feelings of cold and our beliefs about those
feelings, or between the degree to which we feel cold and the degree to which we believe that we feel cold.
If Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds, then it is possible for us to be epistemically disengaged
(that is, disengaged at the level of knowledge) from our minds, the meanings of our words, and what
rationality demands of us; but he can only establish that conclusion by assuming that, even after ideal
reflection, we can be doxastical~y disengaged (that is, disengaged at the level of belief) from our minds, the
meanings of our words, and the demands of rationality.
7. Coda: The Lustrous and the Luminous
I would like to end with a few brief comments about the scope of Williamson's argument.
I take the arguments in §§4-6 to show that Williamson does not successfully demonstrate that
every non-trivial condition is non-luminous. However, even if I am wrong and Williamson's argument
does succeed in showing, say, that one can be in pain without being in a position to know that one is pain,
it would not follow that we could use an analogous argument to show that one can be in pain without
being in a position to justifiably believe that one is in pain. Continuing with Williamson's light-giving
2 If Williamson's epistemicist theory of vagueness is false, there will be a second important disanalogy between Williamson's
argument as applied to the condition that the temperature outside is less than 90 oF and his argument as applied to a condition such as
that one flels cold, since the former but not the latter condition will have a sharp cut-off point between the cases in which it obtains
and those in which it does not.
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metaphor, let us say that a condition C is lustrous if and only if the following holds:
(**) For every case a, if in a condition C obtains, then in a one is in a position to justifiably
believe that C obtains.
A condition that is lustrous shines of its own accord, though not necessarily as brightly as one that is
luminous, for the two notions can pull apart: one's position could be such that, if one were to believe that
the condition in question obtains, then one's belief would be justified, without the justification that one
would thereby have being sufficient to make one's true belief constitute knowledge. And though
Williamson's argument might (perhaps) show that the condition that one feels cold is not luminous, a parallel
argument cannot be used to show that the condition that one feels cold is not lustrous, for while it might
(perhaps) be true that knowledge requires safety from error, it is completely implausible to suppose that justifed
belief requires safety from error.
Or rather, it is completely implausible to suppose that justified belief requires safety from error,
given the common assumption that it is possible to justifiably believe a falsehood. According to the safety
requirement on knowledge, one knows that p in a given case a only if in some set of sufficiently similar
cases, it is true that p. What determines that set will vary depending on which version of the safety
constraint one is working with: perhaps it is all sufficiently similar cases in which one believes that p, or all
sufficiently similar cases in which one believes that p on a sufficiently similar basis as in a, or all sufficiently
similar cases in which one's degree of confidence that p is at most slightly less than in a. (See §§4-5 above.)
But regardless of how one determines the set of sufficiently similar cases, a will itself be among that set, for
a itself is as similar as a case can be to a, and it is trivially true that in a one believes that p on the same
basis and with the same degree of confidence as one believes that p in a. For this reason, the safety
requirement for knowledge implies that knowledge is factive: one knows that p in some case a only if it is
true that p in a. And a safety requirement for justified belief would have exactly the same implication:
according to such a constraint, one is justified in believing that p in a case a only if in some set of
sufficiently similar cases, it is true that p; as a will be among that set, it will follow that justified belief is
factive. However, 'we can be justified in believing falsehoods: for instance, I might be justified in believing
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that my copy of Knowledge and Its Limits is sitting on my desk at home even if this belief is false because,
unbeknownst to me, someone broke into my apartment and stole the book. So there can be no safety
constraint forjustified belief.3 0
Thus if we try to show that the condition that one feels cold is not lustrous by running an argument
parallel to the one that Williamson uses to argue that that condition is not luminous, we will be unable to
appeal to a safety requirement for justified belief in order to secure the analogue of premise (MAR), which
would read as follows:
J-MAR) For every integer i (0 : i < n), if in ai one is justified in believing that one feels cold,
then in ai+1 one feels cold.
(J-MAR) simply does not have the same plausibility as (MAR). It seems perfectly plausible that one could
not feel cold in a~i+ and yet have been justified in believing one millisecond earlier that one felt cold;
indeed, if aci+ is one of the first few cases on the morning in question in which it is not the case that one
feels cold, it seems perfectly plausible that one will still be justified in believing that one feels cold in ai+i
itself and in any number of cases a few milliseconds later.3 1
Therefore a parallel version of the anti-luminosity argument cannot be used to argue that the
condition that onefeels cold is not lustrous-that is, to argue against the claim that whenever one feels cold,
one is in a position to justifiably believe that one feels cold. Williamson, however, is likely to be
unbothered by this result: after all, one of the chief slogans of his book is "knowledge first" (p. v). For
Williamson it is knowledge that is fundamental in all epistemic matters, and interest in justification is only
derivative or secondary. However, it is tempting to see Williamson's anti-luminosity argument as some
kind of devastating attack on foundationalism, and it is important to realize that this is simply not the case:
most contemporary foundationalists are foundationalists with respect to justification, and Williamson's
argument leaves justificatory foundationalism completely untouched. For instance, according to James
Pryor's version of modest foundationalism, "whenever you have an experience as of p's being the case,
30 Note that false beliefs can be justified even on Williamson's view according to which (i) evidence is what justifies belief, and
(ii) one's evidence is all and only what one knows ("E = K"): even though on this view one's evidence only consists of true
propositions, in some circumstances that evidence might be misleading and thus probabilify falsehoods.
31 For this reason, appealing to an alleged safety requirement for justified true belief will not help the anti-lustrousness
argument, either.
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you thereby have immediate (prima facie) justification for believing p."32 And we could easily imagine
someone defending the related foundationalist view that whenever one has an experience as of p's being
the case, one thereby has immediate primafacie justification for believing that one has an experience as ofp's
being the case. Williamson's argument poses no threat to such claims. When Williamson insists that we are
cognitively homeless, what he means is that we are cognitively homeless with respect to our knowledge of what
conditions obtain: even if his argument works (and it doesn't: see §§4-6), we might still have a cognitive home
with respect to matters ofjustification. I leave it open how satisfactory a cognitive home that would be.
32 Pryor (2000), p. 532.
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